Gaza After Operation Breaking Dawn:
What Now?

Critical Neighbors
Egypt, Jordan, and the Israeli-Palestinian Arena

An Israeli Perspective
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A Jordanian Perspective
Farah Bdour

A Palestinian Perspective
Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha

An Egyptian Perspective
Hesham Youssef
Table of Contents

Gaza After Operation Breaking Dawn: What Now? 1
An Israeli Perspective 2
A Palestinian Perspective 9
A Jordanian Perspective 13
An Egyptian Perspective 17
About the Authors 23
Gaza After Operation Breaking Dawn: What Now?

As the guns went silent after yet another round of fighting between Israel and Gaza—the second in 14 months, and the fifth since Hamas took over the Strip in 2007—many wonder whether the two sides are destined for a reality of perpetual conflict; whether another generation of Palestinians and Israelis must witness the horrors of violence, live in fear, and (particularly on the Palestinian side) grow up in untold poverty and misery; or if there is another way.

Below are individual perspectives viewing the issue from four regional vantage points.

*The opinions and proposals expressed in these pieces are only reflective of the respective authors’ opinions and do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of Israel Policy Forum.*
An Israeli Perspective:

There Is Another Way

by Nimrod Novik

IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi

Tactical Success

The recent brief outbreak of violence ended with what is rightfully viewed by Israelis as a significant success: the IDF managed to inflict a heavy blow on the Gaza-based Iranian proxy Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) with no casualties and minimum damage on our side, all while going to great length to minimize civilian casualties among Gazans (as evidenced by released intelligence voice and video recordings).
The operation’s architects are also credited with the fact that violence lasted a mere 66 hours, with managing to keep the far more powerful Hamas on the sidelines, and—unlike in May 2021—with ensuring minimal disturbances in the West Bank, in Jerusalem, or among Israel’s Arab citizens.

As it often has in the past, Egypt received much credit for helping to secure an early ceasefire (with some assistance from Qatar and U.N. envoys), and the main international and regional players either acknowledge Israel’s right to self-defense or, with very few exceptions, criticized it in unusually reserved terms.

**Strategic Inertia**

This sense of relief Israel is experiencing tends to reinforce tendencies best characterized as strategic inertia. Throughout the decade and a half since Hamas took over the Strip, an era characterized by frequent periods of tension and fighting, Israelis have been convinced that they are faced with a choice between two bad options: the current failed policy of “more of the same,” whereby Israel seeks to “buy silence” by measures that partially relieve the closure, only to face another round of violence and another at ever shorter intervals; or getting rid of Hamas altogether by re-occupying the Strip and “cleaning it up.” The latter option not only poses the risk of massive casualties on both sides, but also lacks an exit strategy; how long will Israel be stuck with managing the lives of millions of Gazans and who—if anyone—will ever take it off our hands? In despair, some have thrown into the equation a third option: the illusion that Israel could inflict a major blow on Hamas from which it could never recover. The two bottom lines are so obvious: there are no simple solutions to complicated problems, and political issues do not lend themselves to strictly military answers.

**An Alternative Strategy**

The first to realize that the current policy offers no lasting stability and to present an alternative strategy was the Egyptian security establishment. Shortly after the Gaza war in 2014, Cairo formulated a detailed alternative strategy, sanctioned by President Sisi, in order to break out of the cycle of violence and unrest surrounding Gaza that was a burden on Egypt’s security, Palestinians’ political future, and regional stability.

It was presented to the then-Prime Minister Netanyahu, who endorsed it, only to astonish Cairo by sabotaging it but a few weeks later.
Adopting the logic of the Egyptian approach, which was suspended and then re-introduced by Egypt in 2017, two Israeli organizations, the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)*1 and Commanders for Israel's Security,**2 joined forces in embracing the framework, periodically updating it, and enhancing its Israeli security dimension.

With ECF operating behind closed doors domestically, regionally, and internationally, and CIS—based on its unmatched security credentials—advocating it to the Israeli leadership and public, the two proposed that Israel launch a transformative plan for the Gaza Strip, which also would include related constructive steps regarding the West Bank and Jerusalem.

**Regional-International Coalition**

Much like the Egyptian plan that inspired it, their plan calls for the creation of a powerful Israeli-initiated, U.S.-led regional and international coalition as a key prerequisite for progress. The purpose of this coalition would be both to usher the two Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, along the path suggested by this plan and to contribute—financially and otherwise—to its implementation. Regional participation, considered a fantasy when proposed by Egypt, looks far more realistic in the wake of the Abraham Accords.

