With the war in Iran ongoing, recent weeks have seen a noted spike in violent attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank. As Israel’s international partners and security establishment increasingly sound the alarm over this ballooning phenomenon, the political leadership faces increasing pressure to take action and has been more forthright in acknowledging that a problem exists. Yet far-right ministers constrain the government’s ability to confront a dynamic that has succeeded in increasing the settlement movement’s footprint.

Events on the Ground

According to Yesh Din, the first 25 days of the Iran war saw 257 incidents of settler violence across 116 Palestinian communities. Extremist settlers, including some who were wearing IDF uniforms, have killed seven Palestinians from February 28 until now. Across the West Bank—including Areas A and B, which include no authorized Israeli settlements—settlers have rampaged throughout Palestinian towns and villages, destroying property and attacking residents, including in Jalud, Deir al-Hatab, and Fandaqumiya. Many of these attacks came as part of a wave of retribution for the death of Yehuda Sherman, an 18-year-old settler activist who lived in the Shuva Yisrael illegal farming outpost in the Shomron. Sherman’s ATV crashed into a Palestinian vehicle in Area A under unclear circumstances. 

As the occupying power, the IDF legally bears responsibility for enforcing law and order over all residents of the West Bank (with the exception of Area A, where the Palestinian Authority has full security and civil control.) Yet in practice, settlers who violate the law by constructing outposts without authorization and use them as a base for attacks against Palestinians rarely face consequences. In many instances, soldiers provide cover for settlers carrying out attacks; those serving in the West Bank are often themselves settlers from nearby communities.

This dynamic was on display in a March 28 CNN broadcast by correspondent Jeremy Diamond from Tayasir, located just outside of Tubas. Settlers had attacked the Palestinian village and established an illegal outpost, followed by IDF soldiers who offered them protection—all in Area A, where Israeli soldiers and civilians are forbidden from entering. The soldiers put a member of the CNN crew in a chokehold and detained the team. On camera, one soldier articulated their officially unsanctioned goal: to achieve “revenge,” help the settlers expel Palestinians from their land, and hold the territory for the Jewish people. 

Israeli Responses and Implications

These increasingly visible instances of settler violence—the CNN incident in particular—have prompted strong condemnation from Israeli officials, most of whom have issued similar statements previously.

• In response to a letter from diaspora leaders sounding the alarm about settler violence, President Isaac Herzog condemned the attacks as a “stain” on the country’s moral character that undermines the rule of law.
• IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir referred to the CNN affair as a “grave ethical incident” and condemned the usage of arms for the sake of revenge. He decried settler violence as harming Israel’s security at a moment when Israel is fighting on multiple fronts. 
• Head of Central Command Avi Bluth called on the settler leadership to confront the phenomenon of “violent lawbreakers” acting “contrary to the law, to IDF values, and to the values of the Jewish people.”  
• Notably, Ambassador to the U.S. Yehiel Leiter, himself a longstanding figure in the settlement movement, similarly criticized the lack of action from the settler establishment. Unlike Herzog, Zamir, and Bluth, this is the first time Leiter has spoken out about this issue since he assumed his official role.

We’ve also seen notable condemnation of the attacks by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, Yesha Council chair Yisrael Gantz, and a slew of right-wing pundits. The government now appears to be taking steps to address the trend, including by reinforcing troops in the West bank, establishing a Defense Ministry administration to combat Hilltop Youth, and curbing outpost expansion outside of Area C. The Netzah Yisrael 941st battalion, whose soldiers detained the CNN crew has been suspended and withdrawn from the West Bank for additional training. There’s even talk of reinstituting administrative detention against settlers who commit attacks, which would allow the IDF to more easily apprehend and hold perpetrators, as advocated for by prominent right-wing commentator Amit Segal, who is viewed as close to the prime minister. 

These condemnations may help temporarily offset international outrage over the spike in settler violence—not just from Democrats in Congress and European diplomats, but also the Trump administration. But without a political mandate to curb the proliferation of illegal outposts and farms, arrest and charge perpetrators of attacks, and fully enforce the law against settlers who carry out acts of terrorism against Palestinians, stern and calibrated outrage alone won’t deliver results. Ultimately, as a tool for clearing Palestinian land for Israeli outposts and eventual settlements, settler violence benefits the goals of the settler movement, even if it causes collateral damage reputationally. With the far right in power, it is unlikely to be reversed any time soon.

While global attention has been fixated on the evolving U.S.-Israel war with Iran, progress on security, transitional governance, and reconstruction in Gaza has slowed or stagnated. Clashes between Israel and Hamas have dropped by an order of magnitude since the October 2025 ceasefire, though Hamas cross-border attacks, retaliatory Israeli air strikes, and assassination strikes on militant leaders continue. Hamas has worked to consolidate political, economic, and security control in its part of Gaza, while the IDF has continued working to clear Hamas infrastructure areas it holds, while creating a physical barrier along the Yellow Line. The humanitarian situation, while still severe, has stabilized under increased aid flows and better coordination. 

However, initial efforts to implement transitional governance measures or advance negotiations have made little progress. The political stagnation is driven by a combination of Israel’s and Hamas’ preference for the evolving status quo over painful political concessions, the stabilization of the immediate humanitarian crisis, and regional and international actors distracted by the war with Iran.

Consolidation of power

Both Hamas and Israel have taken steps to consolidate control of their respective areas of Gaza. While exact percentages are unclear, Israel is thought to control between 53% and 58% of Gaza, with Hamas controlling the remaining 42%-47%. The Yellow Line separating the two areas is demarcated by concrete bollards with yellow flags, set every few hundred meters.

IDF-controlled areas

In the areas the IDF controls, which include the entire city of Rafah, many outlying neighborhoods along the eastern edge of Gaza, and large parts of the North Gaza governorate, the IDF has continued to clear and destroy tunnel networks and other militant infrastructure, carry out substantial demolition of buildings, and seize weapons. Recent IDF estimates suggest that at least 60% of Hamas’ tunnel network across Gaza remains intact, and anonymous IDF officials have estimated it would take at least two years of full control to find and destroy them. The IDF is also physically strengthening the Yellow Line by constructing an anti-vehicle trench and dirt berm along its length. Large sections of this barrier are already complete in eastern Khan Younis, the Netzarim area, and northern Gaza. Combined with earthworks and temporary structures at key outposts set back from the Yellow Line, the IDF has largely consolidated its presence in Gaza and seems prepared for an extended stay, during which it will focus on destroying Hamas infrastructure.

Hamas-controlled areas

Hamas, for its part, quickly reasserted security control after the October 2025 ceasefire, flooding the streets with civil police, bringing the humanitarian aid mechanism back under its full control, and using its internal security units to subdue restive armed clans and clash with the anti-Hamas militias. Hamas (and the other militant organizations operating under its direction) is the only relevant military or political actor in its area of Gaza and maintains full control of the population.

Hamas demonstrations of power and governance take a mix of forms, both coercive and socially oriented. For example, beyond basic traffic enforcement and dispute resolution, police units team with inspectors from the Hamas-run Ministry of Economy to regularly seize and destroy large quantities of foodstuffs they say are expired, as well as to set and enforce price controls, often arresting or beating merchants accused of failing to comply. Some of these proceeds are then used to fund the Ministry of Social Development’s “We Are Your Support” campaign, which has disbursed NIS 500 (~$160) aid payments to war widows, those imprisoned or missing during the war, and other disadvantaged groups like dialysis and cancer patients or amputees. Hamas police also publicize their work prosecuting fraud cases, resolving financial disputes, and defusing inter-clan conflicts or confiscating weapons from them. Hamas continues to suppress or attack political dissidents.

