1.             Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors.

There is little argument on this from either Israelis or most non-Hamas Palestinians, though it’s not clear if Israel considers this provision a precondition for withdrawal.  Hamas has long been a menace to the people of Gaza, who suffered under its incompetent and intolerant government, as it was to Israel. That said, the constant sense of deprivation and besiegement Gazans felt, even long before October 7, left many with a soft spot for Hamas’ willingness to act against Israel, even at the risk of violent reprisal. Hamas has also been vastly more successful than the PA in gaining the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails—an extremely resonant issue for Palestinians. This convinced many Palestinians that Israel was purposely empowering Hamas in order to weaken the PA, a not unreasonable conclusion.

There can never be ironclad guarantees that Gaza will be completely terror-free, or that it will never pose a threat of any sort to its neighbors. But the key to reasonably meeting this proposition is curtailing the influence of Hamas, which can only happen by empowering a credible alternative. Israel has lately attempted to empower “anti-Hamas forces” in Gaza, which turned out to be clans or criminal gangs with no legitimacy or staying power. A better approach is to empower a Gazan government that is part of, or clearly connected to, the Palestinian Authority. For all its weaknesses and flaws, the PA still carries some residual legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians and international donors as the only widely recognized framework for Palestinian governance, and an institutional capacity that could not be easily constructed by an entirely new technocratic entity.

2.             Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.

This should be read as reassurance that Trump’s Gaza Riviera and the 20-point plan are not a ruse to cede Gaza to Israeli settlers who clearly crave a return to the territory from which Israel disengaged in 2005. (Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz fed this narrative when he said in December 2025 that Israel would never fully withdraw from Gaza, and suggested—and later walked back—his expectation that Israeli civilian settlements would be reestablished there.) Gaza does, in fact, badly need redevelopment that will require foreign donors and investors willing to help property owners rebuild. This, in turn, will require robust facilitation by Israel to ensure reliable and predictable entry of construction materials, a process that is currently hampered by delays in getting Israeli approvals and “dual-use” lists that limit even some basic materials. Foreign investors, including Arab governments, will also need credible assurances that Israel will not resume bombing newly rehabilitated properties, which is why the success of this element is so inextricably tied to other, more challenging, ones.

3.             If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal.

Here, the ambiguities of the agreement and the motivations of the warring parties create enormous challenges. In theory, both sides agreed to the plan and the war has ended.  But it is not entirely clear what conditions must be met to warrant a complete Israel withdrawal, which party adjudicates those conditions, or what timeline is suggested by the term “staged.” Additionally, while both sides have maintained the stance that the war is over, all military operations have not been suspended. Israel is carrying out aerial operations, such as the one that took out Hamas commander Raed Sa’ad, while Hamas is staging attacks on IDF soldiers along the yellow line. It is also unclear whether battle lines remain frozen, since the yellow line is not well demarcated on a map and only exists with spaced markers that Israel placed and can shift at will.

4.             Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.

The last 20 living hostages were released by Hamas on October 13, 2025. As of now, the remains of one Israeli hostage—Ran Gvili—have yet to be returned to Israel. Israel has claimed that Hamas has been slow-rolling the return of remains. Hamas claims that the destruction and chaos in Gaza have made it difficult to locate all the remains. Both claims are plausible.

5.             Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans who were detained after 7 October 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.

This part of the deal was always going to be lopsided. In 2011, Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. This ratio is lower, but nonetheless highly illustrative of one of the great pathologies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails have achieved a heroic status in Palestinian society, and enormous credibility accrues to whoever gains their release. Palestinians often point out that the lesson to be drawn from these prisoner releases is that the only way to gain concessions from Israel is to kidnap their citizens. The PA leadership also points out how pernicious it is that Hamas kidnaps Israelis and is effectively rewarded for it, while the PA cooperates with Israeli security forces in the West Bank to prevent kidnappings with no reward for its cooperation.

6.             Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries.

