

Understanding the Institutions of Post-War Gaza

The October 2025 U.S.-brokered Gaza ceasefire ended more than two years of fighting between Israel and Hamas, initiated the release of Israel's remaining hostages, and enabled an Israeli withdrawal from nearly half of the strip. Yet despite Hamas' military degradation, Gaza's political future remains unresolved.

This resource examines the Trump administration's institutional framework for Gaza's post-war governance, reconstruction, and security.

The Foundations of the Framework

The following documents comprise the institutional framework for post-war Gaza as of January 2026. Together they define the political, legal, and executive foundations of the post-war governance architecture (which, as of January 2026, remains largely theoretical).

President Trump's 20-Point Plan (Sept. 29)

Framed by the White House as a "comprehensive plan" to end the war, the set of 20 points put forth by President Trump calls for a terror-free Gaza, Hamas' disarmament, the hostages' return, technocratic governance, an International Stabilization Force (ISF), a phased IDF withdrawal, and a special economic zone. It also establishes the Board of Peace (BoP) as an "international transitional body" to oversee the ceasefire. Conditioning any future PA role on reform, the plan frames itself as aiming to advance conditions for eventual Palestinian statehood, which it acknowledges as an aspiration of the Palestinian people. It does not specify benchmarks and provides scant details on implementation.

See Michael Koplow and Amb. Michael Ratney's [Trump's 20-Point Plan, Annotated: A Guide for the Perplexed](#) for more.

CENTCOM Press Release Number 20251021-01 (Oct. 21)

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announces the creation of a Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Israel to support Gaza's stabilization and the flow of humanitarian aid and security assistance. The press release clarifies that U.S. personnel will not deploy into Gaza.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 2803 (Nov. 17)

The UNSC the 20-point plan, recognizes the Board of Peace as a temporary international administration pending a reformed Palestinian Authority reassuming control over Gaza, and authorizes member states to work with the BoP to establish a time-limited International Stabilization Force in Gaza.

White House Statement Initiating Phase II (Jan. 16)

Two days after U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff [announced](#) the start of the ceasefire's second phase, the administration details the formation of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a BoP executive board, and a Gaza executive board. Maj. Gen. Jasper Jeffers is named commander of the ISF and Nickolay Mladenov (former U.N. special coordinator for the Middle East peace process) is named Gaza's "high representative" to liaise between the BoP and the NCAG.

Board of Peace Charter (Jan. 18)

The charter establishes the Board of Peace as a multinational body with a broad peace and stability mission, notably without explicit reference to Gaza. At its Davos signing ceremony on Jan. 22, Jared Kushner [articulated](#) the BoP's role in Gaza's rebuilding and demilitarization.

The Institutions of Post-War Gaza

With the exception of the CMCC, as of January 2026, these bodies are relatively newly established and have yet to play a tangible role on the ground in terms of Gaza's governance, administration, and security.

Political & Administrative Architecture

Board of Peace (BoP)

A U.S.-led international body created to oversee the Gaza ceasefire, along with the strip's governance, reconstruction, and demilitarization. Its charter appears to expand its mandate beyond Gaza as a permanent framework to promote international peace and stability. The BoP holds broad interim authority for Gaza, coordinates donor funding, and exercises strategic oversight over subordinate bodies. As the BoP's permanent chair, President Trump has broad unilateral authority to invite and dismiss members and set the agenda. The charter requires a \$1 billion contribution for countries that desire permanent membership, and otherwise sets three-year terms for the inaugural members.

Current members: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, U.A.E., Uzbekistan, Vietnam



BoP Executive Board

The BoP's principal decision-making body, tasked with managing the organization's funds, setting the agenda, and directing day-to-day operations. Aryeh Lightstone and Joshua Gruenbaum serve as senior advisors.

Members: Marco Rubio, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Tony Blair, Marc Rowan, Robert Gabriel, Ajay Banga, Nickolay Mladenov (Gaza High Representative)



Gaza Executive Board

Tasked with supporting Gaza's administration, service delivery, and disarmament.