While Hamas has partially re-established internal security in Gaza east of the Yellow Line in Hamas-held Gaza, Hamas police report dealing with significant inter-clan conflicts. Pre-war criminal and physical security problems, ranging from reckless discharge of firearms to murder, persist, while others, like flooding and building collapses, have been exacerbated by mass displacement of the population and infrastructure damage.

Hamas itself also has outstanding conflicts with a network of at least five Israel-backed, anti-Hamas militias headquartered in IDF-held areas across Gaza, as well as a number of clans due to Hamas killing their members during the war. Clashes, including regular back-and-forth assassination and arrest attempts, primarily take place between the militias and Hamas’ Rada (Deterrence) and Sahm (Arrow) units. Israel has repeatedly used airstrikes to protect the militias during these clashes.

Humanitarian situation

The humanitarian situation in Gaza has stabilized and improved somewhat since the October ceasefire, but the population remains almost entirely dependent on aid, and there is currently no way to advance systemic reconstruction. Moving beyond humanitarian stabilization and maintaining a low-level equilibrium requires political progress that would allow reconstruction to begin.

Coordination between Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), the U.S.-led Center for Civil-Military Coordination (CMCC), and international aid providers has improved over time, but tensions remain over congestion at the crossings and complaints about commercial goods receiving priority over aid. Hamas is also widely seen to benefit from the drastically increased post-ceasefire aid and commercial flows into Gaza, which provide opportunities for taxation and smuggling of cash, goods, or weapons. For example, COGAT recently suspended UNICEF aid via the less-used Egyptian route after uncovering smuggled goods in its shipments, and Israel has indicted several of its own nationals in separate smuggling cases since the ceasefire. Challenges also persist with the Rafah crossing, which was opened in February for limited entry and exit but was then closed for almost three weeks in March due to the U.S.-Israel war with Iran.

COGAT reports that roughly 20% of goods entering Gaza post-ceasefire come from U.N. agencies and NGOs operating under the U.N. 2720 coordination mechanism. Other NGOs provide an additional 17% of aid, and states another 28%; the final 35% comes from commercial flows. Roughly 70% of all traffic is food and nutritional products, and most of the remainder is shelter and medical aid. Cooking gas and fuel remain among the most hotly contested forms of aid.

Food availability has reportedly increased sharply since the ceasefire. COGAT recently stated that 1.2 million tons of food had entered the strip in the first 4.5 months of the ceasefire, close to five times the WFP’s minimum baseline need estimate of 62,000 tons/month.

However, food availability and pricing remain highly sensitive to local and regional factors. A brief spike in fresh food prices in mid-February drove a key price index from a manageable 100%-150% of pre-war levels to nearly 300%, and the brief closure of all crossings at the outset of the U.S.-Israel war with Iran and persistent uncertainty due to the war have kept prices at or above that level. With most Gazans unemployed and reliant on a continued flow of remittances, cash transfers from a network of U.N. agencies, and irregular charitable distributions from local NGOs and welfare initiatives, rising food prices prevent many from purchasing enough food and increase strain on the aid system.

A shortage of shelter has eased somewhat, but most Gazans remain in tents ill-suited for flooding and high winds brought by repeated winter storms in recent months. Many others live in or around partially destroyed buildings, which have repeatedly collapsed, especially in poor weather, killing tens of Gazans. Durable solutions require elusive progress on reconstruction. Egyptian efforts to build a major tent city in the now-barren Netzarim area in Central Gaza are moving ahead but would leave residents far from markets and services.

The medical situation has also stabilized at a low level, with 28 permanent and field hospitals, most of them partially operational, currently providing most care to Gazans alongside a network of over 200 health clinics and medical points. Some hospitals have notably reopened damaged wings, and the Hamas-run Ministry of Health has touted several complex surgeries conducted in Gazan hospitals as well as vaccination campaigns, but the medical system’s ability to handle complex cases or provide treatment for ailments like cancer and kidney failure remains sharply limited.

Progress toward Trump’s 20-Point Plan 

Both Israel and Hamas appear to prefer the status quo of a divided and destroyed Gaza to the broader political compromises—on Hamas disarmament, the nature of transitional governance in Gaza, and IDF withdrawal from the strip—required to move forward with reconstruction and a more permanent ceasefire. From an Israeli security perspective, extension of low-level equilibrium and a relatively permissive U.S. policy towards Israeli strikes allows it to continue erasing Hamas’ infrastructure east of the Yellow Line and to attrit the group’s personnel west of it. Politically, large parts of the governing coalition are also fundamentally opposed to further withdrawal from Gaza.

From Hamas’ perspective, the group has won by surviving the post-October 7 war and would rather rebuild and consolidate its position in Gaza, even under intermittent Israeli fire, than to make compromises on disarmament that would fundamentally end its role in the “resistance” and limit it to only political activities.

The impasse between the two parties to the conflict has interfered with international efforts to advance reconstruction and transitional governance in Gaza. Neither High Representative Nickolay Mladenov nor the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a technocratic committee created to handle day-to-day affairs in Gaza under the Gaza Executive Board and the Executive Board of the Board of Peace, have been able to enter Gaza. Few countries have indicated willingness to contribute troops to the International Stabilization Force, which has an unclear mandate and funding base.

Regional actors have stepped into the gap to an extent. In Hamas-held Gaza, Egypt has invested heavily in building tent cities, while Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey have contributed funding and aid. In the IDF-run part of Gaza, the UAE is reportedly exploring a plan to use a Gazan contractor to construct an initial planned community near the ruins of Rafah.

Upcoming elections in Israel and within Hamas are likely to delay more significant decision-making, as both sides prefer to hedge until their internal situation clarifies. In Hamas, the result of the struggle between “moderates” less aligned with Iran and more open to some level of disarmament and hardliners will be a major determinant of what progress can be made in Gaza. In Israel, any perceived concessions on Gaza will play poorly in elections, and the governing coalition will prefer to run on military successes in Iran and Lebanon. 

The current war with Iran has also sapped political and economic resources that might otherwise have been directed at Gaza. The U.S. is unlikely to have time to spare on Gaza for weeks or months to come, and Gulf state donations that were expected to be a substantial part of Gaza’s reconstruction may be redirected to rebuild their own infrastructure and rearm their air defenses. 

Looking ahead

The combination of parties to the conflict who prefer the negative status quo to progress with distracted mediators is a recipe for stagnation, and it is unlikely that there will be substantial progress made on long-term issues facing Gaza in the coming months. However, the status quo in Gaza is neither desirable nor stable, since it leaves Hamas in place, Gaza in ruins, and Israel with a variant of the same security dilemma it has faced since the 2005 disengagement. 

While Gaza has unsurprisingly been sidelined due to the major conflict wracking the Middle East, it remains a critical issue. Any hopes that Israeli or American policymakers have for converting the military dominance and brief regional unity displayed during the war against Iran into more durable integration or normalization with Israel and the strengthening of the U.S.-led security order will run into conflicts over Gaza. Accordingly, trying to advance the work of the internationally-approved Board of Peace and NCAG where possible, keeping up pressure on Hamas to agree to disarmament, and pressing Israel to calm tensions elsewhere, including cracking down on a growing lethal wave of settler violence and halting the bureaucratic push for West Bank annexation, are U.S. priorities. After Iran, whether the high-stakes conflict is a success or not, the U.S. will still need to deal with Gaza: either attention or neglect now will compound.

