July 11, 2025
One of the core issues in the ongoing Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks in Doha is humanitarian aid. Both Israel and Hamas agree that Israel would massively increase the amount of aid allowed into Gaza during a ceasefire, but there is a dispute over the distribution mechanism: the U.S.- and Israel-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), the U.N. facilitated mechanism, or both. Hamas is diametrically opposed to the GHF and demands that all aid go through the U.N. mechanism, giving it a chance to continue to tax and hoard aid. Israel wants to prioritize the GHF, however flawed, to damage Hamas’ governance while allowing some U.N. distribution to continue in northern and central Gaza. Aid has long been politicized by both Israel and Hamas, and because it is a core point of contention in the ceasefire talks, there is an incentive to keep the status quo ante until an agreement is finalized.
However, more aid is urgently needed in Gaza. Outside of a few commodities in southern Gaza, food prices continue to rise and, as even Prime Minister Netanyahu acknowledged, any aid distribution will remain chaotic and insecure until Gazans have both a sufficient supply of essentials and confidence that it will not be cut off soon. The GHF and U.N. mechanisms can and should cooperate with and complement each other, and both Israel and the international community can take practical steps to improve the situation.
Post-January Ceasefire Gaza Humanitarian Aid
A 42-day ceasefire between Israel and Hamas went into effect on January 19, 2025, and was slated to move to a second phase on March 1 via continued negotiations. Between January 19 and March 2, Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activity in the Territories (COGAT), the military body responsible for civilian affairs in Gaza and the West Bank, reported that 25,200 aid trucks (600 trucks/day) carrying 447,538 tons of aid entered the Strip. This included 339,000 tons of food aid. However, this reflects only how much aid entered, not the more practical metric of how much was collected, brought to warehouses, and distributed.
When negotiations stalled and Israel cut off aid shipments between March 2 and May 19, the humanitarian situation again deteriorated, drawing international condemnation. The situation worsened further when fighting resumed on March 18. Israel argued that the quantity of aid that entered Gaza during the ceasefire was sufficient for an extended period, and prepared to implement the new GHF aid mechanism.
On May 19, Israel allowed the transfer of aid into Gaza to resume through the southern Kerem Shalom crossing. This aid, which amounts to 3,285 trucks as of July 10, is distributed by two competing mechanisms: the GHF and the U.N.-facilitated mechanism.
Dueling Mechanisms: The GHF and U.N. Aid Mechanisms
GHF Mechanism
The GHF, which launched operations on May 27, continues to operate four distribution sites: three in southern Gaza near the border between Khan Younis and Rafah (named Tel al-Sultan, Saudi Neighborhood, and Khan Younis), and one in the Netzarim area of central Gaza (named Wadi Gaza). The Tel al-Sultan site has been closed since mid-June, possibly due to specific security challenges with the road approaching the site, while the other three are open most days. Since mid-June, the Khan Younis site has distributed an average of 750,000 meal equivalents daily when open, the Saudi site has distributed 620,000 daily, and the Wadi Gaza site, which is open less frequently, distributes roughly 460,000 meal equivalents daily.
As of July 10, the GHF says it has distributed 69.1 million meal equivalents in nearly 1.2 million packages, the equivalent of roughly 1,250 truckloads of aid. This represents around 40% of the total number of trucks entering Gaza with food aid since May 19. The GHF calculates that each truckload holds 960 aid packages, each of which contains the ingredients for 57.5 meals, or enough for a family of five for half a week. The aid typically includes dry goods like pasta, lentils, flour, and rice, as well as canned vegetables, tahini, sugar, and cooking oil. While most aid is distributed in boxes, the GHF began a pilot program in July to distribute potatoes at the sites as well, and said it had distributed some 246 tons by July 10.
On July 9, the GHF announced it had completed a pilot program to distribute aid directly via community leaders who brought registered lists of recipients, aided by local NGOs like the al-Amal Charity. The GHF plans to expand this program, which relies on local leaders and NGOs to proactively reach out to the GHF to assess their needs and then provide them with aid to distribute throughout Gaza.
Despite these figures, the GHF mechanism remains subject to many of the same problems Israel Policy Forum outlined last month: unpredictable hours and site openings, capacity issues and overcrowding, and danger both for Gazans and GHF workers.
GHF has improved its outreach, activating its website, garnering 135,000 Facebook followers, and launching an X account with 11,000 followers and a new Telegram account (several popular fakes were created in the meantime). However, site schedules remain inconsistent and the combination of short notice, long and dangerous journeys to distribution sites, and the sites running out of food quickly endangers Gazans. They are incentivized to get to aid centers early and first for a chance at receiving food, which contributes to chaos on the roads and nearby areas approaching the sites, all of which are in closed military zones.
