Critical Neighbors: Egypt, Jordan, and the Israeli-Palestinian Arena

In setting the stage for a concrete suggestion for leveraging the Abraham Accords to stabilize the Israeli-Palestinian arena and salvage hope for a future peace process, it is important to consider three relevant contexts: Israeli, Palestinian, and regional.

Israel: Warnings Ignored

In recent weeks, security correspondents have reported on the Israeli government’s belated awakening to the explosive situation in the West Bank. Though some placed the blame exclusively on the Palestinian Authority, most spared no criticism of Israel’s decade-long policy of strengthening Hamas in Gaza while weakening the PA in the West Bank. Worse yet, even at this critical juncture, senior security officials censor subordinates’ recommendations so as not to present members of the cabinet with information they prefer not to hear. 

The reality of an over three-year endless election eve seems to be at play here. On the one hand, cabinet members realize the need for a swift and meaningful change of course to restore stability by strengthening the PA and restoring some of its legitimacy, thereby bolstering the legitimacy and durability of its security coordination with Israel. On the other hand, they are deterred from doing so lest the leader of the opposition, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, manipulate such efforts for his election needs by presenting them as surrendering to terror. Thus, hope that no major catastrophe occurs prior to the November 1 election substitutes for taking action.

Palestinians: An Urgent Need for Legitimacy

Israeli reports of over a dozen incidents where Palestinian security officers turned their weapons against IDF units remind me of the words of a Palestinian security chief who, well over two years ago, shared his “worst nightmare” with a visiting Israel Policy Forum leadership delegation. His message was that in the absence of a political horizon, his troops were perceived by family, friends, and others, as “subcontractors of the Israeli occupation, if not traitors,” and “the moment would come when they yield to peer pressure and seek rehabilitation by turning their weapons on Israelis.”

The lack of national elections for well over a decade and a half and other un-democratic practices, the widespread perception of PA corruption and poor governance, and the failure to demonstrate that the PA is the vehicle driving Palestinians to statehood and independence all have contributed to the Palestinian public wishing to see its government and leadership gone. Arab-Israeli normalization (both the Abraham Accords and subtle, yet significant steps taken by other states) amid continued Israeli settlement expansion and routine IDF operations throughout the West Bank is seen as a betrayal of their cause, further aggravating public despair. 

Cognizant of the explosiveness of these trends, yet true to his commitment of non-violent resistance, the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), has sought to regain some credibility by getting the attention of the international community. However, even there his efforts have been met with potent pushback. For example, in recent meetings with senior American diplomats, Palestinian leaders expressed dismay at the U.S. objection to their effort to upgrade Palestine’s standing at the U.N. Their message was, roughly, “if we are unable to deliver some hope to our people via non-violent means, what alternative are you suggesting?”

The Region: Reality Hits Home

As we mark the second anniversary of the signing of the Abraham Accords and all eyes are on the exciting people-to-people, government-to-government, business, academic, scientific, and (albeit discreet) security cooperation it unleashed, few, including Israel, have paid notice to the challenges posed by the Accords.   

A rare exception was the notes of caution expressed by the thoughtful Yousef al-Otaiba, the able UAE ambassador to the U.S. The diplomat, whose groundbreaking opinion piece in an Israeli Hebrew newspaper over two years ago presented Israelis with a choice between West Bank annexation and regional normalization, was again the first to challenge the conventional wisdom that normalization was immune to Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Speaking at the Atlantic Council on September 8, he—unprompted—repeatedly brought up the need for progress on the two-state solution, including when asked to enumerate the challenges to the normalization process. A few days later, while visiting Jerusalem, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan also expressed his country’s wish to see progress toward an eventual two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

Out of context, these statements might be taken for lip service. In context, they probably were not. The first major challenge to the initial conventional wisdom that normalization could be decoupled from Israeli-Palestinian violence came during the May 2021 11-day Gaza war. Then, senior officials from Accords signatories communicated their concerns to their U.S. and Israeli counterparts. Specifically, while acknowledging Israel’s right of self-defense, they urged Defense Minister Benny Gantz to factor the effect of the war and its broadcasted images on their ability to proceed with normalization as planned and to protect what had already been accomplished. 

That message has since been repeatedly conveyed to Israeli leaders, including to Foreign Minister Yair Lapid by his regional counterparts during the first Negev Summit in March 2022, to then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett when visiting Bahrain in February 2022. In the wake of the April 2022 Jerusalem violence, the UAE went even further, leveraging its U.N. Security Council seat in order to convene a special session on the subject. 

What to Do: The Arab Peace Initiative Is Key

Whether it is eager to join or not, the PA’s exclusion from the Negev Forum, an official framework for regional cooperation created with the March 2022 summit of Accords signatories, Egypt, and the U.S., accentuates its isolation and helplessness. Likewise, Jordan’s participation is essential but seems to be conditioned on PA participation. Should the two be included going forward, they stand to benefit both separately and jointly, as do prospects for regional stability. Indeed, their inclusion can gradually help both reduce tensions (e.g. between the UAE and the PA) and enlist Negev Forum participants to support an Israeli-Palestinian process, however tentative. Still, for both to engage, a potent incentive and political cover are required.

Even in the wake of the Abraham Accords, Arab states—signatories included—have continued to express adherence to the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative (API). This was certainly the case when, on September 20 during the U.N. General Assembly in New York, Saudi Arabia convened representatives of 25 countries and multilateral organizations (including the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the U.N., and the EU) for a meeting designed to “relaunch the Arab Peace Initiative”.

Creating a platform for Negev Forum deliberations on the API that acknowledges the initiative’s significance would serve several objectives:

• Reviving the political horizon for two states, which is an urgent prerequisite for stabilizing the PA by restoring some of its credibility and legitimacy.
• Persuading both the PA and Jordan to join the Negev Forum. 
• Encouraging the Negev Forum’s Arab members to engage in the Israeli-Palestinian process. 
• Incentivizing other Arab states either to normalize ties with Israel or (as might be the case with the more cautious Saudi Arabia) to structure other pathways for normalization.

It is therefore proposed to explore the idea of creating a platform for amicable discussion of the API within the Negev Forum. Specifically:

• The Negev Forum could serve as a channel for Israel to engage with Arab participants (and non-participants, possibly including Saudi nationals) on the subject of the API. This would allow Israel to seek clarifications on specific aspects of the API and discuss its reservations.
• With time, relevant scholars, including from non-Abraham Accords signatories (e.g. Saudi Arabia), may also accept invitations to engage in such discussions.
• This process could enable all involved, including Israel, to express support for the API in individual and joint statements.
• Ultimately, this dialogue could yield a dedicated API working group, whose mission would be to discuss how to operationalize the API and turn its vision into an action plan.

The Elephant in the Room: Israeli Elections

In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, Prime Minister Yair Lapid made formal his support for the two-state solution. In addition, he has long emphasized the strategic importance of peace with Jordan and prioritized expanding the circle of Arab-Israeli normalization. With that in mind, he can be expected to be open to having the Negev Forum engage in API deliberations as suggested above. As the ‘father’ of the Negev Summit, he has already provided concrete evidence of his wish to see the Israeli-Palestinian issue included on its agenda when (still as a minister under Prime Minister Bennett) he had that notion incorporated into the concluding statement of the Negev steering committee meeting on June 27 in Bahrain.

Bringing the API into the Negev Forum might still be viable should the Israeli elections yield no option for coalition formation, thus providing Lapid with another term as caretaker prime minister. However, should a hard-right coalition be formed, the idea will inevitably be shelved, with the hope that this right-wing government’s conduct does not render it irrelevant even beyond its tenure.

When the Abraham Accords were first announced over two years ago, the Palestinian leadership strongly opposed them, describing them as a “stab in the back.” Subsequently, the PA failed to obtain a condemnation of the Accords from the Arab League, key players like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, or any other Arab state. With time, the Palestinian reaction became more muted, perhaps out of helplessness and a growing sense of marginalization. Indeed, a few months after the Accords were signed, the Palestinian leadership corrected its course of action and recommissioned the Palestinian ambassadors to Abu Dhabi and later to Manama. In addition, the PA was subsequently more careful and did not dismiss or comment publicly on the announcement of subsequent normalization agreements, including with Morocco and Sudan. Senior PA officials continued to criticize the Abraham Accords, privately warning that the Accords would totally undermine the Arab Peace Initiative, which called on Israel to end its occupation of territories it conquered from Arab states and resolve other issues, including the refugees, in exchange for normalized relations between Arab countries and Israel. According to this view, the Palestinian opposition to the Abraham Accords thus did not stem from ideological opposition to normalizing relations between Israel and the Arab countries, but mainly because the Accords wasted this leverage over Israel, a strategic political asset for the Palestinians. Furthermore, the official PA narrative points out that the signing of the Abraham Accords came without any serious consultations with the Palestinian leadership and against the backdrop of a Palestinian diplomatic boycott of the U.S. and poor relations between the UAE and the Palestinians. It is needless to say that the Palestinians also saw the Abraham Accords as a means of pressuring them to change their position toward the Trump Peace to Prosperity plan, which they had unequivocally rejected.

