Background

Since October 7, Israel has engaged in constant military confrontations with Hezbollah along the Israel-Lebanon border. 

Following Hamas’ October 7 invasion, many in Israel feared that Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies would unleash the full extent of their capabilities on Israel, leading to the rapid evacuation of 62,000 Israelis from towns and communities within five kilometers of the border with Lebanon.

However, the scenario of a Hezbollah attack did not come to fruition. On October 11, 2023, Israel’s war cabinet reportedly called off a planned preemptive strike on Hezbollah due to pressure from Ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, opposition members who had joined the government in the aftermath of the Hamas attack.

Between October 7, 2023, and the start of the ground operation in Lebanon, Hezbollah launched some 12,400 rockets and hundreds of drones at Israeli population centers in the north—to which Israel responded by striking close to 11,000 Hezbollah military targets, mostly close to the border but occasionally deeper into Lebanon. As conflict intensified, over 113,000 Lebanese living near the border fled their homes. By September 17, Hezbollah attacks had killed 46 people in Israel (26 civilians and 20 soldiers), while by September 25 Israeli strikes had killed at least 800 militants from Hezbollah and other groups, along with over 100 civilians. 

Hezbollah is believed to have far greater capabilities than Hamas, including a pre-war estimate of 150,000 rockets. While the majority of this arsenal are relatively short-range rockets and mortars, an estimated 10-15% can reach population centers in central Israel, and several thousand are believed to be precision-guided munitions. Hezbollah also possesses a range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including Iranian-made suicide drones, which existing Israeli air-defense systems often struggle to intercept. Hezbollah had an estimated pre-war fighting force of between 40,000-50,000 operatives, including several thousand in its elite Radwan Force, and large quantities of small arms, RPGs, anti-tank guided missiles, and other munitions.

Summer 2024: Drifting Toward Escalation

After months of cross-border fire, a July 27 Hezbollah strike on a soccer field in the Druze town of Majdal Shams on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights—which killed 12 children and injured dozens of others—led to a new period of escalation. Three days later, Israel assassinated Hezbollah military leader Fuad Shukr in the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiyeh in southern Beirut, and killed Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran less than 24 hours afterward.

While Hezbollah’s retaliation for Shukr’s assassination was considered fairly insignificant, in part due to preemptive Israeli strikes that destroyed many launchers right before they were set to fire,  Israel’s tolerance for the status quo in the north was already strained to the breaking point. Political pressure to return evacuees who had been displaced from their homes for almost a year was at a fever pitch, and the policy of focusing on Gaza over the north was coming to an end as high-intensity fighting in Rafah, the last frontier of the IDF’s ground operation, was wrapping up. With a ceasefire in Gaza that might have lowered tensions in the north elusive, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant indicated that the IDF’s attention would shift to the north.

Escalation into War: September 2024

With the window for a hostage-ceasefire deal seemingly having passed, due to Hamas’ intransigence and new conditions imposed by Netanyahu amid pressure from the far right, Hezbollah and Israel both intensified their aerial attacks throughout September. On September 16, the cabinet voted to officially confirm the safe return of the evacuees from the north as an official aim of the war. On September 17 and 18, thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah exploded across Lebanon and in parts of Syria. Widely attributed to Israel, this unprecedented attack killed 39 people and wounded more than 3,400, including as many as 3,000 Hezbollah members, and dealt a serious blow to Hezbollah’s communications and operations. The following day, Israel carried out a targeted strike in Dahiyeh which killed top commander Ibrahim Aqil—who had taken over for Fuad Shukr and oversaw the Radwan commando force—along with 15 other Hezbollah leaders. 

Fighting quickly escalated to levels not seen since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Hezbollah expanded the range of its aerial attacks on Israel, targeting Haifa, its suburbs, and the southern Galilee for the first time since the start of the war. In parallel, Israel struck thousands of rocket launcher barrels and other military targets, primarily in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. 