It is difficult to imagine how this provision will ever be implemented, or even precisely what the language means.  What does “amnesty” mean in this context? Do individuals only have to decommission their personal arms, or do they have additional obligations to deal with the group’s heavy weapons? In a December 30 interview on Fox News, Netanyahu said Hamas would have to give up all its rifles, which he claimed numbered 60,000. Undoubtedly, some Hamas members would like safe passage out of the misery of Gaza, but it’s not clear if any country would accept them, or significant numbers of any Gazans for that matter, lest they be seen as complicit in expulsion of the Gazan population. Countries are also unlikely to want to take in Hamas members and risk Israeli operations within their borders, or risk Hamas fighters fomenting ideological radicalism. Realistically, implementation of this point would require a tacit agreement to focus on heavy weapons rather than small arms, and an understanding that a “commitment to peaceful co-existence” would, initially at least, mean simply that Hamas cadres no longer represent a threat to Israeli security. 

7.             Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip.  At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the 19 January 2025 agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.

Prior to the ceasefire, the entry of humanitarian aid was painfully slow and inadequate.  According to the CMCC (Civil Military Coordination Center, the body established in October 2025 as part of a ceasefire agreement to coordinate stabilization and relief efforts in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Gaza war), the ceasefire threshold of 4,200 trucks per week is now largely being met.

While there had been improvements to the process for entering humanitarian assistance following the ceasefire, so-called “dual-use” restrictions remain, as do opaque processes for bringing in essential shelter items, medical equipment, and equipment needed to remove rubble and rehabilitate infrastructure. The U.N. World Food Program reports that three-quarters of the population—1.6 million people—are still suffering from acute levels of food insecurity. Winter weather has also left many Gazans with inadequate shelter. In addition, in December 2025, Israel banned numerous international NGOs from providing humanitarian aid in Gaza, a move that will be widely perceived as Israel further hampering the delivery of badly needed aid.

While much of the diversion and looting of humanitarian assistance has been curtailed, this is because Hamas is exerting control and, in effect, policing the red zone. Counting trucks is also not the correct metric, as it gives no indication of how large each truck is and how much it carries. Tracking tons of actual assistance would be better. And better yet would be tracking the extent to which assistance is reaching vulnerable communities. But no matter how one measures the aid, it risks turning into an exercise in meeting an artificial requirement each week rather than trying to solve the underlying problem. 

Ask an economist how to eliminate exploitation of humanitarian aid in wartime, and the answer is usually “flood the zone.” That means if we want to reduce the incentive to loot, hoard, and exploit aid inside Gaza, it needs to be so plentiful that it effectively loses economic value. Access by humanitarian NGOs, in addition to the U.N., should be unimpeded, with clear and consistent permitting requirements. Embedding representatives of humanitarian NGOs in the CMCC is helpful, but more important would be a political decision in Israel and the United States that humanitarian aid will never again be used as a political lever, which effectively punishes the entire beleaguered Gazan population for every transgression by Hamas.

8.             Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under 19 January 2025 agreement.

“Other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party” is a reference to the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a controversial group backed by the U.S. and Israeli governments to distribute humanitarian aid. GHF was shut down when the ceasefire was implemented.

Israel has been reluctant to reopen the Rafah crossing, which would normally be a principal route for Gazans into and out of the territory (including for medical treatment), though at one point said it would reopen the crossing, but only in one direction, towards Egypt. This led to accusations from Arab governments that this is part of an Israeli effort to permanently expel Palestinians and a condition that Egypt rejects.

The plan’s reference to the January 2025 agreement is a nod to the Palestinian Authority without mentioning it directly, as the PA was responsible for administering the Rafah crossing during the ceasefire that was in place from January through March. The delay in opening Rafah may have more to do with Israel’s stance toward the PA than anything else. 

Kerem Shalom, known in Gaza as Karam Abu Salem, is open and has been the principal entry point for humanitarian aid and the entry of people into Gaza. Kissufim, in central Gaza, which was closed in 2005, was reopened in 2024 and remains open, but without large quantities of aid transiting there. Kissufim has been the site of Israeli settlers destroying aid for Gaza and blocking its delivery. Two other crossings are mostly closed: Erez, which was principally used for the passage of people between Gaza and Israel, and Gate 96, a newly created gate opened for U.N. aid.