The Palestinian position on the Accords did not change, but they adapted their strategy by modifying their  approach to rejecting them and changing their attitude towards the Arab countries who were involved in the Accords. The Palestinians believe that Saudi Arabia supported the Accords, despite not being a signatory or taking meaningful steps on its own toward normalization. Given that Saudi Arabia did not sign a similar agreement and remained committed to the Arab Peace Initiative, the Palestinians maintained their position calling for implementing the API and distancing themselves from the Abraham Accords and all relevant platforms, including the Negev Forum. In light of all these dynamics, the key question is what would prompt the PA to engage in a regional cooperation platform like the Negev Forum, and what could Israel and its regional partners do in order to make regional cooperation irresistible for the PA. 

In a careful review of the PA’s various interests, the answer to this hypothetical question appears simple at first glance but political complications emerge when it is examined thoroughly. It is fair to assume that the PA’s main interest is to engage in a process that has a political framework to move regional political dynamics closer to the API’s stipulations to highlight the principle of two states in the normalization process, which thus far has largely avoided the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In addition, the financially challenged PA would have to pursue its economic interests strategically in order to boost its stature domestically and regionally. Small-scale projects or riding the coattails other players’ major projects are not sufficient to change course. It is noteworthy that Jordanian and Egyptian officials recently discussed separately with senior PA officials the prospects of PA engagement in regional cooperation activities such as the Negev Forum. According to senior PA officials, such engagement would only come about if a political platform advancing the two-state solution is secured, and if Palestinians stood to benefit through large-scale economic projects. In addition, those interested in Palestinian engagement in such a platform should take into account the need to address the strained relations between the Palestinian leadership, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

It is clear that the outcome of the upcoming Israeli elections will determine whether such Palestinian conditions could plausibly be met. Assuming they could, the following proposed political and economic frameworks could attract Palestinians to engage actively:

The Palestinians would have a hard time opposing any regional forum that declares a commitment to pursuing a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the API. Short of a clear-cut reference to the API, the Palestinians would probably endorse an invite to join a regional forum that seeks a ‘peaceful resolution to the conflict on the basis of a two-state solution on the 1967 lines with mutual and agreed-upon land swaps.’ It is also important to offer the PA certain practical incentives. These could include (under a centrist Israeli government) a mutual cessation of all unilateral actions. Such a scenario envisions Israel committing to start talks while both sides stop unilateral actions throughout the talks’ duration. This process would also see the gradual implementation of meaningful steps to meet other PA demands, such as transferring control of certain parts of Areas B and C to full PA control and actively working to de-escalate the situation on Haram al-Sharif by affirming and maintaining the status quo that existed before the year 2000. This means allowing the Waqf to take control of coordinating the visits of non-Muslims with the Israeli police. In addition, the Palestinians could take steps in response to a series of demands that Israel and other players have persistently been pushing in the past few years. This includes improving security performance and tightening security coordination, reviewing laws related to prisoner payments, and freezing all actions at international courts and organizations.

On a parallel track, it is important to create an economic incentive for the PA that can’t be rejected. A longstanding Palestinian demand has been to allow the building of luxurious hotels on the West Bank beachside of the Dead Sea. This large-scale tourism project was discussed with the Benjamin Netanyahu government in the past, but was turned down outright. Other feasible projects could include creating a new airstrip in the Jordan Valley that Palestinians could use to travel abroad.  While much would be left for discussion in the regional forum and its subcommittees, the PA would want to benefit from free trade agreements in the region and beyond.  

In conclusion, it is not impossible to bring the Palestinians into a regional cooperation forum, provided the right political terms are set and large-scale economic interests are met. The question remains, however, whether there will be enough political momentum in Israel and whether the U.S. will push such an agenda forward. Otherwise, the regional cooperation forum will mostly likely take normalizing Arab countries and Israel to new horizons away from the increasingly unstable Palestinian Authority. Even so, they will inevitably always have to face the ebbs and flows of Israeli-Palestinian tensions.

When the Abraham Accords were first announced in 2020, Jordanians viewed it with deep concern, since normalizing relations with Israel was no longer preconditioned on achieving progress on the Palestinian track as embodied by the API. Jordanian concerns stemmed from a conviction that the Palestinian issue could not be decentralized from the Middle East turbulence, nor decoupled from internal dynamics. Jordan’s foreign minister explicitly articulated his country’s position toward the accords by saying, “If Israel sees the agreement as an incentive for the end of the occupation and the return of the Palestinian people’s right to freedom and to establish their independent state on the 1967 borders with Eastern Jerusalem as its capital, the region will move towards a just peace. However, if Israel does not do this, the conflict will deepen and threaten the whole region.”

On and off the record, Jordanian security experts have shared that the persistence of occupation legitimizes and bolsters support for terrorist groups in local communities around the world, consequently jeopardizing counterterrorism intelligence crucial for penetrating these groups and halting attacks against Jordan and its allies. They have also pointed out that the Palestinian issue has been weaved into the terrorists’ narrative targeting the young and frustrated. Throughout the years, Jordan has witnessed a number of painful attacks in Amman, Karak, Fuhais, Rukban, and Ein al-Basha, where Palestine was part of the recruitment appeal. With the announcement of the Abraham Accords, these experts have expressed fear that terrorist groups would leverage grassroots resentment of the accords to expand recruitment and establish a foothold in critical locations. The recent attacks in the Nagab (Negev) and Hadera by ISIS affiliates are viewed through that lens. Adding ISIS to Jordan’s western borders is a scenario that will put great pressure on the Jordanian security forces, who are already dealing with attacks by militias linked to Iran on the northern front. The scenario could be exacerbated by reviving a Sunni-Shi’a axis between these terrorist groups. This dark scenario has propelled many experts to reevaluate Jordan’s engagement policy with the dominant Palestinian party on the ground.

There were also concerns that the sole mission of the Abraham Accords was to forge a new anti-Iran alliance. Reorganizing Israel within the area of responsibility of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) alongside the other Middle Eastern nations reinforced this notion. With this move, Jordan feared that the region would witness more polarization and be plunged into militarized competition, where Iran would likely be pushed to adopt even more aggressive policies using its regional proxies. In such a scenario, the coordination and cooperation between Israel and Arab states would rise to a whole different level, stripping Jordan of its Arab strategic depth and providing Israel with the opportunity to liquidate two final status issues: borders, by annexing Palestinian territories that would kill the two-state solution threatening to transform Jordan into an alternative homeland for the Palestinians; and Jerusalem, by marginalizing the Hashemite custodianship, a role that has been contested by Saudi Arabia. 

On the other hand, the growing perception that Arab states have bypassed the Palestinian issue has validated the Israel boycott movement’s rhetoric that Israel is being rewarded for violating human rights in the occupied territories. As a result, public opinion grew more hostile to Israel and is incapable of making a distinction between strategic economic projects that aim to promote favorable conditions for confidence-building between Palestinians and Israelis, and other projects that operate in isolation from the Palestinian issue. The inability to make such a distinction has lumped Jordan under the second category and deprived it of the opportunity to harness powerful tools that strengthen Palestinian state-building and create an environment conducive to resuming peace talks. When the Negev Summit was held with the participation of UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco, King Abdullah sent a loud and clear message while visiting Ramallah that the Palestinian issue won’t be bypassed. In countries like Jordan, where public opinion matters, this message was extremely important.

Now, two years after the Accords, a number of significant developments have provided a clearer picture for Jordan to navigate its concerns and modify its policy toward the Abraham Accords. First, even if the motives behind signing the Abraham Accords were not centered around Palestinian aspirations, there are limits to how far Arab states are willing or able to ignore it, as there is a certain level of commitment to the Palestinian issue they are not prepared to forsake, regardless of who is leading the government on the Israeli side. When the Arab League rejected the Palestinian demand that they condemn the Israel-UAE deal, and later a number of Arab countries followed the UAE’s lead with the Saudi ‘big brother’ implicitly endorsing it and opening its airspace for Israeli airlines, the Arabs were sending a message that they too have pressing national interests that need to be addressed. Nevertheless, when Israel announced its plan to annex the Jordan Valley in 2020 and violence erupted in Jerusalem in May 2021, the UAE threatened Israel with “it’s either annexation or normalization” and voiced a sharp objection toward Israel’s conduct. During the recent Jeddah summit, Arab leaders reaffirmed their support for the Palestinian people and the two-state solution, and during the Negev Forum’s meeting in Manama, they affirmed that the relations between signatories “can be harnessed to create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian relations, towards a negotiated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and as part of efforts to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace.” Even with less substantial matters, Morocco had major role in negotiating the 24/7 opening of the Allenby Bridge during the recent crisis at the border crossing, to ease the movement of Palestinian travelers. 