Members: Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Hakan Fidan, Ali al-Thawadi, Hassan Rashad, Reem

al-Hashimy, Yakir Gabay, Sigrid Kaag, Tony Blair, Marc Rowan, Nickolay Mladenov (Gaza High Representative)



National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)

A technocratic, apolitical Palestinian body responsible for managing Gaza's day-to-day civil administration and public services during the transitional period. Operating under the authority of the high representative for Gaza, it administers public services but does not hold sovereign political authority. The NCAG consists of Palestinian technocratic experts responsible for portfolios such as housing, finance, education, and telecommunications, many of whom come from the private sector. No members are associated with Hamas or currently hold roles within the PA, although NCAG Chair Dr. Ali Shaath was a [longtime civil servant](#) who served as a deputy minister at the PA's Ministry of Planning. According to Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, the committee's composition was approved by all Palestinian factions, including Hamas, and also vetted by Israel, presumably with considerable U.S. involvement.

Members: Dr. Ali Shaath (Chair), Abdel Karim Ashour, Jaber al-Daour, Bashir al-Rais, Ayed Yaghi, Osama al-Saadawi, Maj. Gen. Sami Nasman, Adnan Abu Warda, Arabi Abu Shaaban, Ali Barhoum, Hana Tarazi, Rami Halas, Omar Shamali, Ayed Abu Ramadan, and Husni al-Mughni

Stabilization & Security Mechanisms

International Stabilization Force (ISF)

A multinational U.S.-led force tasked with training a vetted Palestinian police force in Gaza, overseeing Gaza's demilitarization, and providing security during the ceasefire's implementation. Exact roles and responsibilities for the ISF have not yet been confirmed and as of January 29, 2026, no countries have publicly committed to contributing personnel. According to Trump's 20-point plan, the ISF will deploy as the IDF withdraws, although timelines and benchmarks for doing so have not been announced.

Commander: Maj. Gen. Jasper Jeffers

Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)

Operated by U.S. Central Command, the CMCC in Kiryat Gat was established at the start of the Gaza ceasefire to coordinate efforts related to Gaza's stabilization. Approximately 200 U.S. service members were initially stationed at the CMCC, a number that has [gradually decreased](#). Since its opening, over 50 partner nations and international organizations have [joined](#) the effort. The CMCC's primary role is facilitating the entry of humanitarian aid in coordination with organizations on the ground, a function that, according to some [reporting](#), has effectively diluted Israel's oversight. The CMCC operates separately from the Board of Peace framework but interfaces with international partners involved in Gaza's post-war response.

Commanders: Lt. Gen. Patrick Frank, Amb. Steven Fagin

Unresolved Questions and Structural Tensions

The effort to advance the U.S.-led vision for Gaza's rehabilitation faces significant barriers and issues that require further clarity. The following list is non-exhaustive.

- The framework conceptually separates Gaza's governance from its administration, with the Trump led BoP responsible for the former and the fully Palestinian NCAG

handling the latter (although both have yet to assume any tangible responsibility).

- There is no Palestinian representation on the BoP Executive Board or Gaza Executive Board.
- Israel has not yet allowed the NCAG members to enter Gaza.
- It is unclear whether the NCAG is supposed to operate only in the Hamas-controlled red zone, or in the Israeli-controlled green zone as well.
- It remains unclear whether the ISF's mandate includes direct confrontation with Hamas, or how it is expected to concretely advance Gaza's demilitarization.
- Trump wields considerable unilateral authority over the BoP's operations and membership, raising questions about institutional durability beyond his personal involvement.
- Prominent NATO allies such as the UK, France, Norway, and Sweden have not accepted to join the BoP, citing concerns about Russia being invited and the possibility of it attempting to sideline the U.N.'s role.
- There are no clear benchmarks or conditions for further IDF withdrawals and Hamas' demilitarization.
- While Trump's 20-point plan and UNSCR 2803 reference an eventual PA return to Gaza (an outcome opposed by the Israeli government), the administration's messaging stops short of calling for a political horizon for eventual Palestinian statehood.