While Israeli and international attention remains focused on the ongoing U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran, the past few weeks have seen an escalation of ongoing trends in the West Bank. Reduced international and domestic scrutiny and heightened restrictions on Palestinian movement have combined to create a more permissive environment for settler violence. This trend is unfolding alongside continued government efforts to expand and entrench Israel’s civilian presence in the West Bank, including the advancement of new settlements, legalization of outposts, and steps to consolidate control over land in Area C.

Movement restrictions
Since February 28, Israeli authorities have expanded closures and erected additional roadblocks across the West Bank, limiting movement between major population centers. These measures carry a plausible security rationale: reducing the IDF’s operational burden in the territory while resources are diverted to other fronts. However, they have also had deleterious secondary effects. Movement restrictions have left Palestinian communities more exposed to attacks and have impeded Palestinian ambulances and other emergency services, while settlers’ mobility has largely remained unaffected.

On March 15, the IDF’s stepped-up security measures in the West Bank led to the tragic killing of Palestinian civilians by IDF forces in the West Bank that generated international media attention when a group of IDF soldiers and Border Police, reportedly on an arrest mission, shot at a Palestinian family’s vehicle driving near Tammun. IDF fire killed both parents and two of their sons while injuring the two others. Beyond the troops “sensing danger” and reporting that the vehicle had accelerated toward them, there appears to have been no real threat justifying the attack on the family. 

Religious access restrictions
Israel has closed Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan as an emergency security measure amid the Iran war, given that the site typically attracts large crowds that could be prone to unrest. Yet given the significance of the site during Ramadan for Palestinian society, its closure has generated resentment both across the Palestinian arena and the wider Muslim world.

Attacks against Palestinians
This period has also seen a notable increase in Israeli settler violence, which has already been on the rise since October 7, 2023. Yesh Din reported 109 incidents of settler violence during the first 10 days of the war, and according to the West Bank’s health ministry, six Palestinians have been killed by settlers over the month of March. Notable incidents include a raid on Khirbet Humsa al-Fawqa by 20 masked settlers who stole livestock and attacked residents, and settlers opening fire on the village of Qusra, killing a 28-year-old man. 

Some of these incidents have occurred not only in Area C—where such activity has been concentrated historically—but also in Area B, suggesting a widening geographic scope. This shift aligns with a broader push to extend settler control beyond the areas allocated to Israeli administration under the Oslo Accords.

Settlement expansion and entrenchment
Alongside these developments, the government has continued to advance settlement activity. Under the auspices of the Samaria Regional Council and with approval from the IDF and the political echelon, caravans have been placed in the area designated for a new settlement on Mount Ebal, a strategically sensitive location overlooking Nablus and one that would further encircle the large Palestinian city.

At the same time, officials held a ceremony marking the reestablishment of the settlement of Homesh, also in the northern West Bank, where several families have moved into newly installed caravans. Homesh was one of the settlements evacuated during Israel’s 2005 disengagement; following the repeal of the relevant provisions of the Disengagement Law in 2023, it was formally reauthorized in 2025. 

Looking ahead
Taken together, these trends point to a continued deterioration of security in the West Bank: increased restrictions on Palestinian movement, a broader and more frequent pattern of settler violence, and ongoing efforts to expand settlements in strategically significant areas. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 2,360 Palestinians were displaced from their homes between January 2025 and January 2026 as a result of settler violence while IDF operations or demolitions displaced a further 33,648. These dynamics continue to raise pressure on the already strained Palestinian Authority, which Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has been increasingly clear he desires to dismantle to advance maximalist Israeli annexation throughout the West Bank and kill the possibility of territorial separation. With Gaza’s future still in question, the deterioration of any alternative security or governing force to Hamas in the Palestinian arena risks bringing about a period of prolonged conflict and instability.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) claims to have reformed welfare payments to prisoners and the families of dead terrorists—often called “pay to slay”—by making them need-based in accordance with the rest of the PA welfare payments system, rather than tied to the length of a prisoner’s sentence, thereby rewarding larger attacks. This reform is aimed at getting the PA financial relief from two 2018 laws—America’s Taylor Force Act and Israel’s “Freeze Law”—which respectively bar funding to the PA and partially withhold clearance revenue transfers as long as the prisoner and martyr payments exist. However, the reform has yet to be fully enacted, and concerns remain that the old system will continue through different channels. The U.S. can help ensure the PA actually follows through with this reform by conducting a strict and comprehensive audit of the new system and ensuring that it and Israel are aligned on the criteria for determining that the PA has ended the prisoner and martyr payments program. If this process is successful, it would end a major source of political tension between Israel, the U.S., and the PA, help kickstart the resolution of other outstanding Israel-PA fiscal issues, and clear the way for some level of indirect U.S. support to the PA. 

Background 

Since the early 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has paid stipends both to the families of those killed while involved in terror activity against Israel and to Palestinians in Israeli prisons. Today, the so-called prisoner and “martyr” payments system is better understood as a network of benefits for Palestinian prisoners and those injured or killed during attacks against Israel, rooted in several PA laws and cabinet resolutions.  

These benefits include monthly stipends to prisoners, a large one-time grant upon their release, priority or guaranteed hiring for public-sector jobs with a generous salary upon release or significant unemployment benefits, free tuition (including for their spouse and children), health insurance, and other benefits. Years served in prison are also treated as years working in the public sector for the purpose of seniority, pensions, and other benefits.  

Longer sentences yield increased and new benefits. Because the benefits scale sharply with the length of a prisoner’s time served (a proxy for the severity of their crimes) rather than being based on financial need, the U.S., Israel, and others have long argued that this system incentivizes terror attacks. 

Prisoner payments are calculated differently and disbursed by a different organization than payments to the families of those killed and injured (the PLO’s Foundation for the Care of the Families of Martyrs and Wounded). (See Appendix II for details).  

The PA does not disclose the amount spent each year on prisoner and martyr payments or the value of benefits like tuition and insurance waivers. Israel estimates that annual PA payments under this system are usually around NIS 600 million, though due to budget pressures and major prisoner releases, this has gone down after October 7, 2023. This total does not include indirect benefits like tuition and insurance waivers. Payments both to prisoners and to the families of martyrs and the wounded are currently made through the Palestine Post. 

The Palestinian Prisoner Affairs Authority has said that 35,000-40,000 families currently receive payments under the system. 

U.S. and Israeli Legal Structures 

The U.S. and Israel each passed laws in 2018 that impose financial penalties on the PA as long as the prisoner and martyr payment program continues: in the U.S. case, a full ban on funding to the PA, and in Israel’s, withholding of an equal amount of clearance revenues (customs and taxes it collects on behalf of and transfers to the PA under the 1994 Paris Protocol).  

U.S.: Taylor Force Act (2018) 

The U.S. passed the Taylor Force Act in 2018. It restricts any Economic Support Funding (ESF), with very narrow exceptions, to the Palestinian territories that would directly benefit the PA until the prisoner and martyr payments system is ended, the PA and PLO take credible steps to prevent violence against Israeli and American citizens, and publicly condemns and investigates such violence. The Act mandates that the Secretary of State produce a report every six months that evaluates PA compliance or lack thereof with these conditions, presents U.S. efforts to change the PA’s policy, and estimates the amount spent by the PA on the system. 