Reflecting the Egyptian plan, this CIS/ECF initiative calls for the concurrent pursuit of three objectives:

- Solidified ceasefire arrangement—without which donors would not risk their investment
- Gaza rehabilitation—without which no stability can be expected
- Restoration of PA civil management of the Strip—without which Israel would object and donors would so be reluctant to contribute as it would benefit Hamas

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1 * The Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) is the Israeli NGO that launched the Oslo Process. Operating under the radar with a vast network of regional and international connections, it has been involved in all rounds of Israeli-Palestinian talks, both in Track I and Track II negotiations.

2 ** Commanders for Israel's Security (CIS) in a non-partisan movement of over 380 retired IDF generals, Mossad, Shin Bet, Police, NSC, and diplomatic corps equivalents.
Ceasefire

In addition to a resolute strategy of Israeli military deterrence, there is a need to formalize and institutionalize ceasefire understandings that go beyond the vague—and failed—existing formula of “quiet for quiet.” Though no understandings can prevent intentional ceasefire violations, this approach aims to both prevent an escalation arising from a third-party provocation and friction due to misunderstandings. The plan deemed Egypt central for negotiating the ceasefire’s terms, and Egypt might also prove critical should it agree to lead an on-the-ground monitoring mechanism.

Gaza Rehabilitation

It is both a humanitarian imperative and an Israeli security interest that the Gaza population's living conditions improve. Yet Israel and the donor community alike are also determined to prevent Hamas from benefiting from funds earmarked for reconstruction and development.
Moreover, there are ample indications that fear of an Arab Spring-like uprising was one of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s primary motivations for cooperating with the Egyptian proposal (both in 2014 and 2017) to gradually replace Hamas with the PA in civil management of the Strip. Thus, weakening Hamas seems a prerequisite for the proposed strategic change. The plan called for Gaza development to be pursued in ways that would deprive Hamas of opportunities to benefit from it.

Consequently, while encouraging the U.S. to mobilize the donor community in organizing a major Gaza rehabilitation and development program, the plan called on Israel to pursue this effort—both independently and jointly with like-minded regional and international partners—while acting against Hamas’ assets, including its sources of funding and its presence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, all by undertaking the following steps:

- Replacing the mechanisms for the direct transfer of funds via Hamas with mechanisms that ensure the funds serve their intended purposes
- Conditioning the donor community’s support for Gaza’s economic reconstruction on preventing Hamas’ rearmament
- Designing a strict reconstruction supervision regime, along with securing a commitment from regional and international participants to apply sanctions on Hamas should it violate its ceasefire obligations and breach rearmament restrictions

**Restoring PA Management**

Recognizing the poor state of the PA and its limited capacity to resume responsibility for Gaza civil management, the proposed strategy involves a gradual approach concurrent with steps that would also bolster its governance capacity (serving objectives that transcend the Gaza issue).

Frustration with a decade-long Israeli strategy of weakening the PA led ECF and CIS to call upon the Israeli government to inject real substance into the more recent, largely rhetorical commitments to “strengthen the PA” and “shrink the conflict.”

This would include the following:

- Committing to a future negotiated two-state agreement
- Clarifying that the West Bank and Gaza are viewed as a single, integrated polity
- Reaffirm the PLO’s role as Israel’s only Palestinian negotiating partner
Subject to Israeli security needs, this would also include:

- Enabling Palestinian economic development in Area C of the West Bank
- Re-designating portions of Area C as Area B or A
- Seriously addressing settler violence
- Ending all forms of “creeping” or de facto annexation in the West Bank
- Ending Palestinian evictions in East Jerusalem
- Tolerating no provocations regarding Jerusalem holy sites and restoring responsible administration on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif based on the historic Status Quo, including Jordan's role there
- Ending IDF incursions into areas where PA security forces exercise their duties as agreed

**Risks**

While advocating the plan to Israelis, it is crucial to point out not only the obvious benefits of its success for Israelis and Palestinians, but also the consequences of failure. Here, two considerations are noteworthy: First, should Israel pursue the plan in earnest for a year or two before facing its possible failure, the danger posed by Gaza
militants is not likely to increase, given the enormous power imbalance, which is only likely to grow. Second, if it has demonstrated to the world a sincere intention to change the dynamics on the ground in nonviolent ways, should Israel then need to use force, it is likely to enjoy both consensus at home and legitimacy abroad.
A Palestinian Perspective:

One Operation Ends, the Countdown to the Next Begins

by Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar

Since it went into effect, the latest ceasefire has been observed. This ended yet another round of confrontation with Gaza, albeit a short-lived one exposing the Israeli government's tactic of embracing more force to resolve issues with Gaza. This also confirms the lack of a fully developed strategy to resolve Gaza issues, let alone address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, during which Israel refused to negotiate the handover of the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian Authority, the situation progressed from bad to worse. This approach rendered the territory an effective power vacuum; since the PA security forces were largely destroyed over the course of the Second Intifada, Hamas’ military wing was able to take control of the territory in 2007. Since then, successive Israeli governments
carried out one round of military strikes after another, implementing paralyzing, comprehensive closures to resolve issues of instability and address security threats. Whether the intended consequence of this Israeli policy or not, the situation worsened in Gaza over the years. One of the key aspects of this deterioration has been that in place of the Palestinian Authority, the Hamas movement and an alliance of smaller factions including Islamic Jihad has developed paramilitary capabilities that, while not posing a strategic threat to Israel, still undermine Israeli national security in several ways. Employing offensive and defensive tactics, the Israeli government developed the Iron Dome missile defense system in part to confront the threat of rockets from Gaza, imposed tighter restrictions on access and movement, and launched minor and major military offensives to contain the threat, but have failed to eliminate it.

The Israeli security dilemma regarding the Gaza Strip appears to stem from an assumption that if Hamas, the central power controlling Gaza, were to collapse, the security challenges would deepen. In the absence of an alternative, such as the return of the Palestinian Authority to control Gaza, which Israel has deemed unattainable at present, the Gaza Strip would be controlled by fragments of factions and warlords, a chaotic reality that would further undermine Israeli security. The Israeli response to the dilemma appears to be a carrot and stick policy vis-à-vis Hamas, which seeks to provide incentives for Hamas to maintain calm. This leads one to conclude that this round of violence is certainly not the last. It is fair to conclude that once there are enough
reasons, pretexts, or justifications for any of the factions in Gaza, mainly Hamas, another round will be triggered.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that this round of confrontation was limited to Islamic Jihad, unlike most previous rounds, where all factions, including Hamas, were engaged. Some may think that Hamas decided not to participate in this round of fighting so as to preserve its governance in Gaza and maintain the incentives provided by Israel, including work permits for Gazans in Israel. While this may be true for this round, it does not answer the more strategic question of resolving the problem of Gaza. In fact, this Israeli tactic of using force and/or providing incentives for Hamas sets the stage for a more serious and comprehensive confrontation since the temporary calm is not based on solid solutions that address the root of the problem, nor does it involve mutual commitments—even ones arrived at via a third party—to maintain calm. Hence, an equation has been created whereby confrontations lead to more Israeli concessions (on work permits, financial relief, and the like). So, in the absence of a comprehensive change and for as long as the siege is in effect, the next round of confrontation is all but certain, as are others to follow, with no end in sight.

In conclusion, another round of conflict in Gaza ends as the countdown for the next one starts. Military confrontations and extending limited incentives continue to be the main Israeli tactic in dealing with Gaza issues.
It is about time for Israeli governments to conclude that this approach does not bring solutions and leaves both Israeli and Palestinian publics vulnerable to the woes of military confrontations, agony, and hate. So far there seems to be no growing interest in Israel to put forth a strategy to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole, or even one to deal with the question of Gaza more narrowly. It remains clear, however, that a long-term solution for Gaza will have to include the Palestinian Authority, which would coordinate with Hamas and other factions internally, as well as key regional players including Egypt, Qatar, and possibly others. If such a strategy aimed at resolving the issue of the Gaza Strip or a more comprehensive one addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at large are not attainable or politically feasible from an Israeli perspective, the situation will continue to go from bad to worse, and short-term solutions will only deepen and complicate the next round of violence.
A Jordanian Perspective:

Who to Engage?

by Farah Bdour

Operation Breaking Dawn shed light on Jordan’s engagement strategy with the Palestinian players and the one-sided approach of having the secular PA as the only address for Palestinian affairs. The current debate among Jordanian political elites revolves around adopting a balanced approach toward other Palestinian players, like the religious Hamas and PIJ, and creating a secondary address to leverage Jordan’s Israel-Palestine policy, which states that the two-state solution is the only real political ground for achieving fair and comprehensive peace in the region. Although not a new discussion, it takes place at a time when Jordan is keen on building on the diplomatic momentum in the region following U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit and the Jeddah Security and Development Summit, and amid the PA’s recent diplomatic efforts to
demand full membership for the State of Palestine in the U.N. However, the absence of any discussion over the inclusion of the local leadership that operates outside the orbit of the traditional leadership of Fatah and Hamas is shortsighted.

