Israel and the New Syria

Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in December 2024 at the hands of the Syrian opposition, led by former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, transformed the Middle East geopolitical landscape. From Israel’s perspective, the fall of the regime carried mixed implications. 

Syria was central to Iran’s proxy strategy and served as the most important staging ground for arming and coordinating its proxy forces. While potent and adversarial, Assad’s Syria was a threat Israel learned to manage. Within a few years of the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the status quo in Syria was one that Israel knew how to navigate in order to disrupt and prevent acute threats with minimal repercussions. 

The new Syrian regime, led by al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), has required a fundamental recalibration of Israel’s engagement with its northeastern neighbor. Israel has plenty of reasons to view al-Sharaa’s Syria as a potential threat. The uncertainty and upheaval in the Syrian arena led Israel to take a more aggressive approach to ensure security for the north. Simultaneously, Assad’s departure has created new opportunities for Israel to enhance its regional standing vis-à-vis Iran, bolster security in the north, and even improve bilateral relations after decades of hostility. 

This explainer unpacks the equation that governed Israel’s engagement with Syria pre-2025, lays out the potential threats and opportunities al-Sharaa’s Syria poses for Israel, and analyzes how Israel has engaged the regime thus far.

Points of Contention Between Israel and Assad’s Syria

• Syria’s longstanding objection, along with the rest of the Arab world, to Israel’s establishment, which motivated its participation in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars
• Disputes over access to water resources such as the Kinneret and the tributaries of the Jordan
• Israel’s occupation, and later annexation, of the Golan Heights (from 1967 onwards)
• Syria’s support for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah, and other Iranian-aligned actors committed to Israel’s destruction (from the 1980s until the end of Assad rule in 2024)

Israel’s Positioning Amid the Syrian Civil War: 2011-2024

Upon the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Israel adopted a policy of non-intervention: reinforcing the border along the 1974 disengagement line and making it clear that it would respond to direct threats. With Iran and Hezbollah stepping in to defend Assad, the influx of weapons and personnel into Syrian territory prompted Israel to begin striking targets in Syria throughout the early 2010s.

Russia’s direct intervention in Syria in 2015 was instrumental in extending the lifespan of the Assad regime. At the same time, Russia was an actor Israel could speak to directly and that acknowledged Israel’s need to thwart potential threats. This dynamic led Israel to deepen its relationship with Russia and brought about the creation of a deconfliction mechanism whereby Jerusalem would coordinate its military action in Syria with Moscow.

As the Assad regime gradually retook control over most of the country, Israel accelerated its efforts to thwart Iran’s growing entrenchment in Syria in what came to be referred to by the Hebrew acronym mabam (מב״ם), or the “campaign between the wars” (המערכה בין המלחמות). Israel typically did not confirm such strikes, nor did the Assad regime typically retaliate in response to Israel’s interventions. This dynamic largely held following Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel. Unlike Iran’s non-state proxies, the Assad regime did not involve itself directly in the ensuing war. Even as Syria became a backdrop for the escalating Israel-Iran confrontation, the regime remained on the sidelines. 

Al-Sharaa’s Rise and Israel’s Response

The rapid collapse of the Assad regime, as the Syrian opposition swept southward from its Idlib stronghold and seized all major cities within a matter of days, largely caught international observers by surprise. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s organization was known as a radical Sunni Islamist group whose predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, was affiliated with al-Qaeda. Yet once he had assumed control, al-Sharaa quickly turned his messaging outward to the world, signalling his desire to ensure accountable governance and rejoin the international community. 

Suspicious of al-Sharaa’s intentions given his jihadist background, Israel responded quickly to Assad’s fall by seizing control of the entirety of Mount Hermon and the Syrian side of the 1974 demilitarized zone, where it established nine IDF military installations. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Israel would remain in these areas as long as it deems necessary. Israel also initiated an aerial campaign to eliminate much of the former Assad regime’s military capabilities, including chemical weapons. In the months since, Israel’s footprint in southern Syria has reportedly extended to villages far beyond the former buffer zone into the Daraa and Sweida governorates, with Netanyahu demanding that regime forces stay out of these areas. 