Taylor Force includes narrow exemptions, such as U.S. aid to hospitals in East Jerusalem, and other U.S. projects related to the Palestinians—such as training PA security forces, USAID grants in the West Bank and Gaza, or contributions to UNRWA—are not affected by the restrictions. However, under the Trump administration, these aid channels have largely been ended or curtailed.

Israel: Freeze Law (2018) 

The Freeze Law states that the total amount of money or in-kind transfers, whether direct or indirect, to detainees, prisoners, released prisoners, deceased terrorists and prisoners, and their families, will be deducted from the clearance revenues on a monthly basis. This is calculated in a year-end report by the National Bureau on Counter-Terror Finance, which the Minister of Defense submits to the relevant ministerial and Knesset committees. For the following year, 1/12 of the annual amount assessed to have been paid to terrorists the previous year is deducted from the monthly transfers of clearance revenues to the PA.  

Between 2019 and 2023, Israel assessed that the PA spent at least NIS 3.07 billion on prisoner and martyr payments, an average of ~NIS 614 million per year, leading to monthly deductions of NIS 50-55 million. Due to reduced payments and a lower number of prisoners following major releases during the November 2023 ceasefire, this figure fell to NIS 470 million in 2024.  

The continued existence of the prisoner and martyr payments causes other financial issues for the PA, including a law passed by the Knesset in 2024 that allows victims of Palestinian terror attacks to sue the PA for compensation due to its prisoner and martyr payments. 

PA Reform Effort

In January 2025, the PA promulgated two laws that:

• Transferred responsibility for social welfare payments and the PA’s computerized financial assistance system from the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) to the relatively minor Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Initiative (PNEEI);
• Established that only “humanitarian and social criteria” (later clarified to be the “multidimensional poverty index” developed by the MoSD) would be used to determine eligibility for PNEEI aid;
• Cancelled all laws establishing and outlining the prisoner and martyr payments system, while giving current recipients the right to apply under the new PNEEI criteria for aid. 

If enacted fully and faithfully, these changes would end the current prisoner and martyr payments system. 

However, the new system has been rolled out in fits and starts (See Appendix I for a detailed timeline). The PNEEI did not publish an application form for beneficiaries until May, and quickly walked back a 30-day deadline after which payments under the prisoner and martyr benefits system would cease. Laws fixing the new administrative and financial structure of the PNEEI were not passed until late July. These included provisions about hiring and creation of new manuals and internal processes to assess beneficiaries, handle disbursements, and more that would take much longer to establish. 

The PNEEI reissued its beneficiary application form in October with a November 10 deadline, and the first payments under the new system began on December 24, 2025. The same month, recipients under the old program began complaining that they had not received payments since November. Because the PA is three months behind and pays partial salaries due to financial difficulties, this meant the August payment tranche had not been released.

By mid-September, the PA claimed the new system was functioning and that payments had ceased to some 3,000 families receiving prisoner and martyr payments. Both Israel and the U.S., however, maintain that the system has continued, and Israel has said that payments increased in 2025. Israeli media reports that payments have continued to at least some families, and Abbas fired his finance minister in early November, reportedly for continuing to pay out stipends to some prisoners.

The reform has engendered repeated and fierce protests from families receiving prisoner and martyr payments and the powerful associations representing them, up to 90% of whom are unlikely to be eligible for aid under the new need-based system. Sharp criticism also came from two consecutive heads of the PA’s Prisoner Affairs Authority, the first of whom was fired for his remarks, almost all Palestinian political and militant factions, and Fatah dissidents. 

The current state of the reform is uncertain.

U.S. Policy Options 

The prisoner and martyr payments reform has potential but remains incomplete and unverified. A reformed and competent PA is core to finding a sustainable solution for post-war Gaza and advancing the Trump plan’s goal of creating a “credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.” Because this reform is high-profile, already partly implemented, and has the potential to untangle other Israel-PA financial issues and open up U.S. interactions with the PA, it is a useful starting point for the Trump administration to develop its thus-far neglected relationship with the PA.  

By engaging with the PA and holding it to a strict standard, the U.S. can verify whether the prisoner and martyr payments reform is fully implemented and help resolve many of the legal and financial issues the program causes. The first step to doing so is to accept the PA’s standing offer for the U.S. to audit the new social welfare program and send a team—composed of Treasury and State Department technical and policy experts with high-level leadership—to conduct a strict and comprehensive audit. The goal of such an audit is twofold: first, to establish that the new need-based system is working as intended; second, to ensure that the old system has not continued under a new name or through a different PA or PLO agency. 

Such an audit would include:  

• Review of the PNEEI’s new benefit eligibility criteria, application process, and benefits schedule to ensure it is actually need-based; 
• Review of the beneficiary rolls; 
• Monitoring of at least three months of payment flows under the new system to ensure disbursed amounts match the benefit schedule and recipient criteria; 
• Full review of a transparent line-item PA budget matched to expenditure reports to ensure the old prisoner and martyr payments program is not continuing through a different channel, such as the MoSD, Finance Ministry, or pension fund, or paying former recipients through military retiree salaries; 
• Interviews with implementing staff at PNEEI to ensure their actual practices match organizational guidelines. 

The U.S. will also need to consider how to deal with less obvious components of the prisoner and “martyr” payments system, such as the guaranteed military or civil service positions and pensions provided to prisoners who served more than 5 years or university tuition and health insurance waivers (see Appendix I). Identifying who was hired, is receiving a pension, or is receiving a waiver or fee reduction due to their status as a prisoner, and confirming payments or benefits for them have ceased would require more effort. However, these benefits are part of the program, whether directly or indirectly. The language of the Taylor Force Act does not explicitly address these instances, indicating the Secretary of State is responsible for deciding what exactly falls within the scope of the U.S.’ certification requirements.

The goal of such an audit would neither be to legitimize an incomplete reform nor to set up a rigorous test for the PA to fail. Instead, it would be designed to thoroughly check if the PA is compliant with U.S. Taylor Force Act requirements regarding the PA, and if not, to work with the PA to bring its new system into compliance. Without U.S. scrutiny and amid persistent Israeli denials that the program has changed, the issue will remain in limbo.

To ensure success, the U.S. and Israel should coordinate on the requisite standards to determine that the prisoner and martyr payments program has ended. While Israel will continue to conduct annual technical assessments on the basis of the “Freeze Law,” an understanding that a successful U.S. audit will satisfy Israel at a political level is important. If the program was truly ended, Israel’s annual assessment of 2026, in 2027, should show a sharp decrease in funding for terror, resulting in a corresponding decline in relative clearance revenue withholdings. 

Implications 

The prisoner and martyr payments system has long prevented progress on many other 

Israel-PA technical disputes regarding clearance revenues, as laid out in Israel Policy Forum’s 2025 report, No Time to Lose: A Blueprint for Reforming the Palestinian Authority. By helping to remove this roadblock, the U.S. can both unlock more policy levers for itself vis-à-vis the PA and encourage the resolution of more outstanding Israel-PA issues, rebuilding a working relationship between the parties. 

For the U.S., the Taylor Force Act lays out four conditions the Secretary of State must deem satisfied to allow financial interaction with the PA:  

• That the PA has revoked all laws or decisions setting up the prisoner and martyr payments system;  
• That such payments have actually ceased;  
• That the PA takes steps to end terror attacks against American and Israeli citizens by Palestinians under its control; 
• That the PA condemns acts of terror and investigates or cooperates with investigations of attacks.  