The existing distribution sites are insufficient to handle the demand for aid. They exhibit frequent overcrowding and chaos, often closing within two hours of opening after running out of food. Promised new sites in northern Gaza have not materialized. Gazans report that women, children, and the elderly struggle to get aid in the scramble. There are also reports of organized manipulation of the system, with some groups, often armed with sharp objects, taking aid each day rather than once a week.
A separate issue is that the food must be prepared before consumption, which requires potable water, cooking fuel, and kitchen implements that many Gazans lack consistent access to. This limits the efficacy of the aid and may incentivize recipients to exchange the aid for cash with merchants later on, fueling a black market of expensive GHF aid.
Ample social media commentary and videos demonstrate that many recipients strip the aid packages of their most valuable components, such as cooking oil and sugar, for resale while leaving the rest on the ground. This is not a reflection of a lack of need for food, but of the specific interests of those able to repeatedly push to the front of the aid lines, who are doing so for profit. Repeated GHF appeals to obey instructions and instructional videos have not been successful.
Chaos at GHF distribution sites is one factor in the repeated shooting incidents in the vicinity of these sites that the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry claimed had killed 408 Gazans by June 28 and injured nearly 4,200. The IDF disputes Hamas’ casualty figures but is investigating several of these incidents, and recently revamped infrastructure and posted instructions along the routes to sites.
While the military has presented the shooting incidents as crowd control after crowds departed from the approved routes to the distribution sites and approached IDF positions, some reporting has alleged improper and wanton use of force. Israel has sharply denied these allegations. The GHF has strenuously denied that any shooting incidents occurred at the sites themselves, though some reporting, also denied by the GHF, purports to show individual cases of security contractors guarding the sites firing at Gazans.
GHF itself has been targeted by Hamas. 12 GHF employees were killed and more than 20 others injured in a June 12 attack reportedly carried out by operatives from Hamas’ Sahm (Arrow) unit, which is notorious for beating and executing Gazans it accuses of stealing aid or price-gouging. GHF has reported that its personnel and sites have been threatened directly and surveilled by Hamas, and the group has allegedly placed bounties on its staff, including Americans. On July 5, a grenade attack injured two U.S. contractors at the Khan Younis distribution site. Hamas also operates a propaganda campaign against the GHF that condemns shooting incidents, but also promotes conspiracy theories about sugar trap pits and flour laced with narcotics. These efforts increase Gazans’ existing distrust of the GHF, and help Hamas preserve its lucrative grip on aid distribution.
Without forward momentum to build more distribution sites or tackle fundamental problems with communication and procedures, the GHF will continue to struggle on its own merits. Violence, whether committed by Hamas or the IDF, against Gazans or GHF staff will further delegitimize the process. Despite significant GHF outreach, the U.N. and most aid organizations continue to reject cooperation with and condemn it. This is a missed opportunity to enhance aid distribution to Gazans in severe need.
U.N. Mechanism
The U.N.-facilitated aid mechanism, or the UN 2720 mechanism, is a staging, coordination, and tracking mechanism for aid managed by the U.N. Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and part of the Logistics Cluster. It is used by the U.N. and its agencies, state actors, and other humanitarian organizations, and covers food, medical, and other aid that is intended for warehouses, bakeries, and distribution points in north and central Gaza.
Since May 19, this aid has been routed primarily through the southern Kerem Shalom crossing, though the WFP has said they are also bringing aid through the Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza, which is not recorded as such by COGAT. The northern Erez West crossing was active from June 16 to June 25, when videos of gunmen on top of the trucks—reportedly part of an agreement between aid providers and a network of clans to secure the transfers—reignited an Israeli debate over preventing aid from being diverted by Hamas. Though the clans strongly denied that Hamas was involved, Israel cited documents seized in the war showing that Hamas historically drew a percentage from all incoming aid shipments and, following an ultimatum from far-right Finance Minister Smotrich, shut down the northern crossing. However, non-GHF aid has continued to flow through Kerem Shalom.
COGAT data shows that 181 trucks affiliated with state donors entered Gaza between May 19 and July 10. Meanwhile, the U.N. and affiliated agencies brought in 1,332 trucks carrying food, shelters, medicine, and equipment. International organizations, including the GHF, brought in a further 1,772 trucks. Given that the GHF accounts for some 1,250 trucks, this leaves roughly 520 from other organizations. U.N. 2720 data indicates 732 trucks entered under its auspices during June, but it is unclear if their definition for trucks matches COGAT’s.
It is unclear how much aid has actually been delivered to Gazans once it enters Gaza. Large amounts of aid have been looted, either by civilian mobs, armed gangs, or Hamas itself. U.N. 2720 reports that during June, 96% of its recorded aid trucks (1,043/1,090) moving from the border crossings to warehouses or distribution sites were looted in transit. On June 30, WFP reported that some of its convoys had made it to warehouses without being looted for the first time in many weeks.
Diesel shortages further complicate aid pickups and delivery. WFP reported that over 2,650 tons of its aid was waiting for pickup on the Gazan side of the crossings at the end of June. Violent incidents are also a problem in the U.N. mechanism. Some 30% of the aid-related deaths alleged by the Gaza Health Ministry—175 as of June 28—occurred near U.N. convoys or distribution sites.