Second, the Accords are no longer exclusively conceived as an anti-Iran alliance. Each of the Arab states that attended the Negev summit had a different priority. At the Negev Forum in Bahrain, these priorities were reflected in the formation of working groups that deal with six main issues: clean energy, education and coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism. The Iranian issue was not discussed during the forum. Moreover, when looking into details, the signatories of the Accords differ in their approach towards Iran. After Biden’s Middle East tour resulted in the signing of a security agreement between the U.S. and Israel in which the U.S. committed to the use of force as a “last resort,” Abu Dhabi responded by saying that the UAE will not be part of any group that sees confrontation as a direction, although the UAE does see serious problems with Iran and its regional policy that they hope to resolve through diplomacy. The UAE’s strategic shift towards Iran reflects that the UAE is adopting a de-escalation policy that is “wise and necessary,” which Jordan sees as a favorable strategy for approaching conflicts in the Middle East. In his interview with CNBC, King Abdullah alluded to the potential of regional projects to change the behavior of players like Iran and the possibility of creating incentives to reap benefits from regional cooperation. He also referred to a new vibe in the region of regional partners coming to the realization that helping each other is necessary to address the region’s complex challenges.

Within this context, Jordan’s position toward the Accords must take a new outlook. Rather than viewing the Accords as a concern, they should be seen as an opportunity. However, there is nothing that characterizes the Middle East more than being the region where all opportunities wither. The main challenge Jordan will face is the fact that there is no cohesive strategy on a regional (nor international) level to end the occupation and establish the Palestinian state on the 1967 lines. There are also no political conditions imposed on Israel or the Palestinians to comply with the two-state vision. Given the lack of a coherent strategy and the absence of political conditioning, it’s difficult to answer the following questions: How will the Abraham Accords be leveraged for progress on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict? How will the Abraham Accords be used to build confidence across the region with the purpose of accelerating the ripening of an environment conducive to resume peace talks? 

Ideally, the formation of a regional security architecture to create a coherent strategy to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in addition to addressing the region’s pressing security needs would be the right path forward. In Article 4 of their 1994 peace treaty, both Jordan and Israel committed to the creation of a “Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East” along the lines of the Helsinki process. In October 2021, the Economic Cooperation Foundation and the Amman Center for Peace and Development produced a detailed study advocating for the creation of a modified model based on the OSCE that comprises three baskets: political/security, environmental/economic, and human rights. However, since domestic political and economic priorities tend to overrule countries’ commitments to regional structuring, the second-best option is to leverage the Abraham Accords and other existing political and economic mechanisms to develop a realistic roadmap linked to political deliverables that prioritizes the incremental reversal of realities on the ground. The objectives of this road map would be to revive a political horizon, build trust, shift people’s perception, and gradually accelerate the ripening of an environment conducive to resume peace talks. 

The practical manifestation would be adding an API working group to the six working groups formed already, with the goal of kosherizing the Accords and giving signatories a platform to act on their commitment to the spirit of the API. Forming this group would also provide an incentive and political cover for both Jordan and Palestine to join, who could serve as chairs for this working group. Once the incentive  has been provided, Jordan could play a vital role in developing a common understanding on the scope of ignoring or decentralizing the Israeli-Palestinian issue in the region’s security outlook, building consensus around a realistic regional roadmap to reverse facts on the ground, and working on “mainstreaming” the Palestinian issue across the six working groups. Jordan can start by mapping all existing political and economic mechanisms, in order to assess their potential to contribute to achieving the political deliverables and to determine the timeline for doing so. 

For working groups that deal with clean energy, food and water security, health, and tourism, political deliverables could take the form of constructing regional research centers in Area C of the West Bank, building economic corridors to remove physical barriers to create Palestinian territorial continuity and facilitate Palestinian regional integration. It also could mean opening the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce, Arab trade offices in East Jerusalem, or creating a regional fund to facilitate the relocation of settlers. When it comes to tourism, ethics-centered, youth-targeted  planning should be at the forefront of initiatives in this sector, such as facilitating narrative-based and pro-justice tourism in the occupied territories and around the region where Jews were uprooted. In the field of education and coexistence (a term that should be replaced by co-living, co-resistance, shared reality, or shared future), there is a crucial need to form a regional educational body that opens dialogue between educational actors, NGOs, companies, and innovators across the Middle East to promote inclusive education and opportunities prioritizing Palestinian children in Israeli detention. 

Jordan’s presence in the various regional mechanisms like the Arab Quartet, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, Munich Quartet, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC),and  Union of the Mediterranean makes it a natural candidate to enrich the proposed API working group and ensure its impact. Moreover, Jordan’s membership in various bilateral and trilateral economic cooperation mechanisms puts it in a good position to use regional resilient packs to increase Palestinians’ trade integration and connectivity and enhance their economic reality. The fact that the Palestinians will be part of a web of economic mechanisms means that they will diversify their dependence and partially address the power asymmetry with Israel, allowing them to navigate likely political upheavals and changes in Israeli government. On the other hand, the recent relaunching of the API and the seven-year MoU signed between Jordan and the United States with more than $1.45 billion in annual aid offer a good opportunity to act upon a regional roadmap that would gradually accelerate the ripening of an environment conducive to resuming peace talks.

One of the main questions that were asked when the Abraham Accords and other normalization agreements were reached two years ago—a question still being asked today—is whether these new relations would constitute a bridge to advance prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace or a bypass around a political resolution of this conflict. So far, they have been a bypass, but efforts are ongoing to transform them into a bridge.

The UAE has repeatedly indicated that its normalization with Israel saved the two-state solution, as it was predicated on Israel suspending annexation plans. While it is questionable if annexation would have happened anyway (opposition to the move was considerable on both the far right and the left in Israel), former President Trump set the issue to rest; when Israel and the UAE agreed to ties, he declared that annexation was off the table for now. It is meaningful that the UAE linked normalization to the conflict. This was not the case with Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

What are the obstacles to leveraging the normalization agreements to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace? 

There are five main challenges facing the effort to leverage the normalization agreements to advance peace.

First, on the Israeli side, the difficulty is that Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel when the Abraham Accords were announced, repeatedly argued that the Accords represented “peace for peace” and that Israel did not make any concessions. This is not entirely true. As mentioned, annexation was suspended, and a huge portion of the price was paid by the U.S.  The UAE linked normalization to suspending annexation, but it also received several promises pertaining to bilateral relations with the U.S. The UAE felt that this was an important insurance policy to advance its strategic relations with the U.S., regardless of the outcome of the 2020 U.S. elections; its assessment proved correct. Aside from Bahrain, which did not have any demands, this dynamic also applied to the other normalization agreements. Morocco resumed ties with Israel in return for having the U.S. recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, and Sudan announced its intention to normalize with Israel in return for being removed from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Ultimately, there was little political will to link normalization to advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace, and the framing by Netanyahu made it difficult for the new Israeli government of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, which came to power in June 2021, to provide concessions in return for additional normalization steps.

Second, the Palestinians were taken by surprise, and reacted harshly against the UAE. This took place in the context of already tense Emirati-Palestinian relations, which continue to be tense today. The reason for the Palestinian anger is multifold. They were not consulted or even informed when the UAE decided to normalize ties with Israel, but they knew that this was not something that they would have accepted anyway. They are also fearful that it could lead to a domino effect of other Arab states embracing normalization. For that reason, they are concerned that it could lead to the unraveling of the Arab Peace Initiative (API), which they consider the basis for a final settlement. Finally, they are unwilling to admit, even to themselves, how much things have changed since the Arab world took steps against Egypt when it decided to pursue peace with Israel in 1977—steps that included moving the Arab League from Cairo to Tunisia and the severing of diplomatic ties with Egypt by almost all Arab countries.

Third, the Biden administration has been advocating for Arab, African, and Islamic countries to pursue  normalization with Israel. However, Biden is unwilling to follow in the footsteps of the previous administration by paying the price of new normalization deals. At the same time, he was not willing to pressure Bennett and Lapid’s fragile, broad coalition that was established after the last Israeli election to provide meaningful concessions to the Palestinians, as he felt that that could lead to its collapse, which inevitably happened regardless. Despite successive administrations claiming that Arab-Israeli normalization would advance prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace, today this outcome has not materialized.