The first of these conditions was satisfied by the PA’s January decree, if enforced, and the second would be deemed satisfied by a successful and rigorous U.S. audit of the new system. The final two characterizations are more subjective.  

Even if the PA were to satisfy the conditions of Taylor Force, other laws prevent direct U.S. funding so long as the PA pursues action against Israel at the ICC and ICJ. However, compliance with Taylor Force would open up the possibility of funding other projects beneficial to Palestinians indirectly tied to the PA and credibly demonstrate reform to the Trump administration at a critical juncture. 

Appendix I: Timeline of Reform Effort 

January/February 2025 

PA President Abbas announced that the PA would end the prisoner and martyr payments program by making all PA social welfare payments need-based, cancelling previous laws that established and outlined the benefits for prisoners and the families of those killed committing terror attacks. Additionally, all social welfare payments were to be transferred to a relatively new and minor government body, the Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Initiative (PNEEI). Two laws were passed to this effect: 

• Decree Law No. 4 (2025): This amends the 2019 law establishing the PNEEI and has three primary functions:  

1. Expansion of the PNEEI’s mandate to include social welfare programs, not just economic empowerment (Article 3), and instructs the transfer of the PA’s computerized financial assistance system from the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) to the PNEEI (Article 4). If fully enacted, this would give the PNEEI sole control over social welfare payments (separate from other payments like military or civil servant pensions).  
2. Establishing that only “humanitarian and social criteria”—i.e., need-based—will apply to all PNEEI aid disbursements (Article 5). Exact procedures are to be governed by a procedural manual approved by the PNEEI’s council. This council is chaired by close Abbas ally Ahmed Majdalani and comprises six ministers, one representative each from the Palestine Monetary Authority, private sector, and civil society, and an Islamic finance expert. 
3. Cancelling the laws that established and governed the prisoner and martyr payments system (Article 8). If fully enacted, this would end all non-commissary prisoner stipends and release grants, payments to the families of those killed committing terror attacks, and secondary benefits such as insurance and university tuition waivers for direct family members of prisoners or the dead. Families currently receiving benefits under this system have the right to re-apply for benefits under the new need-based system (Article 2).  

• Decision No. 9 (2025): This decision operationalizes the transfer of the PA’s computerized financial assistance system from the MoSD to the PNEEI.; 

March-May 2025 

In late March, PA officials stated that responsibility for social welfare payments had all been transferred to the PNEEI, implying that prisoner and martyr payments had stopped, and said that future benefits would be distributed on the basis of a “multidimensional poverty equation” developed by the MoSD, which includes metrics like housing, health, education, and personal security, and yields a lower poverty rate than the traditional monetary poverty metric. 

On May 8, the PNEEI launched a form for Palestinians to apply for its social welfare payments with a deadline of May 31. According to the announcement, failure to complete the form by this time would result in a suspension of payments—implying that payments were ongoing. On May 14, the PNEEI walked back its stance and said that no beneficiaries would be excluded until the data collection process and new beneficiary list were completed. This clarification followed protests from prisoners’ associations after reports that stipends for over 1,600 prisoners, mostly from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, had been suspended.  

July 2025 

In July, the PA promulgated two new laws fixing the structure and finances of the PNEEI. The laws laid out responsibilities for several key roles, including a board-appointed director-general responsible for running the PNEEI, the director of the finance department, responsible for setting exact disbursement, accounting, record-keeping, and archival procedures, and an internal audit manager to review transactions, statements, and reports.  

These laws call for new positions, hiring structures, and manuals to be established to govern all financial and administrative processes, raising a key question: how could a new need-based welfare system function without any of this organizational infrastructure in place? 

September-October 2025 

On October 3, Abbas reiterated the PA’s commitment to ending the prisoner and martyr payments program and instituting the new need-based program through the PNEEI, calling on Palestinians to fill out the PNEEI application form to qualify for the new aid scheme. On October 9, the PNEEI issued another call to fill out the application form, setting a new deadline of November 10, after which funds would only be disbursed on the basis of the need-based criteria. This implies that the payments had continued in some form up to this point, matching repeated American and Israeli statements to this effect. 

On November 9, Abbas fired the PA Minister of Finance, reportedly for continuing to pay out stipends to some prisoners. Israeli media reported that, though 3,000 previous beneficiaries have been notified they no longer qualify under the need-based system, payments continued to some beneficiaries through the old system. In a November 16 statement, Abbas maintained that the PNEEI was the only channel through which welfare payments would occur and called again on Palestinians to fill out the application form, the link to which many citizens noted had been broken for months. 

December 2025-January 2026

In mid-December, a new wave of protests by families receiving prisoner and “martyr” payments and their supporters against the reform broke out, sparked by complaints by former recipients that they had not received payments since November. Because the PA is three months behind and pays partial salaries due to financial difficulties, this meant the August payment tranche had not been released. 

At the same time, the Abbas-appointed head of the Commission for Detainees’ Affairs harshly criticized the reform, the second to do so, and prominent Fatah figures came out against it.  On December 22, a series of coordinated statements were released by almost all Palestinian militant factions condemning the reform.

PNEEI released statements maintaining that the old prisoner and “martyr” payments system was cancelled and any future welfare payments would only go out on the basis of need. The first round of need-based payments under PNEEI were disbursed on December 24, and the organization later reported that its program included 37,000 beneficiaries being paid between NIS 1440-1800 each month, up from NIS 250-600 provided to 31,000 beneficiaries under PNEEI welfare programs prior to the reform. 

Israel maintains that the prisoner and martyr payments program has continued in a new guise, and stated that payments increased to some $214 million in 2025 from $144 million in 2024, accusing the PA of either continuing to pay salaries through military pensions or directly via PNEEI. A January 2026 non-public State Department report assessed that the old program had gone on until at least August 2025, but did not address the period after that. Social media reports that “martyr” payments went to some recipients in Jordan and Lebanon at the end of January, meanwhile, were sharply denied by PA officials, but rumors of an incoming fix to continue the payments persist.  

The PA has reportedly contracted a private firm to audit the PNEEI. Whatever the results of the firm’s work, due to the audit’s narrow focus it cannot establish that the old payments have truly stopped and that no workaround has been established, only that the PNEEI functions as intended. 

Appendix II

Table 1. Summary of Prisoner Payments Benefits

Based on Cabinet Resolution No. 15 (2013), Decree-Law No. 1 (2013), and Cabinet Resolution No. 1 (2015).
*Year threshold requirements for female prisoners are three years lower for post-release position determinations and two years lower for benefit determinations

Table 2. Summary of Martyr and Wounded Benefits (as of 2010)

Based on excerpts presented in a 2010 AMAN report.
* For those killed unless otherwise specified.

Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in December 2024 at the hands of the Syrian opposition, led by former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, transformed the Middle East geopolitical landscape. From Israel’s perspective, the fall of the regime carried mixed implications. 

Syria was central to Iran’s proxy strategy and served as the most important staging ground for arming and coordinating its proxy forces. While potent and adversarial, Assad’s Syria was a threat Israel learned to manage. Within a few years of the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the status quo in Syria was one that Israel knew how to navigate in order to disrupt and prevent acute threats with minimal repercussions. 

The new Syrian regime, led by al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), has required a fundamental recalibration of Israel’s engagement with its northeastern neighbor. Israel has plenty of reasons to view al-Sharaa’s Syria as a potential threat. The uncertainty and upheaval in the Syrian arena led Israel to take a more aggressive approach to ensure security for the north. Simultaneously, Assad’s departure has created new opportunities for Israel to enhance its regional standing vis-à-vis Iran, bolster security in the north, and even improve bilateral relations after decades of hostility. 

