Discord and Dialogue:

The Lebanon-Israel Conflict

Israel and Lebanon have never had diplomatic relations and define each other as enemy states. For decades, Israel’s relations with Lebanon have been simultaneously characterized by military entanglements and limited cooperation. Various players in Lebanon’s multi-sectarian society and fractured political system have differing views on Israel, ranging from deep ideological hostility to indifference to a sense of shared interests. 

For decades, the root cause of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon has been armed militia groups based in Lebanon carrying out cross-border attacks on Israel—initially the Palestine Liberation Organization, and now Hezbollah (see below).

There are several additional points of contention between Israel and the Republic of Lebanon:

• Lebanese solidarity with the Palestinians;
• Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory: Israel controlled territory in southern Lebanon from 1982 until 2000 and, following the recent war, maintains five military outposts on the Lebanese side of the border adjacent to Israeli communities;
• Israeli action in Lebanon, including past political interventionism and ongoing military activity that results in destruction of property and civilian casualties (even if intended to target Hezbollah);  
• Zones of disputed control along Israel and Lebanon’s de facto border, known as the Blue Line—including the Har Dov area, the Alawite village of Ghajar, and several others.

The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict

Hezbollah is a Shiite fundamentalist militia group and political party that has been designated as a terror organization by the United States and dozens of other countries. Hezbollah functions simultaneously as a Lebanese socio-political movement and a proxy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hezbollah is a separate entity from the Lebanese state, but has been the dominant military force in the country and also controls seats in the Lebanese parliament. Prior to October 7, Hezbollah was believed to possess an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and over 40,000 fighters, making it one of the most powerful non-state actors in the world.

For more background on Hezbollah, see Israel Policy Forum’s explainer.

Hezbollah’s ideological and broader geopolitical interests are the main underlying reasons for Israel’s contemporary conflict with Lebanon and are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, irrespective of Israeli policy.

• Hezbollah’s desire to destroy Israel, which is a primary impetus of its military activity and a basic component of its raison d’être.
• Iran’s use of Hezbollah to extend its regional influence and advance its own quest to destroy Israel.

On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah launched anti-tank missiles at civilian targets across the border following Hamas’ October 7 terror invasion. Over the 17 years since the last Israel-Hezbollah war, Hezbollah had constructed tunnels, stockpiled weapons, and stationed fighters throughout southern Lebanon in preparation for an attack on Israel—in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which had mandated southern Lebanon’s demilitarization in 2006. Consistent tit-for-tat cross-border attacks gradually increased in intensity over the following months, resulting in the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israeli and Lebanese civilians from border communities. 

This equation held until September 2024, when Israel increased the intensity, frequency, and range of its operations against the terror group in order to take out senior leaders, meaningfully erode its capabilities, and disrupt its operations. This began with the remote detonation of thousands of booby-trapped pagers and other communication devices, injuring thousands of Hezbollah fighters and catching the group off guard. Along with widespread airstrikes throughout Lebanon, including Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut’s Dahiyeh quarter and the Bekaa Valley, Israeli forces entered Lebanese territory to push Hezbollah back from the border. A major turning point was Israel’s elimination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and most of the organization’s top echelon, leaving it in disarray.

The November 2024 Ceasefire Agreement

The most recent Israel-Hezbollah war concluded with a U.S.-brokered ceasefire in November 2024 that left Hezbollah military capabilities severely battered. It lost most of its senior leadership, over half of its rocket arsenal, and as many as 4,000 fighters. Within Israel, northern border areas experienced the most significant destruction and disruption.

From October 2023 until the September 2024 escalation, Hezbollah maintained that it would continue fighting Israel as long as the war in Gaza persisted. Following Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah, the group agreed to decouple the two fronts and agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon even as the war in Gaza persisted. 

Key points of the ceasefire agreement:

• Complete IDF and Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon within 60 days;
• LAF to carry out the demilitarization of southern Lebanon and prevent transfer of arms into Lebanon from abroad;
• Deployment of 10,000 LAF troops to southern Lebanon;
• Full implementation of UNSCR 1701, without precluding Israel or Lebanon from exercising their right to self-defense; 
• Establishment of a U.S.-led International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism (IMIM) including France, UNIFIL, Israel, and Lebanon to alert the LAF to violations of the ceasefire agreement reported by Israel.

An unpublished U.S.-Israel side letter to the agreement reportedly confirmed Israel’s right to act against threats in Lebanon that the LAF fails to address.

The original agreement set January 27 as the date by which Israel and Hezbollah were to have completed withdrawing from southern Lebanon. Israel delayed its withdrawal until February 18 after the U.S. and Israel assessed that the LAF and UNIFIL failed to meet the January 27 deadline to disarm Hezbollah in the area. Israel subsequently announced that it would indefinitely maintain a military presence on five strategic points across the border, despite previously committing to a full withdrawal to the Blue Line.

Lebanon’s New Political Outlook

The war with Israel significantly eroded Hezbollah’s military power, political clout, and domestic standing within Lebanon and catalyzed an end to the country’s longstanding political deadlock. With Hezbollah weakened, the U.S., Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were able to leverage their influence to push for the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president, who in turn appointed International Court of Justice Chief Judge Nawaf Salam as prime minister. Aoun’s election and Salam’s successful formation of a government ended a two-year period during which Lebanon lacked a president and an empowered cabinet.