Fourth, the political will of the normalizing countries is also a challenge. The UAE felt that suspending annexation is all that it was willing to do, and that any additional steps could not take place without a genuine effort by the Palestinian leadership to mend fences. Morocco and Sudan probably felt that putting conditions on Israel might derail their deal with the U.S.

Finally, the approach by several Western countries arguing that the train has left the station and it is up to the Palestinians to catch up is also counterproductive. Palestinians are not willing to become an afterthought. Including elements on the agenda of the Negev Forum to improve living conditions for Palestinians is totally inadequate. There are certain non-negotiables the Palestinians require in order to change their attitude toward the whole approach. The multilateral track in the Madrid Peace Process included an element of gradual normalization, but the whole process revolved around resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict; without a clear path toward advancing the two-state solution, it is very difficult for the Palestinians to accept this approach.

What can be done?

Despite these challenges, it is possible to leverage normalization agreements to advance prospects for peace. The question now is what can be done by the parties and stakeholders to achieve this objective.

There is no doubt that from the perspective of Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, the normalization agreements have advanced their interests. Sudan is preoccupied with numerous internal issues and relations with Israel have advanced at a far slower pace. There is ample proof that these relations are steadily advancing in important areas. Shifting Israel from the U.S. European Command to Central Command (CENTCOM) allowed security cooperation to advance in a discreet manner. No details were released, for example, about the Middle East Air Defense Alliance that Israel claims started in 2015 and that Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz argued is already “thwarting Iranian attempts” to target the region.

On the Israeli front, much will depend on the outcome of the upcoming elections in November. The potential that it could result in a swing to the far right would make  positive change extremely difficult. The shadow of Netanyahu and an approach based on “peace for peace” and galloping annexation is a recipe for further tension and escalation. A broader, more balanced coalition may provide some hope through the recognition that there is a need for a process based on mutual concessions to advance peace. Israel needs to recognize that the ceiling facing Arab countries in advancing normalization can be elevated as progress is achieved towards peace. The new normalization agreements provide proof that Israel is accepted and will be integrated and welcomed in the region in the context of peace.

The Palestinians need to get their act together. The popularity of the Palestinian Authority is at an all-time low. The leadership needs to work on reconciliation, good governance, and elections. Furthermore, it should work on ameliorating its relations, particularly with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and must provide a vision and engage in a manner that inspires its own people and the international community, which is preoccupied with other pressing priorities.

Recognizing that the U.S. is not willing to expend any significant political capital, the administration still needs to work harder on several fronts after the midterm congressional elections and the elections in Israel. The level of ambition to do so within the administration is quite modest, but even so, several small steps could serve as a meaningful start. First, the U.S. should translate its policy statements into action plans, including that both sides “deserve equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity” and Biden’s statement that “we cannot wait for a peace agreement to be reached or for every issue to be resolved to deliver on the needs of the Palestinian people that exist today.” Second, the U.S. should continue to ensure that irreversible steps like building settlements in E1 are completely shelved. Third, the U.S. should encourage normalizing countries to link future normalization steps with steps to advance peace.

The normalizing countries are yet to demonstrate the political will to use normalization steps as leverage to advance prospects for peace. However, they need to recognize what a poll by the Washington Institute showed: that 45% of Bahrainis polled held very or somewhat positive views of the Abraham Accords in November 2020, and that this support eroded to 20% by March 2022. The 49% of Emiratis that disapproved of the agreement in 2020 has grown to over two-thirds, and according to the Arab Barometer, only 31% of Moroccans polled support normalization. Recurrent tensions, particularly in Jerusalem and military attacks on Gaza, more than likely contributed to this large decline.

Furthermore, after the signing of the Abraham Accords, there was an expectation that other Arab and Islamic countries would soon follow suit. Even Oman and Qatar, which have long maintained contacts with Israel, refused to join. The Saudis have been willing to take modest steps, like permitting Israeli overflights of its airspace, but continue to stress their unwavering adherence to the API and an insistence that normalization will come at the end of the process, not at the beginning.

There is an important role to be played by Egypt and Jordan in advancing Palestinian reconciliation, assisting Palestinians in formulating a vision for their future, and reconciling Palestinian relations with both the Saudi and the Emirati leadership.

National interests will remain paramount. However, this does not mean that the Arab public opinion is willing to forgo the necessity of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The risk is that escalation, particularly in Jerusalem, and the absence of progress will negatively affect normalization, similar to the decline that was witnessed after the breakdown of the Madrid multilateral process. Transforming normalization agreements into a bridge rather than a bypass can be instrumental in advancing the prospects of peace, and this remains a collective responsibility of all those interested in advancing peace and stability in the Middle East.

Tactical Success

The recent brief outbreak of violence ended with what is rightfully viewed by Israelis as a significant success: the IDF managed to inflict a heavy blow on the Gaza-based Iranian proxy Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) with no casualties and minimum damage on our side, all while going to great length to minimize civilian casualties among Gazans (as evidenced by released intelligence voice and video recordings).

The operation’s architects are also credited with the fact that violence lasted a mere 66 hours, with managing to keep the far more powerful Hamas on the sidelines, and—unlike in May 2021—with ensuring minimal disturbances in the West Bank, in Jerusalem, or among Israel’s Arab citizens.  

As it often has in the past, Egypt received much credit for helping to secure an early ceasefire (with some assistance from Qatar and U.N. envoys), and the main international and regional players either acknowledge Israel’s right to self-defense or, with very few exceptions, criticized it in unusually reserved terms.

Strategic Inertia

This sense of relief Israel is experiencing tends to reinforce tendencies best characterized as strategic inertia. Throughout the decade and a half since Hamas took over the Strip, an era characterized by frequent periods of tension and fighting, Israelis have been convinced that they are faced with a choice between two bad options: the current failed policy of “more of the same,” whereby Israel seeks to “buy silence” by measures that partially relieve the closure, only to face another round of violence and another at ever shorter intervals; or getting rid of Hamas altogether by re-occupying the Strip and “cleaning it up.” The latter option not only poses the risk of massive casualties on both sides, but also lacks an exit strategy; how long will Israel be stuck with managing the lives of millions of Gazans and who—if anyone—will ever take it off our hands? In despair, some have thrown into the equation a third option: the illusion that Israel could inflict a major blow on Hamas from which it could never recover. The two bottom lines are so obvious: there are no simple solutions to complicated problems, and political issues do not lend themselves to strictly military answers.

An Alternative Strategy

The first to realize that the current policy offers no lasting stability and to present an alternative strategy was the Egyptian security establishment. Shortly after the Gaza war in 2014, Cairo formulated a detailed alternative strategy, sanctioned by President Sisi, in order to break out of the cycle of violence and unrest surrounding Gaza that was a burden on Egypt’s security, Palestinians’ political future, and regional stability.  

It was presented to the then-Prime Minister Netanyahu, who endorsed it, only to astonish Cairo by sabotaging it but a few weeks later.

Adopting the logic of the Egyptian approach, which was suspended and then re-introduced by Egypt in 2017, two Israeli organizations, the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF)* and Commanders for Israel’s Security,** joined forces in embracing the framework, periodically updating it, and enhancing its Israeli security dimension.

With ECF operating behind closed doors domestically, regionally, and internationally, and CIS—based on its unmatched security credentials—advocating it to the Israeli leadership and public, the two proposed that Israel launch a transformative plan for the Gaza Strip, which also would include related constructive steps regarding the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Regional-International Coalition

Much like the Egyptian plan that inspired it, their plan calls for the creation of a powerful Israeli-initiated, U.S.-led regional and international coalition as a key prerequisite for progress. The purpose of this coalition would be both to usher the two Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, along the path suggested by this plan and to contribute—financially and otherwise—to its implementation. Regional participation, considered a fantasy when proposed by Egypt, looks far more realistic in the wake of the Abraham Accords.

Reflecting the Egyptian plan, this CIS/ECF initiative calls for the concurrent pursuit of three objectives:

• Solidified ceasefire arrangement—without which donors would not risk their investment
• Gaza rehabilitation—without which no stability can be expected
• Restoration of PA civil management of the Strip—without which Israel would object and donors would so be reluctant to contribute as it would benefit Hamas

Ceasefire

In addition to a resolute strategy of Israeli military deterrence, there is a need to formalize and institutionalize ceasefire understandings that go beyond the vague—and failed—existing formula of “quiet for quiet.” Though no understandings can prevent intentional ceasefire violations, this approach aims to both prevent an escalation arising from a third-party provocation and friction due to misunderstandings. The plan deemed Egypt central for negotiating the ceasefire’s terms, and Egypt might also prove critical should it agree to lead an on-the-ground monitoring mechanism.

