Key:

1. Give the PA responsibilities in Gaza

The PA should provide services alongside and in coordination with the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), such as manning the Rafah crossing, rubble removal, vaccinations, and repairing WASH infrastructure. This will improve the humanitarian situation and help the new Gaza administration operate efficiently, while paving the way for an eventual PA return following a successful reform program as envisioned by the 20-Point Plan.

2.  Leverage U.S. support to improve the effectiveness of the U.N. and restore workable U.N.-Israel ties to establish an effective and coordinated humanitarian aid distribution mechanism

The 20-Point Plan (Point 8) calls for humanitarian aid to run through U.N. agencies and the Red Crescent, necessitating a renewed and repaired U.N.-Israel relationship and having the U.N. better coordinate aid distribution in the absence of UNRWA. With every aid organization handling their own security, logistics, and procedures without a larger coordinating mechanism for aid organizations and state actors, there is inefficiency and waste, making it easier for Hamas to divert and capture aid. Reestablishing the U.N. as a coordinating body will also help the eventual transition away from the CMCC as the new institutions called for in the 20-Point Plan take shape.

3. Use OSC to train a Gaza security force

The Office of the Security Coordinator (formerly the U.S. Security Coordinator) already exists while the International Stabilization Force is still in formation. Even once the ISF is up and running, OSC has decades of experience with successfully training Palestinian security forces and putting them into the field. The role of the OSC in Gaza should be clarified in terms of its responsibilities and interaction with the CMCC and the ISF, and its budget should be expanded to account for any new Gaza-based role.

4. Incentivize voluntary disarmament as the first stage of a larger disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program

Elements of Hamas—renegade splinter groups, or even much of the military wing, absent a broader agreement—will ultimately need to be confronted by a new security architecture. Still, the opening phase of Point 13 implementation should prioritize incentivized, voluntary disarmament under agreed, realistic, and clearly resourced targets that demilitarize Gaza without claiming to eliminate every light weapon. This would start with collecting heavy weapons, mapping militant infrastructure, establishing centralized handover sites, and instituting a buy-back program tied to reintegration. In parallel, vetted and newly trained Palestinian police and security forces would deploy to restore law and order, while the International Stabilization Force (ISF) monitors implementation and, where necessary and within its mandate, enforces agreed demilitarization as part of a phased, conditions-based transition.

5. Set clear guidelines on Israel’s freedom of action

The IDF is still operating in Gaza’s Red Zone (the Hamas-controlled zone west of the Yellow Line) and wants to retain freedom of action to address threats from Hamas, but the situation remains murky in terms of how and when the IDF decides to act. The U.S. and Israel should come to a clear understanding and protocol for when, where, and how the IDF can act west of the Yellow Line, and how this will be coordinated with the Board of Peace through the Gaza Executive Board and the ISF. Establishing guidelines ahead of time is particularly critical for lining up countries to participate in the ISF, which will be impossible without clear procedures and rules of engagement.

6. Crack down on Iranian and Turkish financing and Egyptian drone smuggling routes to choke off all possible support for Hamas 

While Hamas benefits financially from taxing commercial goods and humanitarian assistance, it also stays afloat through smuggling and overseas financial support. The U.S. should continue to disrupt Iranian financial networks that funnel money to Hamas while taking a much harder line with Turkey on Hamas financial activities conducted on its territory and using Turkish assets in Gaza. The U.S. should also demand, and support, Egyptian military efforts in the Sinai aimed at disrupting drone traffic that is smuggling arms and illicit materials into Gaza.

7. Expand OSC’s mandate and bring it into the Rafah crossing

The 20-Point Plan calls for the Palestinian Authority to man the Rafah border crossing once it reopens (Point 8), but implementation and monitoring should be overseen by OSC rather than the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). OSC has a demonstrated track record of working with the PA and monitoring its activities, and has built up a level of trust with Israel and Egypt that leaves it well-placed to serve as an observer monitoring PA compliance with relevant agreements for Rafah.

8. Begin deploying ISF on the Israeli side of the Yellow Line

Assuming the ISF is stood up before Hamas is disarmed, in accordance with the 20-Point Plan, it should deploy first on the Israeli side in the Green Zone in order to establish security zones from which the IDF can then pull back. The envisioned planned communities for Palestinians in the Green Zone will only attract residents if there is no visible IDF presence and if a legitimate and effective Palestinian governance structure is in place. Deploying the ISF on the Israeli side where possible will also allow reconstruction and nascent governance structures (the newly created NCAG) to be implemented without the added pressure of Hamas disarmament.

9. Anchor Gaza’s Civil Administration in the Basic Law

Even if the PA does not yet exercise formal governance in Gaza, it remains essential that core sovereign functions continue to operate under the Palestinian Basic Law and the single Israeli-Palestinian legal framework that links Gaza and the West Bank. In practice, this means the PA must retain responsibility for basic civil registries—population records, identity systems, and issuance of biometric passports—functions no other body is legally or administratively equipped to perform. Entrusting these authorities to a separate body would create a de facto legal and institutional rupture between Gaza and the West Bank, erode the Basic Law’s territorial continuity, and harden political separation at precisely the moment when a future Israeli-Palestinian settlement requires administrative and legal coherence across both territories.