Unlike their immediate predecessors, neither Aoun nor Salam is aligned with Hezbollah. Lebanon’s new president and prime minister have both expressed a commitment to asserting the state’s independence and monopoly on power and the use of force, and fully implementing the ceasefire agreement with Israel and UNSCR 1701. Hezbollah has less influence in Salam’s cabinet than in previous ones, but the cabinet still includes four ministers from the other Shiite movement, Amal. 

Since the November ceasefire agreement was signed, the LAF has taken meaningful steps to increase its presence in southern Lebanon, dismantle Hezbollah outposts, and confiscate weapons, in line with the Lebanese government’s commitment to upholding the ceasefire. 

However, this progress has advanced slowly relative to the timeframe stipulated by the ceasefire agreement, which had called for the immediate deployment of 10,000 LAF troops to southern Lebanon. The Lebanese military’s ability to rein in Hezbollah is hindered by insufficient manpower, outdated equipment, and political constraints. Aoun has said that Hezbollah’s disarmament will be achieved through dialogue, rather than by force. There also appears to be a disagreement between the two sides over the sequencing of southern Lebanon’s demilitarization, with Israel demanding Hezbollah’s dismantlement and the LAF’s deployment as a precondition for a full IDF withdrawal.

Israel cites limited LAF progress demilitarizing southern Lebanon and occasional rocket attacks (that Hezbollah has not been claiming responsibility for) as justification for continuing to hold five outposts north of the Blue Line and carry out targeted strikes in Lebanon. Other possible reasons include a desire to leverage the outposts as a bargaining chip in talks with Lebanon and to reassure Israeli civilians residing close to the border that sufficient measures are in place to defend their communities. Even with their government-funded temporary relocation expiring on March 1, many of the 60,000 evacuees from northern Israel have opted not to return home given the still-uncertain security situation. 

Israel-Lebanon Bilateral Engagement

Even as intermittent exchanges of fire and Israeli presence in southern Lebanon strain the ceasefire, the U.S. and France have facilitated several direct interactions between the Israeli and Lebanese militaries at the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura focused on resolving disputes surrounding ceasefire implementation. These talks have resulted in Israel releasing several Lebanese detainees, including at least one member of Hezbollah, a move that was framed by Israel as a gesture of goodwill to President Aoun.  

Israel and Lebanon announced the establishment of three joint working groups with American and French mediation to resolve outstanding disputes between the two countries, including Israel’s five outposts in Lebanon, the 13 disputed points along the Blue Line, and Lebanese prisoners in Israel.

Looking Forward

Despite the proclamations of senior Israeli officials quoted in the media, it is unlikely that the U.S.- and France-led discussions will result in full normalization between the two countries anytime soon. Prime Minister Salam and President Aoun have both ruled out normalization, and with Hezbollah sidelined but still powerful, the domestic situation in Lebanon is far from conducive to an embrace of Israel.

The relevant question is not whether the post-war period will lead to overt peace in the near future, but whether it will result in enduring or just temporary quiet. 

Hezbollah’s defeat has created a genuine opening for political change in Lebanon, reflected by the country’s new leadership. Neither Salam nor Aoun have any interest in enduring military conflict with Israel and have an interest in demonstrating to Israel, the U.S., and the international community a real commitment to demilitarizing the country’s south and resolving bilateral disputes between the countries. That Israeli and Lebanese officials are meeting face to face is a testament to both sides’ willingness to enter a new chapter.

Nonetheless, there are reasons to temper optimism about the new status quo. Neither side has done its part to fully implement the ceasefire, with Israel and Lebanese militants both still present in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah remains a powerful entity in Lebanon with social and political clout, and the intent to rebuild militarily. While weakened by Israel’s aerial attack in October and the fall of the Assad regime in December, Iran is unlikely to willingly retreat from Lebanon for the long term. The new cabinet will be hard-pressed to advance the country’s reconstruction without external support and some degree of cooperation from Hezbollah. Salam is outspokenly opposed to Israel, which he recently referred to as “the enemy.” Recent ceasefire violations do not appear to threaten the agreement or suggest an imminent return to war, but do underscore that the Israel-Lebanon border remains volatile. 

The effectiveness of the LAF may be a decisive factor in determining whether the ceasefire will hold. The Lebanese military has historically received substantial support from the U.S. Even so, in the period between the 2006 war and October 7, the LAF did not succeed in asserting full control over southern Lebanon and preventing Hezbollah’s entrenchment. Despite the LAF’s mixed record, continued U.S. support will likely prove essential in increasing the capabilities of the LAF and preventing other actors, including Iran, from asserting greater influence over Lebanon’s rehabilitation.  After initially freezing most foreign aid back in January, the Trump administration’s decision to release $95 million in funding to the LAF is a positive step. Israel will likely retain its footholds in southern Lebanon until the LAF has completed the job of demilitarizing and deploying into the area and it is confident that Hezbollah no longer poses a near-term threat to Israel. 

Even if that happens, and Israel and Lebanon are able to resolve their border disputes, Hezbollah and Iran are unlikely to abandon their efforts in the near term to use Lebanon as a front for their long-term aspiration of destroying Israel. To prevent Hezbollah from regaining its strength over the coming years, Israel, the government of Lebanon, and the international community must cooperate to prevent the group’s rearmament and ensure that the LAF and UNIFIL remain the only militarized entities in southern Lebanon. Doing so is easier said than done, and will depend on sufficient international support for the LAF and political will within Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from violating the ceasefire.