
Unpacking “Escalation”
Contextualizing the Intensity of Israel’s War in the North
To a certain extent, Israel has been at war with Iran and its network of proxies, including Hezbollah, since October 8. But even with Israel having launched a ground operation in southern Lebanon and Iran having responded with an unprecedented ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1, the fighting has not passed the threshold of so-called מלחמה כוללת (milhama kolelet), or all-out war.
The question is not if the two sides are at war, but to what degree.
Illusion of Quiet
August 2006 – October 2023
From the end of the Second Lebanon War in August 2006 until October 7, 2023, the Israel-Lebanon border was largely quiet. But the absence of armed conflict did not mean peace. In violation of UNSCR 1701, Hezbollah established a military presence directly on the border with Israel and invested heavily in arming itself for future conflict, with support from Iran. In its rhetoric, Hezbollah reportedly made it clear that it remained committed to its aspiration of destroying Israel.
In the year before October 7, Hezbollah became increasingly brazen in its provocations. In March 2023, a terrorist infiltrated Israel and carried out a terror attack at Megiddo junction, 60 kilometers south of the border. Last summer, Israel made public that Hezbollah had established small military outposts inside Israeli territory in the contested Har Dov area. Israeli officials and analysts warned that the country would likely be forced to confront Hezbollah sometime in the near future.
Limited Cross-Border Warfare
October 2023 – September 2024
Hezbollah began launching anti-tank missiles at Israel’s communities adjacent to the border on October 8, in a show of solidarity with Hamas’ terror invasion. It did not, however, mimic the October 7 attack as many had feared. Israel evacuated communities within 5 km of the border and struck Hezbollah targets on the Lebanese side. This palpable but reserved response led to a war of attrition: tit-for-tat cross-border warfare at low intensity, at least compared to the sides’ full capabilities. Hezbollah maintained it would continue its attacks until Israel ended its war in Gaza.
The two sides gradually pushed the bounds of this equation: Israel growing bolder in targeted assassination of Hezbollah officials and hitting terror targets deeper in Lebanon, Hezbollah increasing the intensity of its missile and rocket attacks, at one point tragically killing 12 Druze children in the Golan. But the desire to avoid an escalation encouraged both sides to exercise restraint, even in the face of pressure to respond to provocations.

Breaking the Equation
September 2024
Israel’s cabinet voted on September 16 to define the safe return of the evacuees from the north as an official war aim. In the days since, Israel escalated the war to the next stage, breaking the equation by hitting the terror group hard to take out senior leaders and disrupt its operations. Israel has racked up a series of impressive tactical victories since it entered this phase—including the elimination of Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah—although these alone won’t translate into the evacuees being able to return home.
Hezbollah responded by expanding the range of its attacks on Israel but refrained from carrying out a full-on attack on Israel, possibly under pressure from Iran to avoid a wider conflagration that would expend its full capabilities.
Timeline of IDF operations leading up to the ground invasion:
- Sept 17-18: Thousands of Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies explode
- Sept 19: IDF attacks 1,000 Hezbollah launchers
- Sept 20: Hezbollah special operations commander Ibrahim Aqil eliminated
- Sept 23-24: Wave of IDF attacks on Hezbollah, killing hundreds in Lebanon
- Sept 24: Hezbollah missile unit commander Ibrahim Kobeissi eliminated
- Sept 26: Hezbollah aerial commander Mohammad Sarour eliminated
- Sept 27: Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and handful of top officials eliminated in strike on Hezbollah headquarters in Dahiyeh
- Sept 30: Ground operation begins

Limited Ground Operation
October 2024
After two weeks of military achievements against Hezbollah, Israel has escalated the war to the next phase: a ground operation on Lebanese soil. But an Israeli incursion into Lebanon has not equated to all-out war. For the time being, Israel is limiting its operations to villages immediately adjacent to the border that Hezbollah had been preparing as a staging ground for terror invasion of northern Israel. The IDF has expanded its strikes on Hezbollah targets in Beirut and the Beqaa Valley, and in recent days deployed thousands more troops.
Sooner or later, the end game of this war will most likely be a ceasefire agreement that resets the clock to 2006 and ensures Hezbollah’s recompliance with UNSCR 1701 removal from the border. Long-term stability would also likely require internal political changes in Lebanon that shift the balance of power on the ground among the various Lebanese factions. Hezbollah would be in a far weaker state and meaningfully deterred, at least for the time being, with its preparations for an October 7-style invasion having been thwarted. Dismantling Hezbollah entirely is likely not realistic given Israel’s manpower, political, and diplomatic constraints.
However, there are signs that Israel could broaden its aims, including the steady increase of troops being sent to the north and Prime Minister Netanyahu recently publishing a video calling for the Lebanese people to overthrow Hezbollah.

All-Out War
Israel’s current calculus could also change if Hezbollah musters a full-scale assault on Israel, including by unleashing its full missile and rocket arsenal—much of which probably still remains intact—at Israeli population centers and critical infrastructure. In response, Israel would have to expand the goals of its ground operation to defeat Hezbollah, along with the Lebanese state that serves as its front, just as it set out to uproot Hamas in Gaza. This would be all-out war. It could come as part of a wider regional escalation between Israel and Iran. In such an event, how Israel could extricate itself from the mud while ensuring a strategic success is far from evident.