9.             Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace,” which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of state to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment.

The creation of a technocratic Palestinian committee is an attempt to incorporate mutually agreed Palestinian actors while also sidelining the Palestinian Authority, which would only be granted a role in Gaza at an indeterminate time in the future and subject to a reform program that is not defined. But if this point is to be successful, the technocratic committee should have links to the PA, at least for communication and coordination, if not members with past ties to Fatah or the PA itself. Based on the recent announcement of the technocratic committee, it appears that some proposed members have PA links but come primarily from independent business and civil society backgrounds. This may solve the immediate problem of appointing new local administration, but will not necessarily empower the PA to the extent necessary to displace Hamas in the long-term, particularly when Hamas still retains effective control on the ground. The lack of a clear PA stake may also create foot dragging on necessary reforms. The reform program that the PA has to undertake should also be specifically defined with tangible benchmarks, and should address incitement, basic governmental and budgetary transparency and corruption, and political reforms that create a new political party law and enact basic civil society protections. While Palestinian elections are important, they should not be prioritized at the expense of openness and capacity building.

While the administration holds no love for the PA, the main impetus here comes from Israel, which has maintained from the outset of the war that the PA can have no role in running Gaza. In order for Arab states to sign on to the plan, however, the PA had to be mentioned. This point seems to have been crafted to meet that requirement but pose no problems for Israel, both through its open-ended ambiguity and because Israel does not believe that the PA will ever institute anything beyond cosmetic reforms.

The reality is that no amount of Palestinian reform will result in the current Israeli government supporting a greater role for the PA, much less a path to statehood, because a reformed PA creates greater pressure on Netanyahu to treat them as a credible partner in political negotiations. But resisting a stronger PA role risks handicapping any effort at establishing non-Hamas governance in Gaza. For all its flaws, the Palestinian Authority would have more legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians than any group chosen by foreigners. That said, a government of genuinely competent technocrats could be useful in re-establishing basic government functions. It is still not clear how members of a “technocratic, apolitical committee” would be identified, and how they would avoid being tarred by Gazans as foreign implants or Israeli collaborators, which would place their lives at risk.

10.         A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.

This is the clearest indication of Jared Kushner’s influence in the post-war planning, and is reminiscent of the economic portion of Trump’s first-term Peace to Prosperity plan for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which was released months before the political portion. Many of the people brought into the Kusher-Witkoff team work in the private sector in finance, and the political arrangements in the Trump plan are designed to move Gaza far enough along to then quickly transition to private sector involvement. There is an irony in Gaza being real estate that nobody wants, while the president and his top advisers on this issue are all real estate developers. Whether it be Kushner’s previous musings about Gaza’s development potential, or Trump’s quickly abandoned Gaza Riviera idea, the administration ultimately sees Gaza as an investment opportunity. 

11.         A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.

A potentially useful idea, this was already implemented in 1997. The Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE), to the east of Gaza City, was established as the first industrial estate in the West Bank or Gaza, with the goal of creating an engine of Palestinian exports to neighboring countries. The GIE was developed by PADICO, a Palestinian holding company, with financing from the IFC, World Bank, the EU, and USAID. The objective was to address the shortage of industrial infrastructure in Gaza, and leverage low labor costs there and preferential trade arrangements with the U.S. and EU. A number of factories were established, and the developers hoped eventually to employ up to 20,000 people there, including at a Coca-Cola bottling plant, which opened there in 2016. The GIE was badly damaged in the Gaza war; a full damage assessment has not yet been completed. Investments in a new industrial estate would require assurances that the facilities there would not again be targeted by Israeli air strikes or exploited by Hamas fighters.