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that the aid flow allowed for the preparation of some 260,000 meals per day in 81 kitchens across central and northern Gaza in the last week of June, while the WFP and the UAE reached a further 13,000 families directly with food aid. While an improvement, this does not cover Gazans’ basic needs.
Incremental Improvements
Each party—GHF, the U.N. and international humanitarian groups, the IDF, and the Israeli government—can take steps to improve the situation.
The GHF could:
- Expand the number of distribution sites, especially in central and northern Gaza. This relies on approval from the Israeli government, which should expedite the process to improve coverage and reduce overcrowding at each site.
- Expand the range of aid provided. The GHF has begun a trial to provide vegetables, currently potatoes, alongside boxed dry goods at some sites. This is welcome, and could be a potential area of cooperation with other humanitarian actors alongside providing some ready-to-eat meals in the boxes or at the sites.
- Expand the direct distribution model and continue refining delivery mechanisms. The community leader distribution model has significant potential to get aid more precisely to those in need, but is more logistically complex than major distribution sites. The GHF should expand its work with local NGOs to get community leaders involved and help with distribution. There is also potential for other international aid organizations to get involved without the challenges of the main distribution sites.
- Establish a registration system for aid recipients, despite privacy concerns. A persistent complaint from Gazans, who have a lifelong familiarity with aid systems, is the lack of order in aid pickup. GHF chose not to require any recipient information to avoid spooking Gazans concerned that the information might be used to target them. However, this allows persistent abuse of the system by those collecting aid daily and stripping it of high-value items for resale. A basic registration system would create new possibilities:
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- Metered aid distribution: To avoid massive crowds along the roads leading to the distribution sites in the pre-dawn hours, recipients scheduled for pickup could be assigned a time to arrive at the site. This could reduce the number of security and shooting incidents on the routes to the sites, and would allow for aid to be distributed throughout the day without crowding or stampedes.
- Specific days, or hours for women and the elderly: These groups have struggled to pick up aid amidst the chaos at the distribution sites, and reserving days or windows for them at specific sites would allow for a more equitable distribution of aid.
- Prevent repeat offenders: Profiteers or organized criminal groups would have a harder time exploiting the aid mechanism since they would not be able to pick up aid every day, and with less crowding, GHF staff or contractors could more easily enforce the rules of the site.
The IDF could:
- Improve and expand communication of procedures: Changes to signage and infrastructure on the routes to aid sites are important but insufficient. Reiterating instructions to Gazans via loudspeaker and amplifying GHF social media messaging can also help, as can informing soldiers operating in these areas of what to expect when.
- Establish clear rules of engagement for soldiers operating near distribution sites & hold accountable those who disobey. Shooting incidents must be investigated promptly and seriously, with lessons about use-of-force, communication, and operations swiftly implemented. Keeping non-essential operations away from aid routes before and during distribution hours and tightening policies on warning shots and use of force would limit violent incidents.
- Coordinate with and improve access for humanitarian aid missions. Improved humanitarian coordination is also key—57% of humanitarian access missions were rejected or withdrawn in June.
On July 6, the Israeli government approved the expansion of U.N.-facilitated aid provision in Gaza, including additional crossings and more trucks, reportedly as part of an arrangement with the EU. This is a positive development, and should be followed up by:
- Providing consistent and set times for aid organizations to pick up aid at the crossings.
- Facilitating access by specific trusted humanitarian actors to the roughly 1.9 million liters of diesel that UNOPS reports is in Gaza, which would speed up aid collection and distribution.
The U.N. and international humanitarian organizations, rather than simply criticizing the GHF, should accept that it is unlikely to disappear soon, barring a sharp reversal or rapid implementation of a new post-war administration in Gaza. It is in the interest of Gazans and aid organizations alike that all aid mechanisms improve and succeed, including the GHF. The U.N. and GHF mechanisms should interact professionally and collaboratively, whether in the form of advice, technical cooperation, or joint missions. The GHF’s new direct distribution model could easily be augmented by international organizations, who could route some types of aid alongside the GHF while maintaining their distribution networks in other parts of Gaza.
Aid and Ceasefire
With or without a breakthrough in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations in Doha, both the GHF and U.N. aid mechanisms are struggling with capacity, security, and consistency, threatening further deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Both mechanisms are necessary to ensure Gazans receive enough aid, and both will need to operate in a dangerous and complex environment in Gaza for months if not years.
A ceasefire will improve Gaza’s aid issues, but they remain severe and likely to persist for months or years. Time is short to make practical improvements to the GHF and integrate it more effectively with the U.N.-facilitated aid mechanism, ensuring Gazans can receive badly needed aid in a safe manner, in sufficient quantities, and with a stable horizon until a new post-war administration can be implemented.