Jabalia and the IDF’s Campaign

On October 6—six days after the start of the Lebanon incursion and Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel—the IDF announced that its 162nd division was moving from Rafah and the Philadelphi corridor to Jabalia. According to the IDF Spokesperson, the operation was initiated based on intelligence reports of Hamas terrorists operating in the area and attempts to reassert Hamas control. Though most of the more than 1 million Palestinians residing in northern Gaza had fled south in the war’s initial months, the IDF renewed its call for those remaining in Jabalia, Beit Hanoun, and Beit Lahia—the Gaza Strip’s northernmost governorate—to evacuate to the south along the Salah al-Din Road. 

With IDF troops having reached most areas of Gaza and having successfully reduced Hamas from a terror army and government to a guerilla force, the only parts of Gaza with a continual IDF presence are the security perimeter along the Israeli border, the Philaldelphi corridor along the border with Egypt, and the Netzarim corridor bisecting the strip south of Gaza City. From these areas, the IDF carries out incursions into other parts of the strip.

Since the war began, the IDF has operated twice before in Jabalia: in the initial invasion in November and December of last year, and then in May—months after the IDF announced that it had defeated Hamas in the area. The IDF’s current Jabalia operation is effectively a repeat of the last one in what has become a regular pattern of this war; Hamas resurging in the vacuum left behind by the IDF. 

The IDF’s campaign in Jabalia is still underway. Having surrounded the city and the camp, the military is continuing to dismantle terror infrastructure and says that it has eliminated around a dozen terrorists each day of the operation. It has also expanded the operation to nearby areas, including Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun.

The Humanitarian Picture

The military campaign in Jabalia has compounded Gaza’s existing humanitarian crisis caused by the war. For months, minimal humanitarian aid has reached northern Gaza and the amount of aid entering Gaza as a whole has dropped off dramatically in October. In recent days, the U.S. and other foreign governments have urged Israel to increase aid to the north, ease dual-use restrictions, and reinstate commercial imports that were paused in September. Some aid trucks have entered the north since, but not enough to support the needs of the population there. Citing Hamas as its source and not distinguishing between militants and civilians, Al Jazeera reported that 770 Palestinians have been killed in north Gaza since the start of the campaign there. Hospitals in the area have reported Israeli attacks and a severe lack of medical supplies. (Hamas often uses areas in or near hospitals for military purposes.)

There are currently no international humanitarian aid organizations operating on the ground in northern Gaza—nor independent foreign journalists anywhere in the strip—meaning that all information about what is happening on the ground is coming from Israel and Hamas. The absence of aid organizations also strengthens Hamas as the entity distributing and controlling the aid, bolstering it as a governing authority and allowing it to stockpile essential supplies at the expense of the civilian population. 

There are thought to be around 400,000 Palestinians remaining in the North Gaza Governorate, according to the U.N. Hamas has ordered civilians there to ignore Israel’s evacuation orders, arguing that Israel continues to attack its humanitarian zones, and according to Israeli reports, Hamas has even shot at Palestinians attempting to escape Jabalia. On October 23, the IDF announced that 20,000 Palestinians have fled Jabalia over the duration of the operation.

The Jabalia Dreidel

On the face of it, the dynamic of the Jabalia campaign is reminiscent of all previous episodes of this Gaza war: civilians caught between Israeli evacuation orders, Hamas threats, and the crossfire between the two sides as the IDF enters to clear out terrorists embedded in civilian infrastructure, coupled with a lack of food and medical supplies. But as the IDF enters its second year of fighting in the dense Palestinian enclave and approaches its third “eradication” of Hamas in Jabalia, there is a legitimate question about whether such operations are actively advancing a strategic goal or merely maintaining a new equilibrium.

According to Haaretz, defense officials questioned the intelligence justifying the Jabalia operation, suggesting that continued military operations in Gaza merely aim to keep the war going to avoid a hostage deal that would allow Hamas to declare any sort of victory and to delay having to make political decisions pertaining to Gaza’s day after. With Hamas defeated as a formal military, the IDF has now seemingly entrenched itself in Gaza, expanding its corridors and buffer zones and carrying out pinpoint raids that deliver small tactical victories but don’t actually further the goal of “defeating” Hamas entirely as a terror guerrilla force. 

The Generals’ Plan

While Israel’s political echelon has not explicitly articulated a strategy to translate Gaza’s new status quo from stalemate to strategic victory, foreign observers and Israeli analysts alike have suggested that the Jabalia operation is evidence of an unspoken strategy being put into action. That strategy is the so-called Generals’ Plan, authored by Giora Eiland.

A prominent former general, regular guest on Israeli television news stations, and a vocal critic of various aspects of the military campaign, Eiland has argued that Israel should implement a total siege north of the Netzarim corridor—including Gaza City and the North Gaza Governorate—after providing a week for civilians to flee to the south. Israel would then declare the north a closed military zone and prevent the entry of humanitarian aid, giving terrorists operating in the area the choice between surrender or starvation. All Palestinians remaining in the area at that point would be considered Hamas members by the IDF. While Eiland argues that such a siege is consistent with international law given that civilians would have the chance to evacuate beforehand, most of the world would likely disagree, as many Palestinians would not leave in practice given Hamas threats and an uncertain reality awaiting them in the south.

Eiland has presented the plan to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. A month ago, Netanyahu was reportedly considering the plan, although the government never officially announced it was adopting it. Defense Minister Gallant offered assurances to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin that it wasn’t Israeli policy. But many have pointed to the Jabalia operation as evidence of the Generals’ Plan being implemented in practice, including human rights organizations and even right-wing commentator Amit Segal, who is considered close to the prime minister. 

The Far-Right’s Shadow

Issuing evacuation orders for specific areas of Gaza—as Israel currently has for Jabalia and the rest of North Gaza—is nothing new for this war and does not necessarily equate to the Generals’ Plan. Israel has not explicitly said it is withholding humanitarian aid as a condition for Hamas to surrender. But regardless of how it is framed, there is a legitimate concern about the temporary evacuation of civilians becoming permanent displacement, putting Israel on the path to formally occupying, annexing, or even re-establishing Israeli settlements in the area. 

Again, this is not official Israeli policy, and when pressed, Prime Minister Netanyahu has claimed that resettling Gaza is “not realistic.” But just a few days ago, a handful of Likud MKs and government ministers gave speeches at a conference focused on doing just that. Far-right minister Itamar Ben Gvir called on Palestinians to be “encouraged” to emigrate from Gaza. Attendees included Likud activists and prominent settler leaders from the West Bank. With Israel not putting forward a vision for replacing Hamas, the likelihood of Israel itself doing so becomes greater—whether by default or by intention. 

Looking Forward

Israel entered Gaza with the legitimate aim of destroying Hamas and preventing it from threatening Israeli citizens—not to mention freeing the hostages abducted on October 7. A year later, Hamas’ governing and military infrastructure has been torn apart, and along with it the physical and social fabric of the society into which it had embedded itself for nearly two decades. With Hamas fighters still roaming the strip, the justification for continuing the war is understandable. But recent months have demonstrated that additional military pressure is not likely to bring more hostages home or tangibly improve the strategic picture in Gaza.

The ongoing operation in Jabalia is in many ways more of the same. But the recent assassination of Yahya Sinwar could provide Israel with an opportunity to declare victory while striking a deal to get the hostages out and putting forward a plan for Gaza’s day after that supplants Hamas as a governing entity. The apparent decision to prioritize an elusive “total victory” instead risks eroding the window for doing so and buying far right time to implement its own day-after plan as the option left on the table that purports to replace Hamas.