12.         No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza.

Many read Trump’s Gaza Riviera concept as an endorsement of forced population transfers, and so it is reassuring that the 20-point plan appears to take this definitively off the table. Nonetheless, more than a few Israeli politicians, in Netanyahu’s Likud party as well as others to their right, continue to advocate expulsion of Gaza’s population, an action that would widely be considered illegal and a war crime. Even if forced transfer is no longer being bandied about, freedom of movement is still far from assured. Both Israel and Egypt adamantly do not want Gazans leaving the territory and staying in their countries, or in Israel’s case, even transiting through, so how precisely those who wish to leave will do so is an open question, given that Gaza’s only borders are with Israel and Egypt. Much of the effort at present is geared toward getting Palestinians not to leave Gaza, but to leave the Hamas-controlled red zone for the Israeli-controlled green zone by building planned communities that are supposed to eventually be patrolled by the new Palestinian force, rather than the IDF. Whether or not this will work is an open question, but if this point is to be more than aspirational, the Rafah crossing needs to open sooner rather than later.

13.         Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration program all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with their neighbors.

Experts in DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) agree that successful disarmament requires a political process, not simply a military one. Israelis may crave the cathartic images of seeing Hamas fighters emerging from tunnels, hands in the air, surrendering their weapons. But what we have seen of Hamas’ behavior over the last two years suggests that while a few may surrender, the majority who are left would prefer to die, martyrs in their own estimation, rather than be seen in a final public capitulation to Israel. 

One scenario being discussed by Palestinians—many of whom badly want to see Hamas disarmed—is to have the weapons collected and put under the control of a committee composed of the Palestinian factions in Gaza, ideally led by Fatah, but with at least the tacit consent of Hamas and PIJ. Disarmament would have to be defined in a way that focuses on weapons that can threaten Israeli forces and civilian communities, and done in phases, with heavy weapons first. The process is also likely to get hung up on how extensively different parties define disarmament; is it only weapons, equipment, and infrastructure that threaten Israel, or does it extend to personal small arms as well? If weapons are decommissioned, will this be the job of the ISF or a different actor? Israel will trust the U.S. to oversee this process, but may not trust anyone else. In addition, such an arrangement risks being read as legitimizing Hamas since it limits their role going forward but does not demand their complete eradication. But accepting their ongoing presence in Gaza need not equate to accepting a role in Gaza that could threaten Gazans or Israel. And the alternative—a relentless military campaign to extirpate the group—hasn’t worked in two years and is unlikely to be more effective going forward, certainly not without aggravating an already dire humanitarian situation inside of Gaza. 

One key here could be the involvement of Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). The current Israeli government will resist this since it is a step toward returning the PA to Gaza and empowering the PA generally. But through some of the worst periods in Israeli-Palestinian relations, and even now, Israeli forces cooperate closely with PASF in the West Bank, and have built a pragmatic modus operandi based on mutual benefit.   Extending that to Gaza is what could save the disarmament effort. On the other hand, the current Israeli approach of working through “anti-Hamas forces” in Gaza essentially means empowering criminal gangs, such as the Tarabin Bedouin. Until his killing on December 4, the Tarabin were led by a mafia leader named Yasser Abu Shabab. Prior to the Gaza war, Abu Shabab made his living principally through drug trafficking and weapons smuggling before the war allowed him to expand into looting. This is not a recipe for “decent governance.” Like much of the 20-point plan, it hinges on Israel removing its veto on PA involvement and defining what PA reform (and sufficient PA capabilities) looks like.

14.         A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbors or its people.

It is unclear which regional partners are supposed to provide this guarantee, or how. Once the Board of Peace’s two-year mandate expires, there is no mechanism for formal international involvement. This may be read as asking parties with influence over Hamas to continuously exercise leverage, or it may be read as an implicit acceptance of further IDF action if Hamas does not comply with its obligations. Regional parties such as Qatar, Egypt, and Türkiye have a finite ability to ride herd on Hamas, certainly not in a way that fully satisfies Israel’s desire for a complete disarmament and removal from governance. A deal that removes Hamas as a threat to Israel is more realistic, particularly coupled with an effort to empower a credible alternative based on the Palestinian Authority.

15.         The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza.  The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.

This will be the biggest test of the willingness of the international community to stay engaged because they will be asked to do what is certainly the hardest task. It is also the most likely point of failure in the whole 20-point plan. There are some countries, such as Italy, that have committed to joining the ISF, and others, like Indonesia, that won’t publicly rule out participation. But that may be primarily because they don’t want to alienate President Trump, whose efforts they genuinely want to see continue.  

