The U.S. initially supported Israel with economic aid. Now it provides security assistance.

Since its founding, Israel has received more foreign aid from the United States than any other nation, totaling $298 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars from 1946-2024. In the aftermath of Israel’s War of Independence in the early 1950s, the U.S. began providing Israel with economic grants, but refrained from supporting the new state militarily. 

That changed in 1962, when the Kennedy administration broke the longstanding arms embargo and approved the sale of Hawk missiles to Israel. Around that same time, the U.S. began providing Israel with military aid in the form of loans. This assistance increased sharply following the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1978 Camp David Accords with Egypt. In 1985, Congress converted U.S. military aid to Israel in its entirety from loans to grants.

In the 2000s, as Israel became more economically self-sufficient, economic aid has dropped off to zero in recent years. Military assistance, meanwhile, has steadily risen to levels of typically over $4 billion annually over the past year.

Most U.S. security assistance to Israel falls under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. 

Israel is a recipient of U.S. FMF, which functions as a grant that a foreign country then must use to purchase weapons and other military platforms manufactured in the United States.

There are two types of U.S. arms sales.

• Foreign Military Sales (FMS): The U.S. government serves as the intermediary, procuring arms and then selling them to a foreign buyer. DOD will often provide technical expertise and support.
• Direct Commercial Sales (DCS): Registered private firms in the U.S. sell directly to the foreign buyer. Sellers are required to secure an export license from the State Department.

Israel is party to some specialized privileges in these sales processes, including:

• Flexible FMF usage: 
  • Offshore Procurement (OSP): Historically, some of the security assistance Israel receives has been designated for Off-Shore Procurement (OSP). Israel can use OSP-designated funds in its domestic defense market, rather than just in the United States. Israel’s OSP privileges, however, are gradually being phased out, from 25% of FMF in 2019 to a projected 0% in 2028. This phase-out was agreed to under the current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated in 2016; it is unclear if a future MOU, if agreed under the Trump administration, will permanently end OSP.
  • Using FMF for DCS: Israel is one of ten countries permitted to use FMF to buy weapons and defense platforms through the DCS process, rather than solely through FMS. Israel has typically used one-third of its allotted FMF in this way. 
  • Israel receives its FMF in a lump sum within 30 days of the funds being appropriated, rather than on a monthly basis. The funds are held in a U.S. bank account, which generates interest benefiting the Government of Israel.
  • Though the U.S. generally prohibits the use of FMF on consumable items, in the past Israel was granted an exception to use FMF for jet fuel purchases. This practice was reportedly ended under the current MOU.
• Payment schedules:
  • The U.S. grants Israel cash-flow financing on purchases made with FMF, enabling payment for large sales to be spread across several years. This is particularly useful for purchases of major platforms like the F-35 or F-15E. 
• Relaxed requirements for Congressional notification and review: 
  • Israel is among 37 countries (NATO members plus Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel) for whom U.S. law relaxes the value threshold beyond which arms sales must be notified to and reviewed by Congress and shortens the timeline for such review.
  • For Israel and other NATO+5 members, the review threshold for Major Defense Articles is $25 million ($14 million normally) and $100 million for Defense Articles ($50 million normally).
  • For Israel and other NATO+5 members, FMS or DCS purchases face a 15-day (rather than 30-day) review period in Congress.

While Israel uses FMF to make most arms purchases from the U.S., it often buys additional defense articles using its own funds. As of April 2025 Israel had over 750 active FMS cases, valued at $39.2 billion. From FY 2018 to FY 2022, the U.S. has authorized $12.2 billion in DCS to Israel. As of April 2026, the Trump administration has notified Congress that it had approved at least $19.6 billion in FMS and DCS arms sales to Israel, and in late 2024 the Biden administration notified Congress that it had approved more than $20 billion in arms sales to Israel.

Since 1998, much of the U.S. commitment to security assistance has been spelled out in 10-year memoranda of understanding. 