The logic of the official Jordanian approach is two-dimensional: domestic and regional. Jordan is reluctant to engage with Hamas and PIJ, out of a desire to avoid facilitating the incubation of the Islamic model among the frustrated Jordanian youth who form the largest demographic group in the country. Hamas’ rise in popularity after the May 2021 round of violence, which grew well beyond its usual support base to reach wide segments of the Jordanian population, raised red flags among the security establishment. During the recent operation, the PIJ has received the same public zeal. Jordan is also concerned about the Hamasization of its own backyard, notably in the Jenin refugee camp, where joint PIJ, Hamas, and splinter Fatah groups are coordinating and launching armed operations. After all, Hamas has gained a reputation for meddling in the kingdom’s internal affairs, which drove the 1999 decision to close the group’s office in Amman. On the other hand, Hamas and PIJ’s alignment with Iran and Qatar
might subject Jordan to the unpredictable whims of Gulf states and complicate Jordan's relations with allies. Moreover, Jordan is concerned about the Iranian presence at its borders, which are facing attacks by militants linked to Iran. These calculations drove Jordan to maintain the one-sided approach of recognizing and legitimizing only the PA.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi

Those who advocate for adopting a balanced approach towards Hamas are laying a very compelling argument. The eroding legitimacy of the PA will cast its shadows on Jordan's credibility as its alignment with a leadership that is perceived as an “occupation collaborator,” and its policy of avoiding engagement with resistance groups closer to the pulse of the street, will reflect negatively on the government's perceived commitment to reform and integrating the people's voice in decision-making. Jordan is implementing an ambitious political and economic modernization program, and is struggling to rebuild citizen-state trust, especially among youth. On the other hand, there is an assumption that the PA's collapse is inevitable during or after Abbas' tenure, along with a possible Hamas takeover of the West Bank. In either case, advocates call upon Jordan to establish relations with the arguably soon-to-be dominant party to prevent
likely spillover from the security deterioration in the occupied territories. Hamas’ recognition of the 1967 borders and its flirting with the Jordanian government throughout the years are often cited as evidence of the pragmatic nature of the movement and its thirst for international legitimacy. It is interpreted as an indication for future softening of its position regarding Israel and other regional issues. Finally, the Egyptian model continues to be a source of fascination for many. Despite branding Hamas as a terrorist organization, Egypt has succeeded in asserting itself as the mediator between the group, Israel, and the U.S. This role has served as leverage for Cairo in consolidating its national interests. Based on these calculations, many call for adjusting Jordan’s engagement strategy and integrating Hamas as part of it.

However, what is missing from this discussion is the inclusion of the voiceless local leadership in the territories and the development of a realistic roadmap for their engagement under the wider Jordanian policy of preserving the viability of the two-state solution. Jordan has a long history of trial and error when it comes to implementing different models of citizen participation in decision-making, particularly among marginalized segments of the population such as women and youth, advancing the partnership between government and citizens, and bolstering civil society. Jordan should learn from these experiences to invest in such initiatives under current circumstances, where Israel’s electoral cycle is still spinning and the PA’s legitimacy continues to erode. Jordan must coordinate with the PA and Egypt to facilitate the inclusion of marginalized community voices and gradually channel the management of vital resources to local communities and foster more accountability on the part of the management. Jordan could also work on creating a credible committee to observe this initiative and work to rebuild trust among the main Palestinian players.
An Egyptian Perspective:

A Short Military Confrontation With Disproportionate Implications

by Hesham Youssef

An Israeli airstrike in Rafah, Gaza Strip on August 7, 2022

No one was ever in doubt about the damage that the Israeli army can inflict on Gaza, or in the occupied territories in general, in any military confrontation. The gap in the balance of power is one of the widest in the region. This has been the case in the wars that took place in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021, and in the latest military attack that ended on August 7, 2022. The duration of the conflict, the extent of the destruction in Gaza, the regional and international response, and other factors varied widely. However, unsurprisingly, like in previous confrontations, each side claims that to some extent it was able to achieve its objectives.
Another Episode in the Unrelenting Cycle of Violence