Whether or not this succeeds will depend on how the scope of the ISF’s mission is defined. Is it intended to disarm Hamas or be an enforcement mechanism, or is it intended to be a peacekeeping and monitoring force that stays away from any direct confrontation or engagement with Hamas? Who will coordinate between the various forces in Gaza, with the ISF, the IDF, and a Palestinian force, all of which will presumably have different roles but will still create a messy system of overlapping jurisdictions. Will the IDF withdraw concurrent with ISF deployment, or will IDF withdrawal depend on other metrics? Without clear answers to these questions, convincing countries to contribute is a tall order, as evidenced by the recent conference in Doha meant to stand up the ISF, but that resulted in few public commitments. 

It is hard to imagine any Arab or Muslim country—with the possible exception of Türkiye—willing to put their troops between Israel and Hamas. Even Türkiye will not want to be seen protecting Israel from Palestinians, or potentially shooting Palestinians. That said, absent deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force made up of non-Muslim countries from outside the region, Türkiye is reportedly already training forces for this mission, and is probably the only country willing and able to wade into this conflict, reach some imperfect arrangement with Hamas that President Trump can say qualifies as disarmament, and in doing so, create the conditions for a gradual resumption of normal life there.

The reality, though, is that Israel-Türkiye relations are at a low point, and Israel has repeatedly ruled out Turkish participation in an ISF, at least inside of Gaza. President Trump reportedly tried to persuade Netanyahu otherwise when they met on December 29. Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan has claimed that other Muslim countries, including Indonesia and Azerbaijan, want Turkey included. He told the Doha Forum in December 2025 that the ISF’s first mission should not be disarmament, but rather separating Israeli forces and Hamas along the yellow line to prevent renewed war. Israel is principally interested in Hamas disarmament, but Fidan said that the ISF cannot be tasked with the “impossible objective” of disarmament on day one. After securing the border, internal governance must be restored, including establishing a non-Hamas police force, restoring Palestinian administration, allowing humanitarian aid to flow freely, and normalizing civilian life. At that point, he said, Türkiye, Qatar, Egypt, and other regional states will enforce the agreement.

The key to success will be quickly agreeing on the precise nature of the ISF’s mission, and to draw it up in a way that will not place upon it the burden of actively confronting Hamas. If the ISF remains along the border and facilitates humanitarian assistance, leaving direct confrontation with Hamas and patrolling rebuilt Palestinian cities to the eventual Palestinian force, that should unlock more willingness of countries to join. Crucially, there will also have to be confidence among the contributors that Israel is not going to restart the war in an effort to remove Hamas from the red zone once and for all, which will only come from a U.S. guarantee to prevent a new IDF operation.

16.         Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.

This reflects Israel’s natural preoccupation with security, and the language effectively gives Israel the final say on when and to what degree they withdraw. Netanyahu has publicly suggested that the IDF will be in Gaza “for the foreseeable future,” which is at odds with the stipulation that Israel will not occupy the territory. Press reports suggest that Israel is making the yellow line a semi-permanent border, reinforcing fears that it does, in fact, intend to annex part of the territory or replicate the situation of effective permanent occupation that exists in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Hamas has very clearly reasserted itself in the western part of the strip, ostensibly imposing law and order, but also making a clear demonstration of power to Gazans and Israelis alike. As many in the region had feared, and even predicted, two years of brutal bombing have vanquished neither Hamas’ will to fight, nor their capacity.

This points to the potentially fatal weakness of the 20-point plan. Israel is not inclined to withdraw from Gaza, maybe ever, and the continued presence of armed Hamas elements there gives them a natural excuse. Hamas is not inclined to disarm, maybe ever, and Israel’s continued occupation gives them a natural excuse not to. This point in the plan is the one that Netanyahu has used to keep his coalition partners in check, since it is so open-ended as to render any Israeli commitment to withdrawal meaningless. The answer, if there is one, will be highly imperfect. An arrangement, perhaps brokered by Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt, to gain a Hamas commitment that they will not threaten Israel, allowing time for a credible alternative to establish control. And a commitment from Israel to actually withdraw from the balance of Gaza, something only President Trump could cause them to do. Into that must come a substitute system able to maintain law and order, facilitate construction, and begin to offer basic public services.  The organization that was once best placed to offer the two most important public services—health and education—was UNRWA, but it has been so vilified by both Israel and Washington that its involvement is now hard to imagine. Gaza nonetheless needs massive help providing these services, and so some international—likely U.N.—body that holds legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians and international donors will be needed for this critical role.