Gaza Rehabilitation

It is both a humanitarian imperative and an Israeli security interest that the Gaza population’s living conditions improve. Yet Israel and the donor community alike are also determined to prevent Hamas from benefiting from funds earmarked for reconstruction and development. 

Moreover, there are ample indications that fear of an Arab Spring-like uprising was one of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s primary motivations for cooperating with the Egyptian proposal (both in 2014 and 2017) to gradually replace Hamas with the PA in civil management of the Strip. Thus, weakening Hamas seems a prerequisite for the proposed strategic change. The plan called for Gaza development to be pursued in ways that would deprive Hamas of opportunities to benefit from it. 

Consequently, while encouraging the U.S. to mobilize the donor community in organizing a major Gaza rehabilitation and development program, the plan called on Israel to pursue this effort—both independently and jointly with like-minded regional and international partners—while acting against Hamas’ assets, including its sources of funding and its presence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, all by undertaking the following steps:

• Replacing the mechanisms for the direct transfer of funds via Hamas with mechanisms that ensure the funds serve their intended purposes
• Conditioning the donor community’s support for Gaza’s economic reconstruction on preventing Hamas’ rearmament
• Designing a strict reconstruction supervision regime, along with securing a commitment from regional and international participants to apply sanctions on Hamas should it violate its ceasefire obligations and breach rearmament restrictions

Restoring PA Management

Recognizing the poor state of the PA and its limited capacity to resume responsibility for Gaza civil management, the proposed strategy involves a gradual approach concurrent with steps that would also bolster its governance capacity (serving objectives that transcend the Gaza issue).

Frustration with a decade-long Israeli strategy of weakening the PA led ECF and CIS to call upon the Israeli government to inject real substance into the more recent, largely rhetorical commitments to “strengthen the PA” and “shrink the conflict.” 

This would include the following:

• Committing to a future negotiated two-state agreement
• Clarifying that the West Bank and Gaza are viewed as a single, integrated polity
• Reaffirm the PLO’s role as Israel’s only Palestinian negotiating partner

Subject to Israeli security needs, this would also include:

• Enabling Palestinian economic development in Area C of the West Bank
• Re-designating portions of Area C as Area B or A
• Seriously addressing settler violence
• Ending all forms of “creeping” or de facto annexation in the West Bank
• Ending Palestinian evictions in East Jerusalem
• Tolerating no provocations regarding Jerusalem holy sites and restoring responsible administration on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif based on the historic Status Quo, including Jordan’s role there
• Ending IDF incursions into areas where PA security forces exercise their duties as agreed

Risks

While advocating the plan to Israelis, it is crucial to point out not only the obvious benefits of its success for Israelis and Palestinians, but also the consequences of failure. Here, two considerations are noteworthy: First, should Israel pursue the plan in earnest for a year or two before facing its possible failure, the danger posed by Gaza militants is not likely to increase, given the enormous power imbalance, which is only likely to grow. Second, if it has demonstrated to the world a sincere intention to change the dynamics on the ground in nonviolent ways, should Israel then need to use force, it is likely to enjoy both consensus at home and legitimacy abroad. 

Since it went into effect, the latest ceasefire has been observed. This ended yet another round of confrontation with Gaza, albeit a short-lived one exposing the Israeli government’s tactic of embracing more force to resolve issues with Gaza. This also confirms the lack of a fully developed strategy to resolve Gaza issues, let alone address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, during which Israel refused to negotiate the handover of the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian Authority, the situation progressed from bad to worse. This approach rendered the territory an effective power vacuum; since the PA security forces were largely destroyed over the course of the Second Intifada, Hamas’ military wing was able to take control of the territory in 2007. Since then, successive Israeli governments carried out one round of military strikes after another, implementing paralyzing, comprehensive closures to resolve issues of instability and address security threats. Whether the intended consequence of this Israeli policy or not, the situation worsened in Gaza over the years. One of the key aspects of this deterioration has been that in place of the Palestinian Authority, the Hamas movement and an alliance of smaller factions including Islamic Jihad has developed paramilitary capabilities that, while not posing a strategic threat to Israel, still undermine Israeli national security in several ways.  Employing offensive and defensive tactics, the Israeli government developed the Iron Dome missile defense system in part to confront the threat of rockets from Gaza, imposed tighter restrictions on access and movement, and launched minor and major military offensives to contain the threat, but have failed to eliminate it. 

The Israeli security dilemma regarding the Gaza Strip appears to stem from an assumption that if Hamas, the central power controlling Gaza, were to collapse, the security challenges would deepen. In the absence of an alternative, such as the return of the Palestinian Authority to control Gaza, which Israel has deemed unattainable at present, the Gaza Strip would be controlled by fragments of factions and warlords, a chaotic reality that would further undermine Israeli security. The Israeli response to the dilemma appears to be a carrot and stick policy vis-à-vis Hamas, which seeks to provide incentives for Hamas to maintain calm. This leads one to conclude that this round of violence is certainly not the last. It is fair to conclude that once there are enough reasons, pretexts, or justifications for any of the factions in Gaza, mainly Hamas, another round will be triggered.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that this round of confrontation was limited to Islamic Jihad, unlike most previous rounds, where all factions, including Hamas, were engaged. Some may think that Hamas decided not to participate in this round of fighting so as to preserve its governance in Gaza and maintain the incentives provided by Israel, including work permits for Gazans in Israel. While this may be true for this round, it does not answer the more strategic question of resolving the problem of Gaza. In fact, this Israeli tactic of using force and/or providing incentives for Hamas sets the stage for a more serious and comprehensive confrontation since the temporary calm is not based on solid solutions that address the root of the problem, nor does it involve mutual commitments—even ones arrived at via a third party—to maintain calm. Hence, an equation has been created whereby confrontations lead to more Israeli concessions (on work permits, financial relief, and the like). So, in the absence of a comprehensive change and for as long as the siege is in effect, the next round of confrontation is all but certain, as are others to follow, with no end in sight.  

In conclusion, another round of conflict in Gaza ends as the countdown for the next one starts. Military confrontations and extending limited incentives continue to be the main Israeli tactic in dealing with Gaza issues.

It is about time for Israeli governments to conclude that this approach does not bring solutions and leaves both Israeli and Palestinian publics vulnerable to the woes of military confrontations, agony, and hate. So far there seems to be no growing interest in Israel to put forth a strategy to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole, or even one to deal with the question of Gaza more narrowly. It remains clear, however, that a long-term solution for Gaza will have to include the Palestinian Authority, which would coordinate with Hamas and other factions internally, as well as key regional players including Egypt, Qatar, and possibly others. If such a strategy aimed at resolving the issue of the Gaza Strip or a more comprehensive one addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at large are not attainable or politically feasible from an Israeli perspective, the situation will continue to go from bad to worse, and short-term solutions will only deepen and complicate the next round of violence.

Operation Breaking Dawn shed light on Jordan’s engagement strategy with the Palestinian players and the one-sided approach of having the secular PA as the only address for Palestinian affairs. The current debate among Jordanian political elites revolves around adopting a balanced approach toward other Palestinian players, like the religious Hamas and PIJ, and creating a secondary address to leverage Jordan’s Israel-Palestine policy, which states that the two-state solution is the only real political ground for achieving fair and comprehensive peace in the region. Although not a new discussion, it takes place at a time when Jordan is keen on building on the diplomatic momentum in the region following U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit and the Jeddah Security and Development Summit, and amid the PA’s recent diplomatic efforts to demand full membership for the State of Palestine in the U.N. However, the absence of any discussion over the inclusion of the local leadership that operates outside the orbit of the traditional leadership of Fatah and Hamas is shortsighted.

The logic of the official Jordanian approach is two-dimensional: domestic and regional. Jordan is reluctant to engage with Hamas and PIJ, out of a desire to avoid facilitating the incubation of the Islamic model among the frustrated Jordanian youth who form the largest demographic group in the country. Hamas’ rise in popularity after the May 2021 round of violence, which grew well beyond its usual support base to reach wide segments of the Jordanian population, raised red flags among the security establishment. During the recent operation, the PIJ has received the same public zeal. Jordan is also concerned about the Hamasization of its own backyard, notably in the Jenin refugee camp, where joint PIJ, Hamas, and splinter Fatah groups are coordinating and launching armed operations. After all, Hamas has gained a reputation for meddling in the kingdom’s internal affairs, which drove the 1999 decision to close the group’s office in Amman. On the other hand, Hamas and PIJ’s alignment with Iran and Qatar might subject Jordan to the unpredictable whims of Gulf states and complicate Jordan’s relations with allies. Moreover, Jordan is concerned about the Iranian presence at its borders, which are facing attacks by militants linked to Iran. These calculations drove Jordan to maintain the one-sided approach of recognizing and legitimizing only the PA.