MOUs are non-binding agreements between countries or other parties. This system allows Israel and the United States to negotiate a sustained U.S. commitment to military aid for a certain number of years, avoiding a year-to-year negotiation process. Since MOUs are not treaties, they do not require Senate ratification, though the most recent 2016 MOU was enshrined in law by Congress. The security assistance agreed within an MOU, however, is still subject to the Congressional appropriations process on a yearly basis.

The 2016 MOU, which is set to expire in 2028, spells out an annual U.S. commitment of $3.8 billion in security assistance. Of that $3.8 billion, $3.3 billion falls under FMF and $500 million is designated for cooperative missile defense programs, such as co-production of the Iron Dome system and joint research and development of others. 

To answer changing needs throughout the years, Congress has also appropriated supplemental security assistance on top of the $3.8 billion laid out in the MOU. In April 2024, President Biden signed a $95.3 billion supplemental appropriations package to support Ukraine, Israel, and allies in the Indo-Pacific. Supplementing the annual $3.8 billion from the MOU, this package allocated $8.7 billion in security assistance:

• $4 billion to replenish the Iron Dome and David’s Sling missile defense systems
• $1.2 billion for the new Iron Beam aerial defense system
• $3.5 billion in additional FMF

This package also included $9 billion in humanitarian aid for the Palestinians. 

However, U.S.-Israel security cooperation extends well beyond the MOU. 

The United States has recognized Israel as a major non-NATO ally since 1987, and bilateral defense cooperation also includes an array of strategic agreements, joint research and development programs, intelligence sharing, and frequent combined training exercises. Israel also benefits from general U.S. defense assistance programs for allies. These include the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, wherein the U.S. military can transfer or sell discounted surplus U.S. military articles to select allies. Since 1992, Israel has received over $6.6 billion in surplus defense articles from this program. Israel also hosts a stockpile of munitions under the War Reserves Stockpiles Act-Israel (WRSA-I), which allows Israel to draw on a U.S. weapons store located in Israel in the event of an emergency or war. Finally, in recent years the U.S. has deployed substantial assets to defend Israel from Iranian attack, including multiple carrier groups, and has deployed assets and personnel in Israel itself, including but not limited to THAAD missile defense batteries and U.S. military personnel at the Civil-Military Coordination Center responsible for some elements of ceasefire oversight in Gaza.

The U.S. and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty.

The United States has signed treaties committing it to defend more than 50 nations—the most prominent among them being the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which established NATO. Unlike MOUs, treaties are legally binding and require Senate ratification with a two-thirds majority.

Despite the close partnership between the two countries, the United States and Israel do not have a treaty that requires the United States to come to Israel’s defense in the event of an attack. This issue is separate from security assistance, but is part of the overall picture of U.S.-Israel security ties.

The United States is required by law to uphold Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). 

Qualitative military edge refers to a sustained, credible military advantage over all foreseeable threats. Ensuring Israel’s QME has been U.S. policy since the Johnson administration approved the sale of F-4 Phantom fighter jets to Israel in 1968. This marked a departure from the previous U.S. security doctrine of attempted parity between Israel and the Arab states. 

The emphasis on maintaining Israel’s QME is an acknowledgment that—notwithstanding its impressive military and technological capabilities—Israel has several strategic disadvantages vis-à-vis its adversaries, including its limited size and manpower. 

Israel’s QME was enshrined in U.S. law in 2008. This legislation bans arms sales to other Middle Eastern states that would endanger Israel’s QME, requiring such sales to be offset by bolstering Israel’s capabilities. It also requires the administration to regularly assess the status of Israel’s QME to ensure it is being maintained.

The Security Assistance Process: From Commitment to Shipment

The process of administering security assistance requires buy-in at various stages from the executive and legislative branches, and differs for fixed-term commitments like the MOU and one-off supplemental appropriations. In the case of Israel, whether the funding commitment stems from an MOU, a one-off supplemental, or elsewhere, some of the steps include: 

Stage 1: Congress Writes the Check 

The U.S. Constitution gives the power of the purse to Congress, meaning that the legislative branch has the sole authority to allocate funding to provide foreign aid. During the annual Congressional appropriations process, Congress allocates the funding for security assistance as determined by the MOU in the case of Israel. It theoretically could withhold or limit funding to Israel and cause the U.S. to renege on the MOU commitment made by the executive branch, but this has not happened.