17.         In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.

This is effectively happening now. Aid is principally entering the “green zone” on the east side of Gaza, where a fraction of the pre-war Palestinian population is located. Hamas remains well in control of the west side of the strip. Aid operations are being conducted through an ad hoc agglomeration of Israeli and U.S. military, the U.N., and NGOs operating out of the CMCC established in Kiryat Gat, northeast of Gaza. Plans are also being carried out to clear rubble and build planned communities for Palestinians in the green zone, and reports suggest that any initial ISF deployment will also happen in the green zone. The theory being advanced by the U.S. is that making the green zone attractive to Palestinians will get them to move there from the red zone, unlocking buy-in from the Gulf state for reconstruction funding and putting increasing economic and societal pressure on Hamas. This is a long shot, but it will also need IDF withdrawal from these areas for it to have the best chance of success, and without a clear benchmark or timetable, that withdrawal is hard to envision.

18.         An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.

This point can be read as a nod to the UAE in particular, trying to build on the language of the Abraham Accords as a model. Numerous organizations exist that have engaged in these dialogues and would be well placed to resume them. They are neither a solution nor a palliative, however, when fundamental political conflicts remain unresolved. Regrettably, this is the case in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

19.         While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.

The explicit mention of statehood is important, given previous Trump administration ambiguity on the issue. No less important is that this language has been codified in a U.N. Security Council resolution and also passed by the Israeli Knesset. Despite this, it is not the clear endorsement of two states that Palestinians want. Palestinians read this element as giving Israel the ultimate veto on statehood, and as any Palestinian will say, they consider national self-determination a right, not a privilege to be granted by Israel. Palestinians also reasonably doubt that any amount of reform will ever satisfy Israel, much less make the Palestinian leadership more legitimate in the eyes of their public. Reform may be good for the sake of Palestinians, but what the Palestinian leadership needs is re-legitimization, something that probably can’t happen without elections. But elections can’t happen without a revitalization of Palestinian politics. Elections that give Palestinians a choice among various Fatah personalities would not constitute re-legitimization of Palestinian governance. And none of this makes sense if the ultimate objective is not acknowledged by all parties, including Israel, to be Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia has publicly made a path to Palestinian statehood a requirement to move toward normalization with Israel. Other Arab governments have made it a requirement to participate in a security force or contribute substantially to reconstruction. So, as disinclined as Israelis are to support statehood, Palestinian engagement with figures in a future Israeli government is important. While the various possible Israeli alternatives to Netanyahu will be no more enthusiastic about publicly supporting Palestinian statehood, they may at least be less committed than Netanyahu to preventing practical progress toward it or obstructing efforts to improve the lives of Gazans and Palestinians more generally.  

20.         The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.

The Palestinian Authority—its leadership and officials—have become deeply estranged from Washington, and so such a dialogue is long overdue. The Trump administration has only tentatively engaged PA officials, and the PA leadership has been reticent to expand contacts and is probably unsure how to go about it. There have also been no political talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians since the collapse of the Kerry process in 2014. Abu Mazen will typically articulate what has come to be regarded as a maximalist position—negotiations leading to a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 lines with East Jerusalem as its capital. While not discarding that goal in the abstract, it would benefit the Palestinians if they developed a pragmatic relationship with Washington and used that to gain Israeli commitments that would improve the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank, starting with an end to settler attacks, greater economic freedoms including property development in Area C, and release of customs revenues that have been held by the Israeli finance minister. The Palestinian leadership should also make a credible argument to the Trump administration for a substantial role in the governance of Gaza, the only non-Hamas entity that has the capacity to do so, however imperfectly.