10. Double down on PA economic reforms in order to prepare for an eventual governance role in Gaza

It is imperative that the PA take the reform process seriously if it is to have any reasonable chance of successfully returning to Gaza. The U.S. should tap into business and private-sector expertise to accelerate PA reforms, particularly in governance, public-service delivery, and economic management. Drawing on lessons from U.S. experiences in public-sector modernization and institutional reform, the U.S. can support the PA by fostering partnerships with American businesses that bring proven strategies in financial management, public administration, and infrastructure development. This collaboration could involve deploying U.S. experts to guide reform processes, sharing best practices, and using private-sector innovation to improve efficiency and transparency in PA institutions.

11. Negotiate specific benchmarks for future IDF withdrawals

The 20-Point Plan calls for phased IDF withdrawals from Gaza, but it is unclear what will trigger them. The U.S. and other relevant actors should come to an agreement with Israel that sets out hard benchmarks and targets that must be met before the IDF withdraws further east of the Yellow Line, tied to standards, milestones, and timeframes related to deployment of the ISF, Palestinian forces, or Hamas disarmament.

12. Prioritize road building and repairing water and power infrastructure

The key to better humanitarian aid provision and effectively functioning security forces is being able to transit through Gaza and providing basic living standards. Roads should continue to be prioritized in reconstruction, and power and water systems should be stabilized as an immediate priority. Without these moves, providing for basic human needs and establishing a baseline of law and order will prove elusive.

13. Crack down on settler violence in the West Bank

Sidelining Hamas includes not only security and political strategies in Gaza, but also cutting off the supply of rhetorical fuel for a resistance narrative. The biggest culprit in this regard is settler violence, which is escalating to new heights and has routinely been ignored, or even backed, by the Israeli government and not taken sufficiently seriously by the IDF. There must be a zero-tolerance policy on settler violence, with culprits not only arrested, but prosecuted and jailed.

14. Send a State Department verification team to Ramallah to assess the PA’s state of compliance with Taylor Force

Verifying PA compliance with ending prisoner and martyr payments is the first step to any productive U.S. engagement with the PA going forward. Once there is enough track record in place (1-2 quarters) and preliminary investigations conclude, the U.S. should send a State and Treasury team to conduct a strict and comprehensive audit of the Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Initiative (often referred to as Tamkeen, Arabic for empowerment), which the PA claims is now overseeing a transformed needs-based social welfare system. The goal of such an audit is twofold: first, to establish that the new needs-based system is working as intended, and second, to ensure that the old system has not continued under a new name or through a different PA or PLO agency.

15. Help the PA pass a political party law

Palestinian elections in the next couple of years will be counterproductive without a more robust political system, which starts with creating the possibility of more political engagement and bringing new actors into the political arena. Otherwise, holding elections risks a repeat of the 2006 mistake of pushing elections before the system was ready for it, which is what empowered Hamas. The U.S. should work with the PA on a political parties law that requires renouncing all forms of violence, committing to peaceful political engagement, and adhering to the PLO’s political platform, including a negotiated two-state outcome. It should also explicitly prohibit political entities from acquiring or maintaining weapons and mandate the transfer of all factional arms to a national security structure.

16. Prevent PA financial collapse

The Israeli government has taken a variety of measures that have put unprecedented pressure on the PA’s ability to operate, including freezing transfers of tax revenues collected by Israel on the PA’s behalf and enacting new financial sanctions on PA officials. A PA financial collapse is incongruent with the 20-Point Plan’s vision for an ultimate PA return to Gaza following a reform process. The U.S. should press Israel to transfer all tax revenues required under agreements and Israeli law (excluding prisoner and martyr payments offsets), extend correspondent banking either through a longer-term waiver or utilizing a separate state financial institution for correspondent banking operations, and increase the cap on cash transfers to Israel.

17. Set a firm principle of unity of Palestinian territory

Irrespective of when or even if the PA returns to Gaza, the U.S. should clearly state that its vision is for Gaza and the West Bank to eventually be a single administrative unit, rather than cater to fantasies about a three-state solution or a Gaza-only solution for Palestinians. Without a political vision for a Palestinian future, regional actors will be reluctant to support the necessary elements of the 20-Point Plan or commit resources to help transition Gaza away from Hamas and to a more productive status.

18. Secure an Israeli commitment to have only one armed central actor in Gaza

Disarming Hamas will be hard enough without Gaza being awash in even more weapons and prone to cycles of retribution, but Israel’s arming of different groups and clans in an effort to weaken Hamas has only resulted in a greater militarization of the territory. The eventual aim should be a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, first by the ISF aiding a Palestinian security force, and eventually by a post-transitional government. All relevant actors, including Israel, should commit now to this principle.

19. Ensure that the Board of Peace has representative regional membership in order to put regional normalization back on track

Further normalization between Israel and regional actors is currently frozen, but it is imperative to have political conversations and engagement in order to lay the groundwork for the process to resume once specific policy problems have been overcome. Having broad regional representation on the Board of Peace will create more touchpoints and opportunities for cooperation between Israel and Arab states, paving the way for a new round of normalization once Gaza is stabilized and other political obstacles have been removed.

20. Make the new planned Green Zone communities as attractive as possible by removing any visible IDF presence

If Palestinians are expected to move to Green Zone communities, the IDF must be outside populated areas, governance must be handled by Palestinians, and economic activity must run through non-Israeli entities. This will require the ISF to be established before any new planned communities are completed, the Palestinian technocratic administration to be set up, and a skeleton Palestinian security force to be deployed.