Since al-Sharaa’s rise, Israel has attempted to foster relations with Druze communities in southern Syria, many of whom have familial ties to Druze communities in the Israeli Golan, in the hopes of cultivating this minority community as a buffer between Israeli territory and potential jihadist threats. Positioning itself as a defender of the Syrian Druze, Israeli officials have openly threatened retaliation against the new Syrian regime should the Druze come under attack. This dynamic came to a head in July 2025, when Israel struck Syrian regime targets in southern Syria and even in Damascus in response to deadly clashes between Druze and Bedouin tribes in Sweida, with the latter reportedly receiving support from al-Sharaa’s forces. The plight of the Druze garnered widespread sympathy across Israeli society. Upon the signing of a ceasefire between the Druze and the government, Israel backed down from its demand that al-Sharaa avoid deploying troops to Sweida, at President Trump’s insistence.

Amid the backdrop of the Druze massacres and Israel’s intervention, Israeli ministers rebuked al-Sharaa as a terrorist and have even called for him to be eliminated. Such rhetoric was never employed against Bashar al-Assad, a ruler who committed atrocities against his own people and served as an integral link of the Islamic Republic’s regional axis. 

At the same time, Israeli decision-makers clearly recognize that al-Sharaa may be someone Israel can work with. Engaging al-Sharaa is in line with President Trump’s preference who, encouraged by the Gulf countries, met in person with al-Sharaa and subsequently removed sanctions on Syria. On his part, al-Sharaa has repeatedly communicated his desire to avoid conflict with Israel, with figures close to him even signaling an interest in normalization—apparently in spite of Israel’s enduring presence in the Golan. The potential of normalization was openly touted by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, although Israeli officials have since tempered their public openness to ties with Syria following July’s interethnic violence in southern Syria. More realistic is talk of a deconfliction arrangement that sees Israel withdraw from areas seized since Assad’s fall and essentially reimposes the 1974 disengagement agreement.

A complicating factor shaping Israel’s approach to Syria is Turkey, one of al-Sharaa’s primary foreign patrons, which has taken an increasingly rhetorically hostile stance toward Israel since the start of the Gaza war. With Turkey attempting to establish military bases in Syria and a zone of influence in the country’s north, Israeli officials suspect that it is moving toward a Sunni Islamist regional axis hostile to Israel, mimicking the approach used by Iran. Ongoing deconfliction talks between Israel and Turkey were reportedly a success, with both sides clarifying their desire to avoid an open confrontation. Nonetheless, Israel’s military intervention this summer on behalf of the Syrian Druze underscored the tenuous nature of the understandings reached with Ankara, which is set on preventing Israel from establishing a permanent presence or sphere of influence in Syria.

Looking Forward

While Bashar al-Assad was no friend of Israel and unquestionably considered Israel an enemy state, Israel had a clear playbook for operating in Syria under his regime. Even as Israel’s tactics evolved in the years leading up to Assad’s ouster, the strategic goals remained consistent: thwarting Iran’s entrenchment, disrupting arms shipments to Hezbollah, and removing immediate security threats. Israel did not aim to depose Assad. Even as Russia propped him up, it allowed for Israeli airstrikes in Syria because they did not ultimately threaten his rule.

Since al-Sharaa’s rise, Israel has adopted a heavy-handed approach in thwarting threats by extending the IDF deep into Syrian territory, demanding that al-Sharaa’s forces refrain from deploying across large swaths of Syria’s south, and openly questioning whether it would tolerate al-Sharaa’s consolidation of power across the country. This maximalism is to some extent a symptom of the post-October 7 era, in which much of the Israeli public is unwilling to trust that borders alone will keep them safe from extremist threats in their vicinity. Another factor is the tendency among ministers of Israel’s current hard-right government to pander to emotional extremes and populist sentiments, even if doing so impedes a coherent national security strategy.  

Decision-makers in Jerusalem are right to view al-Sharaa and the extension of Turkish influence into Syria with suspicion. But with al-Sharaa focused on entrenching his new regime and bolstering its international standing, a confrontation with Israel is likely nowhere near the top of his agenda. A fatigued IDF preoccupied with Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and other theaters would be hard-pressed to maintain a permanent area of influence in southern Syria, especially if doing so prevents understandings with Ankara and Damascus that account for Israel’s security needs. With intermittent clashes between ethnic groups in Syria likely to continue in the coming months, the Trump administration and Israel’s regional partners can be expected to press Israel to avoid major military interventions that undermine al-Sharaa’s regime. Whether Israel and the new Syrian government are able to set aside decades of hostility and mutual suspicion in favor of an enduring diplomatic arrangement remains to be seen.