Those who advocate for adopting a balanced approach towards Hamas are laying a very compelling argument. The eroding legitimacy of the PA will cast its shadows on Jordan’s credibility as its alignment with a leadership that is perceived as an “occupation collaborator,” and its policy of avoiding engagement with resistance groups closer to the pulse of the street, will reflect negatively on the government’s perceived commitment to reform and integrating the people’s voice in decision-making. Jordan is implementing an ambitious political and economic modernization program, and is struggling to rebuild citizen-state trust, especially among youth. On the other hand, there is an assumption that the PA’s collapse is inevitable during or after Abbas’ tenure, along with a possible Hamas takeover of the West Bank. In either case, advocates call upon Jordan to establish relations with the arguably soon-to-be dominant party to prevent likely spillover from the security deterioration in the occupied territories. Hamas’ recognition of the 1967 borders and its flirting with the Jordanian government throughout the years are often cited as evidence of the pragmatic nature of the movement and its thirst for international legitimacy. It is interpreted as an indication for future softening of its position regarding Israel and other regional issues. Finally, the Egyptian model continues to be a source of fascination for many. Despite branding Hamas as a terrorist organization, Egypt has succeeded in asserting itself as the mediator between the group, Israel, and the U.S. This role has served as leverage for Cairo in consolidating its national interests. Based on these calculations, many call for adjusting Jordan’s engagement strategy and integrating Hamas as part of it.

However, what is missing from this discussion is the inclusion of the voiceless local leadership in the territories and the development of a realistic roadmap for their engagement under the wider Jordanian policy of preserving the viability of the two-state solution. Jordan has a long history of trial and error when it comes to implementing different models of citizen participation in decision-making, particularly among marginalized segments of the population such as women and youth, advancing the partnership between government and citizens, and bolstering civil society. Jordan should learn from these experiences to invest in such initiatives under current circumstances, where Israel’s electoral cycle is still spinning and the PA’s legitimacy continues to erode. Jordan must coordinate with the PA and Egypt to facilitate the inclusion of marginalized community voices and gradually channel the management of vital resources to local communities and foster more accountability on the part of the management. Jordan could also work on creating a credible committee to observe this initiative and work to rebuild trust among the main Palestinian players.

No one was ever in doubt about the damage that the Israeli army can inflict on Gaza, or in the occupied territories in general, in any military confrontation. The gap in the balance of power is one of the widest in the region. This has been the case in the wars that took place in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021, and in the latest military attack that ended on August 7, 2022. The duration of the conflict, the extent of the destruction in Gaza, the regional and international response, and other factors varied widely. However, unsurprisingly, like in previous confrontations, each side claims that to some extent it was able to achieve its objectives.

Another Episode in the Unrelenting Cycle of Violence

Israel achieved several important objectives in these wars and military operations. In the latest attack, it assassinated two key Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders and destroyed several of the organization’s military sites. It mostly achieved its objective of separating Hamas and PIJ; separating Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem; and separating the Palestinians and Arab Israelis—three characteristics that contributed to the spread of violence during the previous war in May 2021. This is one of the reasons why Israel avoided a prolonged war, as this would probably have resulted in further complications on these fronts. However, despite the ceasefire, Israeli forces have intensified incursions in the West Bank, killing four people, including an al-Aqsa Brigades commander, and apprehended numerous Palestinians undermining at least one of these objectives.

Israeli reports indicate that the performance of the Iron Dome is improving, but so are the capabilities of Palestinian armed groups to launch rockets. The Iron Dome had an 86% interception rate in 2012, 89% in 2014, 94% in 2021, and 97% in the last operation. However, Israel did not expect these armed groups— who have been under siege in Gaza since 2007—to launch more than 4369 rockets in 11 days in May 2021, or 1100 by PIJ in fewer than a mere three days. The range of rockets increased from two to three kilometers in 2001 to 160 kilometers in 2014. Ineffective as these rockets are, they still terrorize Israeli communities and resulted in Israel closing Ben Gurion Airport in May 2021 and diverting flights in 2022.

At the same time, the region has witnessed how Iranian assistance advanced the capabilities of Hezbollah to the point that it reached some level of deterrence vis-à-vis Israel and allowed the Houthis to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE with significant consequences. Iran is a strong supporter of PIJ and its cooperation with Hamas has been advancing. The siege has not prevented the armed groups in Gaza from strengthening their capabilities, and this is expected to continue with Iranian support, despite all kinds of constraints.

Many in the region speculated that the upcoming Israeli elections played an important role in the recent decisions pertaining to the attacks on both Gaza and the West Bank. Prime Minister Lapid, they suggested, felt the need to present his credentials to voters who are increasingly moving to the right as he has no military experience. Defense Minister Benny Gantz was also viewed as eager to advance his chances in these elections.

On the Palestinian side, Hamas supported PIJ on the rhetorical level but not militarily. It also assisted Egypt in mediating the ceasefire. However, this military confrontation allowed PIJ  to demonstrate its military capability when it is on its own. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the relations will be strained between Hamas and PIJ, who lost two key leaders and expected Hamas to be more supportive.

Egypt has been active in efforts to achieve a ceasefire in all the above-mentioned wars and military confrontations. This time it was trying to deescalate the situation between Israel and PIJ to prevent the attack and continued its efforts once it started until a ceasefire was achieved, with important involvement by Qatar. Egypt indicated in the ceasefire understanding that it will endeavor to achieve a PIJ demand that two prisoners held by Israel would be released. Defense Minister Gantz has indicated that Israel will not release them.

What Should We Expect Going Forward?

1. Hamas will continue to try to maintain calm in Gaza while encouraging escalation in the West Bank.
2. PIJ will multiply its efforts in order to make sure that it is independently better prepared if it is again forced to have military confrontations with Israel on its own.
3. Iran is expected to continue, and probably increase, its support to Palestinian armed groups.
4. It is hoped that Israel would be very careful not to undermine Egypt’s ability to intervene by demonstrating some flexibility in relation to the two prisoners held by Israel, as it is almost certain that this will not be the last military confrontation. This ceasefire is quite fragile and already contains the seeds of a return to violence.

Where to Go From Here?

The Israeli government cannot claim that it wants to strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA) while undermining its credibility through daily incursions, assassinations, apprehensions, home demolitions, land expropriation, settlement expansion, and more. The PA may soon be unable to control the security situation in areas under its jurisdiction in the West Bank.

In the latest military confrontation, Israel was able to differentiate between Hamas and PIJ. Israel should be able to explain why this differentiation cannot be applied between the PA and armed groups in Gaza, as for the past decade this is one of the main obstacles to Palestinian reconciliation. Israel should change the Netanyahu policy of holding the PA responsible for any attack, no matter the perpetrator, once it regains control over Gaza as long as other groups in the Strip are not disarmed. The ability of these armed groups to continue to resist one of the strongest armies in the world is their own measure of their success.

Addressing “the residents” of Gaza, Lapid said that Israel knows how to protect itself from anyone threatening it, but it also knows how to provide work, livelihood, and a life of dignity to anyone who wants to live in peace by its side; that there is another way to live through the path of the Abraham Accords and the Negev Summit; and that the choice is theirs—knowing very well that this narrative is a nonstarter from the Palestinian perspective without a clear political horizon. What transpired reconfirms that Israel is unwilling to accept that what it calls “mowing the lawn” is not a sustainable policy and that maintaining the status quo is a myth. Shrinking the conflict, economic peace, improving living conditions, and all these slogans will achieve neither Israeli security nor peace.

There cannot be a Gaza strategy without hope on how to address Palestinian national aspirations. It should be clear to Israel that Palestinian surrender is not an option. The next step for the Palestinians will most certainly be moving towards a struggle for equal rights in one state and not providing further concessions on final status issues.

Israeli leaders have been serving its short-term goals at the expense of its long-term stability and interest. Israel must decide whether it wants to end the occupation or continue to be an occupying power, because this will be a determining factor in its future path.

The PA also has its work cut out for it, as it is at a historically low level of popularity. Its performance leaves much to be desired regarding reaching a vision for achieving Palestinian national aspirations, promoting good governance, and conducting elections.