On September 23, Israel declared the start of Operation Northern Arrows and established a special state of emergency across the country. Over the next week, the air force struck well over 2,300 Hezbollah targets, including the group’s intelligence directorate operations, weapons depots, rocket launchers, and Lebanon-Syria border crossings Hezbollah used to transfer weapons. The IDF also warned Lebanese civilians to leave areas where Hezbollah operates or stores weapons, including several buildings in Beirut that it later struck. Israel also called up two reserve brigades to bolster its ground forces in the north.

Simultaneously, Israel continued to carry out targeted assassinations of Hezbollah leaders, killing the head of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile division Ibrahim Qubaisi and his deputy, the commander and deputy of the missile unit in southern Lebanon, and the head of Hezbollah’s Aerial Command and responsible for UAVs. This culminated in a massive strike on Hezbollah’s central headquarters in Dahiyeh on September 27 that killed Hezbollah’s leader since 1992 Hassan Nasrallah, the commander of the group’s southern front Ali Karaki, and at least 20 other Hezbollah operatives. The next day, Israel eliminated the leaders and deputies of Hezbollah’s medium-range missile and precision missile units, completing the decapitation of Hezbollah’s entire rocket and missile force. On September 29, Israel killed Nabil Qaouk, head of Hezbollah’s internal security apparatus, and eliminated the heads of Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) operations in Lebanon the following day.

Within two weeks, Israel effectively eliminated Hezbollah’s military leadership echelon, dealt significant damage to the group’s rocket and missile stores, and eliminated key methods of communication. While this dampened Hezbollah’s retaliation, the group drastically increased its rate of fire on and range of targeting in Israel, launching well over 700 rockets and missiles, as well as dozens of drones between September 23 and September 30, and repeatedly targeting central Israel with missiles.

The Ground Operation: October 2024

Between September 30 and October 1, Israel began a limited ground operation in Lebanon designed to clear villages along the border of Hezbollah infrastructure and fighters, and ordered residents across southern Lebanon to evacuate north of the Awali River, about 45 miles north of the border. The same day, the IDF called up four additional reserve brigades, and the ground operation has since expanded to involve five divisions operating in multiple sectors along the Israel-Lebanon border. 

While Hezbollah is a stronger enemy than Hamas, the IDF says it is experiencing less resistance than expected and that many border positions and compounds, along with large quantities of weapons and documents, were simply abandoned. This may reflect a combination of a lack of coordination and leadership in Hezbollah’s ranks and the organization’s desire to draw Israel into a long-term war of attrition in territory favorable to them. Thus far, the IDF estimates it has killed around 1,200 Hezbollah fighters in the ground operation, including over 50 battalion, company, and platoon commanders, arrested several operatives, seized large quantities of weapons, rockets, and launchers, and discovered and destroyed a number of tunnels and military compounds inside southern Lebanese villages. The IDF believes Hezbollah only has about 30% of its rocket and missile capability left, combining destroyed, seized, and launched munitions. Targeted killings of Hezbollah leaders continue, including commanders overseeing weapons transfers from Iran to Lebanon, local commanders, and senior figures in Hezbollah’s aerial unit. 

The IDF has conducted several thousand airstrikes since the ground operation began, mostly in southern Lebanon, but has repeatedly struck weapons depots and meeting points in Dahiyeh and, more rarely, central Beirut, as well as locations in the Bekaa Valley, Baalbek, and Akkar in northern Lebanon. Israel has also targeted Hezbollah’s financial assets, striking several branches of the group’s primary banking institution, U.S.-sanctioned al-Qard al-Hassan.

The IDF has announced the deaths of 20 soldiers in combat in the northern arena since the start of the ground invasion, and a further four were killed and 58 injured by a suicide drone attack on the Golani Brigade training base on October 12. 