This explainer unpacks the equation that governed Israel’s engagement with Syria pre-2025, lays out the potential threats and opportunities al-Sharaa’s Syria poses for Israel, and analyzes how Israel has engaged the regime thus far.

Points of Contention Between Israel and Assad’s Syria

• Syria’s longstanding objection, along with the rest of the Arab world, to Israel’s establishment, which motivated its participation in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars
• Disputes over access to water resources such as the Kinneret and the tributaries of the Jordan
• Israel’s occupation, and later annexation, of the Golan Heights (from 1967 onwards)
• Syria’s support for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, and other Iranian-aligned actors committed to Israel’s destruction (from the 1980s until the end of Assad rule in 2024)

Israel’s Positioning Amid the Syrian Civil War: 2011-2024

Upon the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Israel adopted a policy of non-intervention: reinforcing the border along the 1974 disengagement line and making it clear that it would respond to direct threats. With Iran and Hezbollah stepping in to defend Assad, the influx of weapons and personnel into Syrian territory prompted Israel to begin striking targets in Syria throughout the early 2010s.

Russia’s direct intervention in Syria in 2015 was instrumental in extending the lifespan of the Assad regime. At the same time, Russia was an actor Israel could speak to directly and that acknowledged Israel’s need to thwart potential threats. This dynamic led Israel to deepen its relationship with Russia and brought about the creation of a deconfliction mechanism whereby Jerusalem would coordinate its military action in Syria with Moscow.

As the Assad regime gradually retook control over most of the country, Israel accelerated its efforts to thwart Iran’s growing entrenchment in Syria in what came to be referred to by the Hebrew acronym mabam (מב״ם), or the “campaign between the wars” (המערכה בין המלחמות). Israel typically did not confirm such strikes, nor did the Assad regime typically retaliate in response to Israel’s interventions. This dynamic largely held following Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel. Unlike Iran’s non-state proxies, the Assad regime did not involve itself directly in the ensuing war. Even as Syria became a backdrop for the escalating Israel-Iran confrontation, the regime remained on the sidelines. 

Al-Sharaa’s Rise and Israel’s Response

The rapid collapse of the Assad regime, as the Syrian opposition swept southward from its Idlib stronghold and seized all major cities within a matter of days, largely caught international observers by surprise. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s organization was known as a radical Sunni Islamist group whose predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, was affiliated with al-Qaeda. Yet once he had assumed control, al-Sharaa quickly turned his messaging outward to the world, signalling his desire to ensure accountable governance and rejoin the international community. 

Suspicious of al-Sharaa’s intentions given his jihadist background, Israel responded quickly to Assad’s fall by seizing control of the entirety of Mount Hermon and the Syrian side of the 1974 demilitarized zone, where it established nine IDF military installations. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Israel would remain in these areas as long as it deems necessary. Israel also initiated an aerial campaign to eliminate much of the former Assad regime’s military capabilities, including chemical weapons. In the months since, Israel’s footprint in southern Syria has reportedly extended to villages far beyond the former buffer zone into the Daraa and Sweida governorates, with Netanyahu demanding that regime forces stay out of these areas. 

Since al-Sharaa’s rise, Israel has attempted to foster relations with Druze communities in southern Syria, many of whom have familial ties to Druze communities in the Israeli Golan, in the hopes of cultivating this minority community as a buffer between Israeli territory and potential jihadist threats. Positioning itself as a defender of the Syrian Druze, Israeli officials have openly threatened retaliation against the new Syrian regime should the Druze come under attack. This dynamic came to a head in July 2025, when Israel struck Syrian regime targets in southern Syria and even in Damascus in response to deadly clashes between Druze and Bedouin tribes in Sweida, with the latter reportedly receiving support from al-Sharaa’s forces. The plight of the Druze garnered widespread sympathy across Israeli society. Upon the signing of a ceasefire between the Druze and the government, Israel backed down from its demand that al-Sharaa avoid deploying troops to Sweida, at President Trump’s insistence.

Amid the backdrop of the Druze massacres and Israel’s intervention, Israeli ministers rebuked al-Sharaa as a terrorist and have even called for him to be eliminated. Such rhetoric was never employed against Bashar al-Assad, a ruler who committed atrocities against his own people and served as an integral link of the Islamic Republic’s regional axis. 

At the same time, Israeli decision-makers clearly recognize that al-Sharaa may be someone Israel can work with. Engaging al-Sharaa is in line with President Trump’s preference who, encouraged by the Gulf countries, met in person with al-Sharaa and subsequently removed sanctions on Syria. On his part, al-Sharaa has repeatedly communicated his desire to avoid conflict with Israel, with figures close to him even signaling an interest in normalization—apparently in spite of Israel’s enduring presence in the Golan. The potential of normalization was openly touted by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, although Israeli officials have since tempered their public openness to ties with Syria following July’s interethnic violence in southern Syria. More realistic is talk of a deconfliction arrangement that sees Israel withdraw from areas seized since Assad’s fall and essentially reimposes the 1974 disengagement agreement.

A complicating factor shaping Israel’s approach to Syria is Turkey, one of al-Sharaa’s primary foreign patrons, which has taken an increasingly rhetorically hostile stance toward Israel since the start of the Gaza war. With Turkey attempting to establish military bases in Syria and a zone of influence in the country’s north, Israeli officials suspect that it is moving toward a Sunni Islamist regional axis hostile to Israel, mimicking the approach used by Iran. Ongoing deconfliction talks between Israel and Turkey were reportedly a success, with both sides clarifying their desire to avoid an open confrontation. Nonetheless, Israel’s military intervention this summer on behalf of the Syrian Druze underscored the tenuous nature of the understandings reached with Ankara, which is set on preventing Israel from establishing a permanent presence or sphere of influence in Syria.

Looking Forward

While Bashar al-Assad was no friend of Israel and unquestionably considered Israel an enemy state, Israel had a clear playbook for operating in Syria under his regime. Even as Israel’s tactics evolved in the years leading up to Assad’s ouster, the strategic goals remained consistent: thwarting Iran’s entrenchment, disrupting arms shipments to Hezbollah, and removing immediate security threats. Israel did not aim to depose Assad. Even as Russia propped him up, it allowed for Israeli airstrikes in Syria because they did not ultimately threaten his rule.

Since al-Sharaa’s rise, Israel has adopted a heavy-handed approach in thwarting threats by extending the IDF deep into Syrian territory, demanding that al-Sharaa’s forces refrain from deploying across large swaths of Syria’s south, and openly questioning whether it would tolerate al-Sharaa’s consolidation of power across the country. This maximalism is to some extent a symptom of the post-October 7 era, in which much of the Israeli public is unwilling to trust that borders alone will keep them safe from extremist threats in their vicinity. Another factor is the tendency among ministers of Israel’s current hard-right government to pander to emotional extremes and populist sentiments, even if doing so impedes a coherent national security strategy.  

Decision-makers in Jerusalem are right to view al-Sharaa and the extension of Turkish influence into Syria with suspicion. But with al-Sharaa focused on entrenching his new regime and bolstering its international standing, a confrontation with Israel is likely nowhere near the top of his agenda. A fatigued IDF preoccupied with Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and other theaters would be hard-pressed to maintain a permanent area of influence in southern Syria, especially if doing so prevents understandings with Ankara and Damascus that account for Israel’s security needs. With intermittent clashes between ethnic groups in Syria likely to continue in the coming months, the Trump administration and Israel’s regional partners can be expected to press Israel to avoid major military interventions that undermine al-Sharaa’s regime. Whether Israel and the new Syrian government are able to set aside decades of hostility and mutual suspicion in favor of an enduring diplomatic arrangement remains to be seen.