The international community keeps repeating the necessity of breaking this cycle of violence with every military confrontation—a noble objective that is only paid lip service. In addition to the aforementioned Israeli and Palestinian requirements, there is an important role to be played by the region, Egypt and Jordan in particular.  Moreover, President Biden said that “there must be a political horizon that the Palestinian people can actually see or at least feel,” and that “we cannot wait for a peace agreement to be reached or for every issue to be resolved to deliver on the needs of the Palestinian people that exist today.” Europeans also support these points, which are supposed to be the two legs on which progress can be achieved once there is a political will to do so. Meaningful progress is necessary to raise the risk and price of resorting to military confrontations.

A Troubling Context

Against the backdrop of Jerusalem-related waves of violence during the recent convergence of Jewish and Muslim holidays, friends in Washington asked what future ‘black swans’ might again force President Biden and his administration’s senior advisors to re-engage in Israeli-Palestinian affairs when all are eager to focus on pressing matters elsewhere. 

The killing of Shireen Abu Akleh, a popular Al Jazeera reporter shot while covering violent clashes between the IDF and armed Palestinians, and the ensuing violent disruption of her massive funeral by Israeli police, certainly qualify.

Such tragedies and this kind of careless conduct are the marks of a conflict left to its own volition. 

Consequently, a dose of skepticism is warranted when discussing the likelihood that the presidential visit ends up reflecting the spirit it is intended to convey.

 I Am a Zionist

Priding himself on having met every Israeli prime minister since Golda Meir, and often defining himself not only as a friend but as a Zionist, this president is probably the most knowledgeable on all matters Israel compared to any predecessor. Likewise, his record of support for Israel—in the Senate, as vice president, and now as president—is second to none. These two features—unparalleled expertise and a record of solid support— position him as uniquely qualified to make a mark. No Israeli politician can ‘play’ him as some did when previous presidents undertook ambitious initiatives, not to their liking, and few Israelis are likely to buy his portrayal as hostile when a reluctant prime minister tries to undermine the message by smearing the messenger.

As the Biden school of Zionism firmly believes in a two-state solution as a prerequisite for preserving Israel’s character as both Jewish and democratic, it was reasonable to expect tensions over measures that make that objective even harder to achieve, including settlement expansion, settler violence, East Jerusalem evictions and demolitions, and Temple Mount provocations, to dominate his relationship with Naftali Bennett.

I’m Not Here for Peacemaking

Alas, it appears that no such test of will is in the offing. Long before the visit, it became clear that the president’s preference is to establish harmonious relations with Bennett. Some attribute it to the fragility of an Israeli coalition that got rid of Netanyahu and concern that its collapse would bring him back. Others argue that in carefully choosing its battles, Biden’s administration judged the Iran nuclear deal more urgent and important. And others yet attribute this unusual mute reaction to Israeli conduct, which the previous Joe Biden confronted forcefully, to U.S. domestic political considerations.

Be the reason as it may, thus far and with rare exceptions, the Biden administration has exhibited a combination of soft urging behind closed doors and a public posture of ‘no daylight between us.’ 

The visit too seems designed to serve several objectives, but making progress toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not among them. Even if one were to ignore for the moment the limited political capital available to President Biden, as well as the entire range of enormous challenges he must navigate in complex domestic and international settings, looking at the parties can make one lose the appetite to get involved. Suffice it to note the combined effect of the fragile Israeli coalition and an unpopular, weak, divided Palestinian leadership—neither able to make bold decisions even if it wanted to—to realize that under these conditions, any attempt to bridge enormous gaps in positions is both ill-advised and doomed to fail.

It’s Stability, Stupid.

Cynics would argue that the visit is designed primarily for domestic purposes, having to do with the looming midterm elections (belying Kissinger’s quip that singled out Israel for having “no foreign, only domestic policy”). However, it seems wrong to accept that narrow view. The timing might have to do with the domestic political calendar, but no Washington planner can ignore the policy ramifications of such a visit to Israelis, Palestinians, and the dynamics between them, as well as others in the region.

With no bold peace initiative on the agenda, there are reasons to conclude that the visit, much like the overall policy, is designed to contribute to what appears to be the president’s primary objective: stability. Yet, stability is anything but synonymous with inaction. 

This was evidenced in May 2021, when the president spent precious time on the phone with regional leaders and sent his secretary of state to the region in an attempt to contain violence, and again in April 2022, when his phone conversations were followed by the dispatch of other senior State Department diplomats, a visit to the White House by Jordan’s King Abdullah, a trip to Cairo by his national security advisor, and other efforts.

Once again, the old phenomenon has been at play: no stability can be expected when looking the other way, for the Arab-Israeli arena has a nasty habit of forcing itself on the agenda.

The Catch and a Hope

Election eve, midterms, or otherwise, it is hardly the moment for leaders to engage in high-risk policy initiatives. As noted above, at the reported time of the visit, the stars seem to be aligned against even lower risk-taking. Alas, the risks of omission are no less significant.

Here are a few examples of pitfalls and opportunities planners and the president ought to take note of:

Political Horizon

The administration’s oft-repeated Israeli-Palestinian policy characterization has been perceived as accentuating the ‘here and now’ at the expense of the ultimate objective. As encapsulated in “Israelis and Palestinians deserve equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity,” the absence of a fifth “measure”—independence, statehood, or self-determination—seems to echo the notion of ‘shrinking the conflict’ while shelving the ultimate (if presently unattainable) objective of resolving it. Though on occasion, officials—from the president down—acknowledge continued commitment to a two-state solution, its absence from the main policy formulation has raised eyebrows: is this commitment merely lip service to a previous policy? 

If there is one area where the visit can be leveraged to inject some life into the elusive political horizon, it is by signaling an equal commitment to the ‘over the horizon’ as to the ‘here and now’ by injecting that fifth measure into the standard policy formulation.

A Regional Gathering

While one might argue that the visit should serve to bring regional partners together, with the accent on Israel’s peace partners—Egypt, Jordan, and Abraham Accord signatories—the administration would do well to consider two possible caveats: first, once such meetings become routine, the uniqueness of the Negev Summit, including its important working groups, is substantially diluted. Perhaps the visit should serve to announce the next round of the Negev Summit rather than to convene a competing forum. Second, and more important: while Palestinians might gain little from attending, they lose much by being excluded yet again. All who worry about the future of the fragile Palestinian Authority must avoid steps that further erode its residual legitimacy. Better to forgo a regional gathering—a Negev Summit sequel or otherwise—than to have it without them.

Jordan and Jerusalem

With every passing day, the cost of having undermined Jordan’s role in Jerusalem’s holy sites (as enshrined in its peace treaty with Israel), and the potency of the Jordanian Waqf on its behalf, is mounting. Absent an Islamic ‘mature adult’ to restrain incited Palestinian youth at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, the task is left to the ill-suited Israeli police.

Here too the visit can be leveraged for powerful constructive messages. Whether in a trilateral meeting with King Abdullah and President Abbas or otherwise, President Biden can convey a clear and powerful message on the subject.

A Zionist Message to Israelis

As noted above, no president before him arrived in Israel with a more solid record of support. Convinced of the need to reach an eventual two-state solution, no previous president has ever been better positioned to talk straight to Israelis on the perils of closing the door on that option. One can only hope that while reiterating his self-identification as a Zionist, the president spells out in clear terms his Zionist vision and how incompatible it is with creeping—let alone galloping—annexation.

President Biden will be warmly welcomed by Israelis. Let’s hope that by the time he flies back home, he will have seized on that sentiment in promoting his objective of greater stability, adding to it a guarded measure of hope. 

Since the election of President Biden to the White House in 2020, the Palestinians have taken several steps to restore political contacts with the U.S. administration following a three-year boycott of the Trump administration. Initially, the Palestinians had high expectations from the Biden administration. Those expectations were primarily based on its policy declarations with respect to undoing the damage caused by its predecessor to Palestinian–U.S. relations and the delicate state of Israeli-Palestinian affairs. At the top of these expectations was the reopening of the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, a campaign promise made by Vice President Kamala Harris. Other expectations included reaffirming support for the two-state paradigm as the only viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since its elections, however, the Biden administration has fallen short on both counts. No concrete steps have been made on the ground to reopen the consulate and no meaningful measures were taken to launch a serious process of peacemaking. The seeming lack of serious engagement and preoccupation with other issues regionally and globally has resulted in deep disappointment among Palestinians—leaders and the public alike. This sentiment clouds the anticipated visit of President Biden.