Hezbollah has launched at least 1,600 rockets and missiles at Israel since the ground operation began, along with dozens of drones. While Israeli air defense systems perform well against rockets and missiles, they often struggle to intercept low-flying drones, which take unpredictable flight paths and sometimes drop off of radar. Dozens of Israeli civilians have been wounded and three have been killed by Hezbollah attacks since October 1. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s villa in Caesarea was damaged by a direct impact from a Hezbollah drone on October 19, though the prime minister was elsewhere at the time.

The war has taken a heavy toll on an already strained Lebanon. According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, at least 1,936 people had been killed and 9,806 injured between September 16 and October 22. While the ministry no longer specifies demographics and does not distinguish between civilians and combatants, as of October 3, 76% of those killed were adult men. International organizations believe that over 1 million people have either been internally displaced or fled the country.

UNIFIL, the peacekeeping force established in 1978 after an Israeli invasion of Lebanon targeting Palestinian militants and tasked with implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701–passed after the 2006 war to keep the peace and prevent Hezbollah from establishing a presence in southern Lebanon–is caught between the warring parties. The force has rejected Israeli requests to evacuate its bases in combat zones and several peacekeepers have been injured by fighting adjacent to their bases, drawing sharp international condemnations of Israel. Israel, for its part, has discovered extensive Hezbollah infrastructure across UNIFIL’s area of operations, including stockpiles and underground compounds adjacent to UNIFIL positions, which it says underscores the organization’s fundamental failure and the need to replace it.

Hezbollah’s Current Position

The conventional wisdom among the Israeli security establishment and Israel’s allies after October 7 remains that Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel initially aimed to show solidarity with Hamas and the Palestinians, and that the Lebanese terror group did not desire all-out war with Israel. But a war of attrition resulting in 60,000 displaced Israelis was only politically sustainable in Israel for so long, leading to the current escalation, which is effectively war between the parties. Though Hezbollah has lost most of its top leaders, particularly in the critical rocket and missile arrays,  aerial units, and the elite Radwan force, it still has tens of thousands of fighters and rockets, and cannot be defeated to the same extent Hamas was in Gaza without an extended ground campaign much deeper in Lebanon, something Israel finds strategically unpalatable. 

Key mitigating factors that previously kept Hezbollah from launching a full-scale war against war have either been rendered moot or removed.

In recent years, Lebanon has endured several economic and political crises unrelated to Israel and the country’s south has suffered tremendously as a result of the ongoing military confrontation. The organization is sensitive to domestic concerns and knows that it lacks the popular support needed to benefit politically from initiating a full-scale war that could leave the country in ruins. However, from its weakened position, Hezbollah may consider its only way to retain credibility and power, both vis-à-vis Israel and other Lebanese factions, to be continuing to fight Israel despite domestic opposition.

In the past, Iran viewed Hezbollah as a second-strike capability to deter Israel from escalatory military action, such as striking nuclear facilities in Iran itself, and thus wanted to keep the organization in reserve until the time was right. That strategy has been obviated by events; Israel and Hezbollah are fighting what amounts to a war anyway, leaving Iran with the choice to either intervene to protect Hezbollah or allow it to be further degraded. Iran’s unprecedented ballistic missile attack against Israel on October 1 signaled its willingness to enter into direct interstate conflict. While Iran was willing to allow a less important proxy like Hamas to be destroyed, its calculations may differ for Hezbollah.

With Hezbollah’s leadership itself still unclear and the organization reeling from multiple blows, its political and strategic calculations may evolve suddenly and unpredictably as new leaders come to power.

Israel’s Current Position

October 7 significantly shook Israelis’ trust in any tacit understandings with terror organizations.

The situation in the north is currently untenable, with tens of thousands of Israelis unable to return home due to the threat of rockets, which have caused significant damage and widespread fires in northern towns and cities, and they are unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future while Hezbollah remains a credible long-term threat.