The Lebanon-Israel Conflict

Israel and Lebanon have never had diplomatic relations and define each other as enemy states. For decades, Israel’s relations with Lebanon have been simultaneously characterized by military entanglements and limited cooperation. Various players in Lebanon’s multi-sectarian society and fractured political system have differing views on Israel, ranging from deep ideological hostility to indifference to a sense of shared interests. 

For decades, the root cause of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon has been armed militia groups based in Lebanon carrying out cross-border attacks on Israel—initially the Palestine Liberation Organization, and now Hezbollah (see below).

There are several additional points of contention between Israel and the Republic of Lebanon:

• Lebanese solidarity with the Palestinians;
• Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory: Israel controlled territory in southern Lebanon from 1982 until 2000 and, following the recent war, maintains five military outposts on the Lebanese side of the border adjacent to Israeli communities;
• Israeli action in Lebanon, including past political interventionism and ongoing military activity that results in destruction of property and civilian casualties (even if intended to target Hezbollah);  
• Zones of disputed control along Israel and Lebanon’s de facto border, known as the Blue Line—including the Har Dov area, the Alawite village of Ghajar, and several others.

The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict

Hezbollah is a Shiite fundamentalist militia group and political party that has been designated as a terror organization by the United States and dozens of other countries. Hezbollah functions simultaneously as a Lebanese socio-political movement and a proxy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hezbollah is a separate entity from the Lebanese state, but has been the dominant military force in the country and also controls seats in the Lebanese parliament. Prior to October 7, Hezbollah was believed to possess an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and over 40,000 fighters, making it one of the most powerful non-state actors in the world.

For more background on Hezbollah, see Israel Policy Forum’s explainer.

Hezbollah’s ideological and broader geopolitical interests are the main underlying reasons for Israel’s contemporary conflict with Lebanon and are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, irrespective of Israeli policy.

• Hezbollah’s desire to destroy Israel, which is a primary impetus of its military activity and a basic component of its raison d’être.
• Iran’s use of Hezbollah to extend its regional influence and advance its own quest to destroy Israel.

On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah launched anti-tank missiles at civilian targets across the border following Hamas’ October 7 terror invasion. Over the 17 years since the last Israel-Hezbollah war, Hezbollah had constructed tunnels, stockpiled weapons, and stationed fighters throughout southern Lebanon in preparation for an attack on Israel—in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which had mandated southern Lebanon’s demilitarization in 2006. Consistent tit-for-tat cross-border attacks gradually increased in intensity over the following months, resulting in the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israeli and Lebanese civilians from border communities. 

This equation held until September 2024, when Israel increased the intensity, frequency, and range of its operations against the terror group in order to take out senior leaders, meaningfully erode its capabilities, and disrupt its operations. This began with the remote detonation of thousands of booby-trapped pagers and other communication devices, injuring thousands of Hezbollah fighters and catching the group off guard. Along with widespread airstrikes throughout Lebanon, including Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut’s Dahiyeh quarter and the Bekaa Valley, Israeli forces entered Lebanese territory to push Hezbollah back from the border. A major turning point was Israel’s elimination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and most of the organization’s top echelon, leaving it in disarray.

The November 2024 Ceasefire Agreement

The most recent Israel-Hezbollah war concluded with a U.S.-brokered ceasefire in November 2024 that left Hezbollah military capabilities severely battered. It lost most of its senior leadership, over half of its rocket arsenal, and as many as 4,000 fighters. Within Israel, northern border areas experienced the most significant destruction and disruption.

From October 2023 until the September 2024 escalation, Hezbollah maintained that it would continue fighting Israel as long as the war in Gaza persisted. Following Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah, the group agreed to decouple the two fronts and agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon even as the war in Gaza persisted. 

Key points of the ceasefire agreement:

• Complete IDF and Hezbollah withdrawal from southern Lebanon within 60 days;
• LAF to carry out the demilitarization of southern Lebanon and prevent transfer of arms into Lebanon from abroad;
• Deployment of 10,000 LAF troops to southern Lebanon;
• Full implementation of UNSCR 1701, without precluding Israel or Lebanon from exercising their right to self-defense; 
• Establishment of a U.S.-led International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism (IMIM) including France, UNIFIL, Israel, and Lebanon to alert the LAF to violations of the ceasefire agreement reported by Israel.

An unpublished U.S.-Israel side letter to the agreement reportedly confirmed Israel’s right to act against threats in Lebanon that the LAF fails to address.

The original agreement set January 27 as the date by which Israel and Hezbollah were to have completed withdrawing from southern Lebanon. Israel delayed its withdrawal until February 18 after the U.S. and Israel assessed that the LAF and UNIFIL failed to meet the January 27 deadline to disarm Hezbollah in the area. Israel subsequently announced that it would indefinitely maintain a military presence on five strategic points across the border, despite previously committing to a full withdrawal to the Blue Line.

Lebanon’s New Political Outlook

The war with Israel significantly eroded Hezbollah’s military power, political clout, and domestic standing within Lebanon and catalyzed an end to the country’s longstanding political deadlock. With Hezbollah weakened, the U.S., Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were able to leverage their influence to push for the election of Joseph Aoun as Lebanon’s president, who in turn appointed International Court of Justice Chief Judge Nawaf Salam as prime minister. Aoun’s election and Salam’s successful formation of a government ended a two-year period during which Lebanon lacked a president and an empowered cabinet.

Unlike their immediate predecessors, neither Aoun nor Salam is aligned with Hezbollah. Lebanon’s new president and prime minister have both expressed a commitment to asserting the state’s independence and monopoly on power and the use of force, and fully implementing the ceasefire agreement with Israel and UNSCR 1701. Hezbollah has less influence in Salam’s cabinet than in previous ones, but the cabinet still includes four ministers from the other Shiite movement, Amal. 

Since the November ceasefire agreement was signed, the LAF has taken meaningful steps to increase its presence in southern Lebanon, dismantle Hezbollah outposts, and confiscate weapons, in line with the Lebanese government’s commitment to upholding the ceasefire. 

However, this progress has advanced slowly relative to the timeframe stipulated by the ceasefire agreement, which had called for the immediate deployment of 10,000 LAF troops to southern Lebanon. The Lebanese military’s ability to rein in Hezbollah is hindered by insufficient manpower, outdated equipment, and political constraints. Aoun has said that Hezbollah’s disarmament will be achieved through dialogue, rather than by force. There also appears to be a disagreement between the two sides over the sequencing of southern Lebanon’s demilitarization, with Israel demanding Hezbollah’s dismantlement and the LAF’s deployment as a precondition for a full IDF withdrawal.

Israel cites limited LAF progress demilitarizing southern Lebanon and occasional rocket attacks (that Hezbollah has not been claiming responsibility for) as justification for continuing to hold five outposts north of the Blue Line and carry out targeted strikes in Lebanon. Other possible reasons include a desire to leverage the outposts as a bargaining chip in talks with Lebanon and to reassure Israeli civilians residing close to the border that sufficient measures are in place to defend their communities. Even with their government-funded temporary relocation expiring on March 1, many of the 60,000 evacuees from northern Israel have opted not to return home given the still-uncertain security situation. 