Congress can also allocate additional security assistance funding, including Foreign Military Financing and missile defense. This is typically done through supplemental appropriations bills.

Stage 2: Israel Requests to Purchase Arms Using FMF Credit

Most U.S. aid to Israel ($3.3 billion annually per the MOU) is Foreign Military Financing—a credit that Israel can then spend to purchase defense materials from the U.S. This part of the security assistance process resembles standard arms sales, except the payment is covered by the FMF Israel was allocated by Congress.

For both Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales, Israel submits a letter of request from the U.S., either to purchase a defense article directly (FMS) or to get a license to purchase from a U.S. firm (DCS). 

Stage 3: Federal Agencies Review Arms Sale 

Once the request for an FMS purchase or DCS license is submitted (whether being paid for by FMF or Israeli funds), various DOD and Department of State offices conduct a review to ensure that the sale is consistent with national security, human rights concerns, and other considerations. The State Department and Department of Defense are tasked with conducting end-use monitoring. However, this monitoring largely focuses on ensuring that defense articles remain with the intended recipient, rather than focusing on their operational use.

Stage 4: For Larger Arms Shipments, Congress Is Notified

Thresholds for Congressional Review

Certain arms sales are subject to congressional review. Congress must be notified about sales to Israel that surpass the following dollar thresholds:

• Major defense equipment: $25 million
• Defense articles: $100 million
• Design and construction: $300 million
• Firearms: $1 million

Informal Notification

20 to 40 days before this formal review process, the State Department submits an informal notification to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). This allows committee members to raise questions and concerns or place a hold on a sale prior to the formal notification. While the administration can still advance a transfer that is under a congressional hold, it will typically refrain from doing so.

Formal Notification

For arms sales to Israel subject to congressional review, the president must notify the speaker of the House and the chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) 15 days in advance. 

Congress can block arms sales by passing Joint Resolutions of Disapproval (JRDs). Members may introduce a resolution at the committee level, after which they can be brought to a floor vote. JRDs are privileged in the Senate; the rules allow for a senator to force a floor vote on a JRD if the SFRC committee has not advanced it within 10 days. In the House, JRDs are considered highly privileged after they have passed the HFAC.

Congress has never successfully blocked an arms sale by means of a JRD, although Congressional opposition has resulted in the executive branch making changes to a sales package.

The president can waive this review in the event of a national security emergency by notifying Congress and providing a detailed justification. 

Stage 6: Cleared for Shipment

After Congress has the opportunity to weigh in, the defense articles are cleared for shipment.

Notable Restrictions and Oversight

Defense articles provided by the U.S. must be used for their intended purposes. Both Congress and the president have the authority to block the sale or transfer if the recipient is determined to be not complying with U.S. conditions. 

Self-Defense Only

In Israel’s case, the arms it receives from the U.S. are designated to be used only for self-defense. 

Third-Party Arms Transfers

Israel needs U.S. consent to transfer arms it acquired from the U.S. to another party.

Humanitarian Considerations

FAA Section 620M (Leahy Law)

Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act, known as the Leahy Law, bars the U.S. from providing weapons or aid to foreign security forces that have committed gross human rights violations—defined as “torture, extrajudicial killing, enforced disappearance, and rape under the color of law.” Both DOS and DOD take this law into account when vetting a recipient for security assistance. This law was introduced in 1997 and made permanent in 2008.

FAA Section 502B

Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act bars the provision of security assistance to foreign governments that have a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” This gives the executive branch the authority to deem a country ineligible to receive security assistance. Congress can also request a report from the State Department to evaluate compliance, and subsequently restrict or end aid via a joint resolution based on the report’s findings.

FAA Section 620I

This law bars security assistance to governments that directly or indirectly restrict the provision of U.S. humanitarian aid. The president can issue a waiver based on national security interests.