Israel’s substantial initial successes vis-à-vis Hezbollah have knocked the organization off-kilter, giving the security establishment hope that the limited IDF ground operation can secure the north, letting the IDF rely on air power to prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing itself along the border. However, there is an understanding that Hezbollah remains a potent military force, evidenced by its daily barrages of rockets into northern and occasionally central Israel. The IDF wants to achieve its operational objectives without being bogged down into a long-term ground deployment in southern Lebanon, which would expose soldiers to guerilla attacks and draw further international condemnation. 

Prime Minister Netanyahu has made clear that Israel will not accept a unilateral ceasefire or one which allows Hezbollah to rearm. Israel continues to seek a diplomatic arrangement that will keep Hezbollah back from the border, and does not trust UNIFIL, the existing peacekeeping force that failed to keep Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon, to implement any future arrangement. Defense Minister Gallant has indicated that Israel is now open to a ceasefire-hostage deal that would address both conflicts.  

Diplomatic Efforts

Though a U.S.-led ceasefire effort backed by 21 countries fell apart immediately after it was presented on September 27 due to Israel’s assassination of Nasrallah, many international players continue to call for an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. The U.S. has had a mixed reaction to Israeli operations in Lebanon, but does not currently support calls for an immediate ceasefire.

Hezbollah’s deputy leader Naem Qassem recently reaffirmed that Hezbollah wants any ceasefire to be linked to a ceasefire in Gaza, contradicting anonymous comments from other Hezbollah officials who indicated they would be open to a stand-alone ceasefire in Lebanon. Defense Minister Gallant has indicated openness to linking the two arenas as the IDF appears on pace to achieve its operational goals on the ground, but it is not clear if Prime Minister Netanyahu feels the same way. However, Gaza ceasefire talks have been dormant for weeks, with the U.S. and Israel blaming Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar—assassinated by Israel on October 16—for refusing to negotiate seriously. 

Israel reportedly passed a ceasefire proposal to the U.S. in mid-October that included demands for freedom of action, including in Lebanon’s airspace, to prevent Hezbollah from resupplying itself with weapons or returning to the border areas. The U.S., for its part, would like to see a combination of an enhanced UNIFIL and an empowered Lebanese military take control of southern Lebanon and enforce Resolution 1701. Both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Biden advisor Amos Hochstein traveled to the region in late October to try and advance a ceasefire along these lines.

UNIFIL poses a particular diplomatic challenge. Many countries, particularly those with soldiers serving in the peacekeeping operation, have condemned incidents where UNIFIL troops were injured by military activity near their posts, much of it attributed to the IDF, or had their activities impeded. UNIFIL has rejected Israel’s requests for it to redeploy from southern Lebanon, and future incidents seem likely. In the long term, Israel believes UNIFIL has fundamentally failed and should be discontinued, while many international actors would prefer it stay. Any stable post-war arrangement will need to credibly demilitarize southern Lebanon and avoid the failures of 2006.

Looking Forward

While Israel has achieved far better operational results against Hezbollah than expected and succeeded in pushing it back from the Israel-Lebanon border, the group remains a substantial and lethal military force. As the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon grows, international calls for a ceasefire are certain to increase. Israel wants to avoid being drawn into a long-term presence in southern Lebanon, but does not want Hezbollah to be able to recover, rearm, and re-establish itself on the border. Hezbollah, for its part, wants time to recover from its substantial losses while maintaining its attacks on Israel, and would benefit from a prolonged guerilla war that would increase IDF losses and might eventually increase Hezbollah’s domestic support.

While the argument for a ceasefire in Lebanon seems superficially appealing to both parties, as Israel may want to consolidate its military achievements with a better political arrangement and Hezbollah wants to prevent further damage, developments elsewhere in the region complicate any diplomatic process. Hamas appears uninterested in a ceasefire in Gaza, particularly when it feels it is on the brink of finally sparking the regional war October 7 was designed to start, while the Israel-Iran conflict could easily override Israel-Hezbollah dynamics if it escalates further. Combined with the steep diplomatic challenge of constructing a stable post-war order that allows Israeli and Lebanese civilians along the border to return to their homes, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict is likely to persist.