Israel-Lebanon Bilateral Engagement

Even as intermittent exchanges of fire and Israeli presence in southern Lebanon strain the ceasefire, the U.S. and France have facilitated several direct interactions between the Israeli and Lebanese militaries at the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura focused on resolving disputes surrounding ceasefire implementation. These talks have resulted in Israel releasing several Lebanese detainees, including at least one member of Hezbollah, a move that was framed by Israel as a gesture of goodwill to President Aoun.  

Israel and Lebanon announced the establishment of three joint working groups with American and French mediation to resolve outstanding disputes between the two countries, including Israel’s five outposts in Lebanon, the 13 disputed points along the Blue Line, and Lebanese prisoners in Israel.

Looking Forward

Despite the proclamations of senior Israeli officials quoted in the media, it is unlikely that the U.S.- and France-led discussions will result in full normalization between the two countries anytime soon. Prime Minister Salam and President Aoun have both ruled out normalization, and with Hezbollah sidelined but still powerful, the domestic situation in Lebanon is far from conducive to an embrace of Israel.

The relevant question is not whether the post-war period will lead to overt peace in the near future, but whether it will result in enduring or just temporary quiet. 

Hezbollah’s defeat has created a genuine opening for political change in Lebanon, reflected by the country’s new leadership. Neither Salam nor Aoun have any interest in enduring military conflict with Israel and have an interest in demonstrating to Israel, the U.S., and the international community a real commitment to demilitarizing the country’s south and resolving bilateral disputes between the countries. That Israeli and Lebanese officials are meeting face to face is a testament to both sides’ willingness to enter a new chapter.

Nonetheless, there are reasons to temper optimism about the new status quo. Neither side has done its part to fully implement the ceasefire, with Israel and Lebanese militants both still present in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah remains a powerful entity in Lebanon with social and political clout, and the intent to rebuild militarily. While weakened by Israel’s aerial attack in October and the fall of the Assad regime in December, Iran is unlikely to willingly retreat from Lebanon for the long term. The new cabinet will be hard-pressed to advance the country’s reconstruction without external support and some degree of cooperation from Hezbollah. Salam is outspokenly opposed to Israel, which he recently referred to as “the enemy.” Recent ceasefire violations do not appear to threaten the agreement or suggest an imminent return to war, but do underscore that the Israel-Lebanon border remains volatile. 

The effectiveness of the LAF may be a decisive factor in determining whether the ceasefire will hold. The Lebanese military has historically received substantial support from the U.S. Even so, in the period between the 2006 war and October 7, the LAF did not succeed in asserting full control over southern Lebanon and preventing Hezbollah’s entrenchment. Despite the LAF’s mixed record, continued U.S. support will likely prove essential in increasing the capabilities of the LAF and preventing other actors, including Iran, from asserting greater influence over Lebanon’s rehabilitation.  After initially freezing most foreign aid back in January, the Trump administration’s decision to release $95 million in funding to the LAF is a positive step. Israel will likely retain its footholds in southern Lebanon until the LAF has completed the job of demilitarizing and deploying into the area and it is confident that Hezbollah no longer poses a near-term threat to Israel. 

Even if that happens, and Israel and Lebanon are able to resolve their border disputes, Hezbollah and Iran are unlikely to abandon their efforts in the near term to use Lebanon as a front for their long-term aspiration of destroying Israel. To prevent Hezbollah from regaining its strength over the coming years, Israel, the government of Lebanon, and the international community must cooperate to prevent the group’s rearmament and ensure that the LAF and UNIFIL remain the only militarized entities in southern Lebanon. Doing so is easier said than done, and will depend on sufficient international support for the LAF and political will within Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from violating the ceasefire.

The Syrian civil war entered a new and uncharted phase this weekend with the shocking fall of Bashar al-Assad’s 24-year dictatorship. A loose alliance of rebel groups in Syria’s northwest, led by the Sunni jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), swept southwards and took Damascus in a 12-day lightning offensive amidst the Syrian army’s collapse. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, overstretched by other wars, stood by while Assad fled to Moscow and a key link in the axis of resistance disappeared.

What does this mean for Israel?

Assad was a staunch enemy of Israel, and under his rule, Syria became a conduit for Iranian arms and personnel flows to Hezbollah across the Iran-Lebanon land bridge. His demise further isolates Hezbollah, already severely damaged after a two-month war with Israel, and reduces Iranian influence in Syria, both positive developments for Israel. However, under Assad, there were no Israel-Syria border clashes for decades, and after October 7, Syria did not attack Israel or allow other groups to attack from its territory. For better and worse, Assad was the devil Israel knew.

The new Syria presents fresh challenges for Israel. The most straightforward are the stores of advanced weapons, including chemical weapons, left behind in military sites across Syria. Israel’s heavy bombardments of bases, military research centers, and other sites around Syria over the last few days are designed to prevent these stores from falling into enemy hands. While HTS issued a statement saying it considered the use of chemical weapons a crime and would work to secure them, Israel has learned the lessons of the past and will take actions it deems necessary to secure itself.

Israel was surprised by the speed of the Assad regime’s collapse, and as Damascus fell, quickly secured the 235-km2 U.N.-monitored buffer zone and the Syrian side of Mt. Hermon, critical high ground overlooking southern Syria. The IDF called these deployments defensive and temporary, but said it would stay as long as security conditions necessitated. Israel also accelerated the construction of a barrier, called “New East,” which has been in the works for months and is designed to block vehicles. The IDF remembers the mid-2010s, when armed factions fought for years very close to the Israeli border, and wants to keep the chaos further away.

The strategic effects of Assad’s fall are also mixed for Israel. Israel has good ties with some rebel factions—namely, Kurdish forces that hold most of Syria’s east and the Druze in the south. However, HTS is al-Qaida’s former Syrian branch, and its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Golani), was a member of an early version of the Islamic State. While HTS claims to have moderated and to have no interest in global jihad, they are no friends of Israel. Jolani’s chosen last name also foreshadows conflict over territory; his family hails from the Golan Heights, which Israel partly occupied after the 1973 War and annexed in 1981.

HTS is also backed by Turkey, whose president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has emerged as Israel’s sharpest non-Iranian critic and placed a trade embargo on Israel. Turkey is poised to become the dominant international player in Syria, and is already accelerating its war against Syrian Kurds. 

Syrian instability also threatens Jordan, which is financially strapped, struggling to manage an enormous refugee population, and fighting low-level conflicts to stop drugs and arms flows from Syria. Iran has long sought to destabilize the kingdom, and is sure to redouble its efforts. Israel’s border with Jordan is its longest and least defended, making Jordanian security a top priority. 

Israel’s dominant interest is in strengthening its border and preventing unfriendly actors from setting up shop in southern Syria. However, the IDF’s deployment in the buffer zone will face greater scrutiny over time and is likely to cause friction with a new Syrian government. In the long-term, figures like Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and National Unity Party leader Benny Gantz have called for closer ties with the Kurds, who face an intensified Turkish campaign against them and may be targeted by other rebel groups, and the Druze. Israel will have to weigh the benefits of bringing those relationships into the light against the challenges that may cause for those groups in Syria.

Syria is at a crossroads, and its new order will be shaped by Syrians themselves. A stable Syria with sustainable, accepted arrangements with its minority populations is in Israel’s interest, but Israel has little to no influence over that. Israel’s primary concern is that Syria does not again become a haven for Iran or any enemy actor, and its policies will likely be predicated on that condition above all else.