Israel achieved several important objectives in these wars and military operations. In the latest attack, it assassinated two key Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders and destroyed several of the organization’s military sites. It mostly achieved its objective of separating Hamas and PIJ; separating Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem; and separating the Palestinians and Arab Israelis—three characteristics that contributed to the spread of violence during the previous war in May 2021. This is one of the reasons why Israel avoided a prolonged war, as this would probably have resulted in further complications on these fronts. However, despite the ceasefire, Israeli forces have intensified incursions in the West Bank, killing four people, including an al-Aqsa Brigades commander, and apprehended numerous Palestinians undermining at least one of these objectives.

An Iron Dome battery in Israel

Israeli reports indicate that the performance of the Iron Dome is improving, but so are the capabilities of Palestinian armed groups to launch rockets. The Iron Dome had an 86% interception rate in 2012, 89% in 2014, 94% in 2021, and 97% in the last operation. However, Israel did not expect these armed groups— who have been under siege in Gaza since 2007—to launch more than 4369 rockets in 11 days in May 2021, or 1100 by
PIJ in fewer than a mere three days. The range of rockets increased from two to three kilometers in 2001 to 160 kilometers in 2014. Ineffective as these rockets are, they still terrorize Israeli communities and resulted in Israel closing Ben Gurion Airport in May 2021 and diverting flights in 2022.

At the same time, the region has witnessed how Iranian assistance advanced the capabilities of Hezbollah to the point that it reached some level of deterrence vis-à-vis Israel and allowed the Houthis to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE with significant consequences. Iran is a strong supporter of PIJ and its cooperation with Hamas has been advancing. The siege has not prevented the armed groups in Gaza from strengthening their capabilities, and this is expected to continue with Iranian support, despite all kinds of constraints.

Many in the region speculated that the upcoming Israeli elections played an important role in the recent decisions pertaining to the attacks on both Gaza and the West Bank. Prime Minister Lapid, they suggested, felt the need to present his credentials to voters who are increasingly moving to the right as he has no military experience. Defense Minister Benny Gantz was also viewed as eager to advance his chances in these elections.

On the Palestinian side, Hamas supported PIJ on the rhetorical level but not militarily. It also assisted Egypt in mediating the ceasefire. However, this military confrontation allowed PIJ to demonstrate its military capability when it is on its own. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the relations will be strained between Hamas and PIJ, who lost two key leaders and expected Hamas to be more supportive.

Egypt has been active in efforts to achieve a ceasefire in all the above-mentioned wars and military confrontations. This time it was trying to deescalate the situation between Israel and PIJ to prevent the attack and continued its efforts once it started until a ceasefire was achieved, with important involvement by Qatar. Egypt indicated in the ceasefire understanding that it will endeavor to achieve a PIJ demand that two prisoners held by Israel would be released. Defense Minister Gantz has indicated that Israel will not release them.
What Should We Expect Going Forward?

1. Hamas will continue to try to maintain calm in Gaza while encouraging escalation in the West Bank.
2. PIJ will multiply its efforts in order to make sure that it is independently better prepared if it is again forced to have military confrontations with Israel on its own.
3. Iran is expected to continue, and probably increase, its support to Palestinian armed groups.
4. It is hoped that Israel would be very careful not to undermine Egypt’s ability to intervene by demonstrating some flexibility in relation to the two prisoners held by Israel, as it is almost certain that this will not be the last military confrontation. This ceasefire is quite fragile and already contains the seeds of a return to violence.

Where to Go From Here?

The Israeli government cannot claim that it wants to strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA) while undermining its credibility through daily incursions, assassinations, apprehensions, home demolitions, land expropriation, settlement expansion, and more. The PA may soon be unable to control the security situation in areas under its jurisdiction in the West Bank.

In the latest military confrontation, Israel was able to differentiate between Hamas and PIJ. Israel should be able to explain why this differentiation cannot be applied between the PA and armed groups in Gaza, as for the past decade this is one of the main obstacles to Palestinian reconciliation. Israel should change the Netanyahu policy of holding the PA responsible for any attack, no matter the perpetrator, once it regains control over Gaza as long as other groups in the Strip are not disarmed. The ability of these armed groups to continue to resist one of the strongest armies in the world is their own measure of their success.

Addressing “the residents” of Gaza, Lapid said that Israel knows how to protect itself from anyone threatening it, but it also knows how to provide work, livelihood, and a life of dignity to anyone who wants to live in peace by its side; that there is another way to live through the path of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Summit; and that the choice is theirs—knowing very well that this narrative is a nonstarter from the Palestinian perspective without a clear political horizon. What transpired reconfirms that
Israel is unwilling to accept that what it calls “mowing the lawn” is not a sustainable policy and that maintaining the status quo is a myth. Shrinking the conflict, economic peace, improving living conditions, and all these slogans will achieve neither Israeli security nor peace.

Prime Minister Yair Lapid

There cannot be a Gaza strategy without hope on how to address Palestinian national aspirations. It should be clear to Israel that Palestinian surrender is not an option. The next step for the Palestinians will most certainly be moving towards a struggle for equal rights in one state and not providing further concessions on final status issues.

Israeli leaders have been serving its short-term goals at the expense of its long-term stability and interest. Israel must decide whether it wants to end the occupation or continue to be an occupying power, because this will be a determining factor in its future path.
The PA also has its work cut out for it, as it is at a historically low level of popularity. Its performance leaves much to be desired regarding reaching a vision for achieving Palestinian national aspirations, promoting good governance, and conducting elections.

The international community keeps repeating the necessity of breaking this cycle of violence with every military confrontation—a noble objective that is only paid lip service. In addition to the aforementioned Israeli and Palestinian requirements, there is an important role to be played by the region, Egypt and Jordan in particular. Moreover, President Biden said that “there must be a political horizon that the Palestinian people can actually see or at least feel,” and that “we cannot wait for a peace agreement to be reached or for every issue to be resolved to deliver on the needs of the Palestinian people that exist today.” Europeans also support these points, which are supposed to be the two legs on which progress can be achieved once there is a political will to do so. Meaningful progress is necessary to raise the risk and price of resorting to military confrontations.
About the Authors

Nimrod Novik

Nimrod Novik is Israel Policy Forum’s Israel fellow. The former senior advisor on foreign policy to the late Shimon Peres, Novik is currently a senior associate at the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) and is a member of the Executive Committee at Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS). In addition to Israeli security and political circles, Novik maintains close contacts with the Egyptian intelligence community, Jordanian security establishment, Palestinian political leadership, and Saudi security experts, as well as with senior U.S., European, U.N., and other relevant officials dealing with Middle East policy.

Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha

Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha is a senior political consultant based in the West Bank. Currently, he heads a private think tank in Ramallah, the Horizon Center for Political Studies and Media Outreach. Mr. Dalalsha’s former role as senior political advisor at the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem spanned two decades. He has been named the State Department’s Foreign Service National of the Year for outstanding political analysis/reporting and extraordinary networking/outreach three times throughout his career. Dalalsha has played an integral role in peace negotiations across the Middle East, including the 2014 ceasefire negotiations held in Cairo, in addition to other initiatives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

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Farah has been the Programs Director at the Amman Center for Peace and Development (ACPD) since 2012. ACPD is a Jordanian thinktank that engages in innovative, relevant, high-quality research and provides policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers, public leaders, and the strategic community, both in Jordan and abroad. She is the Director of Seeds of Peace Program in Jordan since 2015, having first attended the Seeds of Peace Camp in Maine as a Jordanian Delegation Leader in 2014. Seeds of Peace is an American NGO that works on equipping exceptional youth and educators with the skills and relationships to work in solidarity across lines of difference to create
more just and inclusive societies. She is also part of The Middle East Training Team at Bosserman Center for Conflict Resolution at Salisbury University; one of the largest academic, practice, and research-based centers in the U.S. that provides innovative and impactful training at the local, national, and international levels for graduate and undergraduate students.

A certified mediator who writes reports about current regional conflicts and has been published in numerous research institute journals.

Hesham Youssef

Ambassador Hesham Youssef was a career diplomat with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt. From 2014 to 2019, he served as assistant Secretary General for Humanitarian, Cultural and Social Affairs of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and completed his term in July 2019. From 2001 to 2014, he served as a senior official in the Arab League, as Official Spokesman and later the Chief of Staff to Secretary General Amr Moussa from 2003 to 2011. From 2012 to 2014, Ambassador Youssef was a Senior Advisor to the Secretary General of the Arab League, Dr. Nabil Elaraby, on issues pertaining to crisis management as well as the reform of the Arab League.