Almost none of Palestinians’ expectations has materialized. Not only did the U.S. administration fail to deliver on the Palestinian-Israeli track, but it also did not address any of the significant issues on the U.S.-Palestinian bilateral track. Trump’s proclamation of “unified Jerusalem” as the capital of Israel remains intact, despite its inherent contradiction with longstanding U.S. policy and international law. Furthermore, the PLO delegation office in Washington remains closed since the Trump administration shut it down in late 2017. The Palestinians generally view the issue of reopening the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem as a top political priority, because it relates to the most significant final-status issue: the status of Jerusalem. Another major policy initiative undertaken by the previous administration that has not been revised by the Biden administration relates to the Abraham Accords. While the Biden administration highlighted the need to leverage these agreements to boost the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in practice, not much has been done to undo the damage of sidelining the Palestinians entirely from this process. For the past two decades, the Palestinian diplomatic and political stance was based almost entirely on advocating the implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, whereby Arab and Islamic states’ normalization with Israel is to follow the end of the Israeli occupation of the territories it took control of in 1967. From a Palestinian perspective, the Accords had a devastating impact on their political leverage. Lastly, the Palestinians attempted to use the renewed political contact with the U.S. administration to help restore Arab (and other) financial support to the Palestinian Authority, including from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but that objective was not achieved either.

These issues and the U.S. demand to transform the Palestinian prisoner payments into an acceptable welfare system, thereby also addressing the paralyzing impact of the Taylor Force Act on U.S. assistance to the Palestinians, have created a deeper state of frustration. The Palestinian plan to deal with the prisoner payments system is to transform the bulk of such payments into early retirement stipends and to place others—mainly younger recepients—on the payroll of civil and security agencies. Though it has been under incremental implementation for nearly two years, it has not been recognized by either the U.S. or Israel as living up to expectations. 

If all that was not bad enough, the visit also comes amidst unconfirmed reports that the president intends to hold a regional summit for the signatories of the Abraham Accords. Should such a summit take place without active Palestinian participation, this would be another blow to the standing of the Palestinian leadership and the Palestinian cause. Needless to say, such a summit will further damage the delicate relations between the U.S. and the Palestinians. While the Palestinians are not in a position to force Israel or the U.S. to secure their presence, this will further undermine U.S. political leverage over the Palestinian leadership.

While these issues constitute major challenges that a single presidential visit to the region is unlikely to resolve, such a visit could nonetheless serve as a catalyst for energizing the start of a meaningful process. There are some tactical and strategic policy questions that could be addressed, or at least raised, during the visit.  

The U.S. may want to consider the following steps:

On a tactical level,

• Empower the Jordanian Waqf Department on Haram al-Sharif/the Temple Mount, which would be in line with the stated U.S., and in some ways Israeli, policy by preserving the historic and religious Status Quo. This requires the practical step of reintroducing Jordan’s Jerusalem Islamic Waqf Department’s full authority over the site. The Waqf’s powers were seriously undermined throughout recent years, mainly with regard to coordinating non-Muslim visits and unilateral Israeli action on the site. 
• Initiate a formal Palestinian-U.S. dialogue, which should involve senior officials on both sides, to address bilateral issues including reopening the U.S. consulate, reopening the PLO mission in Washington, prisoner payments reform, and other matters of concern. Such a committee was formed in the summer of 2021. However, it was composed of high-level Palestinians but low-ranking U.S. officials. This undermined the Palestinians’ confidence that the U.S. representatives were in a position to deliver on their quests. A new formation could also look into the possibility of initiating a dialogue with members of Congress or senior staffers to discuss the legislative implications of issues at stake.

On a strategic level,

• Address the issue of Jerusalem in a way that is consistent with longstanding U.S. policy. The Trump administration’s Jerusalem proclamation stated that “recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and announcing the relocation of our embassy do not reflect a departure from the strong commitment of the United States to facilitating a lasting peace agreement. The United States continues to take no position on any final status issues. The specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem are subject to final-status negotiations between the parties.” Yet, subsequently, the Trump administration made numerous statements strongly indicating that Jerusalem is no longer on the agenda for final-status negotiations. The current administration left vague its exact position on East Jerusalem while affirming the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. A policy statement clarifying the policy would be a game-changer on the Palestinian, and perhaps Arab, side of the equation.

Given President Biden’s preoccupation with a host of domestic and international challenges, Palestinians are sober enough to expect no historic breakthrough. Yet, given their low expectations, with a little effort, the president’s visit can do much good in injecting a measure of confidence that Washington is interested in turning a new page, is aware of Palestinians’ aspirations, needs, and desires, and, while insisting on certain quid-pro-quos, is prepared to take steps to make good on its past promises and address current needs. 

President Joe Biden’s visit to the Middle East arrives during a critical period in the new chapter of Israeli-Jordanian relations. Since the formation of the Bennet-Lapid government in 2021, a noticeable diplomatic effort has been invested in repairing a decade of damaging policies under Netanyahu. These efforts included reviving high-level visits and resuming strategic talks over shared interests, as well as coordinating measures to prevent a recurrence of the May 2021 violence. Yet, despite these efforts, tension grew between the two states after a rapid series of events that put the bilateral relations under real test, risking its reversal.

The series of events began with the eruption of violence in Jerusalem last month, during which Israeli actions were viewed as designed to change the Status Quo at al-Aqsa Mosque/al-Haram al-Sharif and impose a spatial and temporal division of the compound. Consequently, the Jordanian government stepped up diplomatic pressure on Israel by holding a number of high-level calls and meetings with regional and international partners, including, most notably, King Abdullah II’s phone call with President Biden and the monarch’s participation in a short-notice trilateral meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and then-UAE Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed.   

Tensions continued to build after Prime Minister Bennett’s recent statements regarding Israel’s exclusive sovereignty over al-Aqsa Mosque, which was described by the Jordanian Parliament as “irresponsible.” The Parliament also warned that Bennett’s statement has the potential to ignite the region in religious conflict, calling it a coup against the historic reality of al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem. Moreover, the Israeli decision to endorse blueprints for building more than 4,000 new settler units in the occupied Palestinian territories led the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to condemn the decision, describing it as a dangerous violation of international law and undermining peace efforts toward reaching a solution to the conflict.

To make things worse, the killing of the iconic Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh and the images of the Israeli police intrusion into her funeral procession were met with great shock and outrage in Amman. Abu Akleh, a graduate of a Jordanian university, enjoyed close relations with various circles in Jordanian society. Commenting on her killing on Al Jazeera, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi stated that all indications show that Israel bears responsibility while describing the Israeli police’s actions as abhorrent and inhumane. 

Amidst these tensions, and prior to President Biden’s arrival to the region, the Jordanian king met the president at the White House. Upon the meeting’s conclusion, President Biden confirmed his “unwavering support” for Jordan and His Majesty’s leadership. The president recognized Jordan’s crucial role as the custodian of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and cited the need to preserve the historic Status Quo at al-Haram al-Sharif. The president also affirmed his strong support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

An assessment of these statements suggests that the president set guidelines to steer Israeli-Jordanian relations through tense times, within an American regional policy objective of “keeping calm.” Repeatedly, it was proven that the erosion of the Status Quo in Jerusalem and weakening of the Hashemite custodianship have the potential to set the region on fire. Therefore, what the president seemed to call for was going back to basics, as outlined in Article 9 of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. Like the Jordanians, Biden seems to view a restored Status Quo as critical to mitigating a major source of regional instability and preventing further deterioration in relations between two U.S. allies in the region. In an interview with H.R. McMaster in Washington, D.C., King Abdullah II referred to the interconnectedness of regional and global threats and the need for adopting a holistic approach in addressing various challenges. King Abdullah then pointed out that American presidents ignore the Middle East “at their own peril, because it will come back and give [them] a swift kick on the backside if [they are] not careful.” Tending to the Palestinian issue and resolving the conflict is a must, he concluded. 

Given the American status as guarantor of both the Israel-Jordan peace treaty and Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, from a Jordanian perspective, going back to basics requires immediate, robust, and active American diplomacy to clarify the Status Quo and ensure its implementation. Failure to do so would increase Jordan’s domestic constraints, leaving it with little room to maneuver and no choice but to abandon its long-held balancing act and resort to aggressive policies vis-à-vis the fragile Israeli government. The ensuing more complex and volatile security environment will serve no one. 

Jordan, long struggling to accommodate well over one million refugees from Syria (not to mention a previous wave from Iraq), has serious concerns regarding challenges in Yemen, the humanitarian disaster in Lebanon, the aftermath of two years of the COVID pandemic, food security issues, and the re-emergence of Daesh in Syria, Iraq, and Africa. Jordan is also concerned that any vacuum in the south of Syria will be filled by Iranians and their proxies, leading to an escalation of problems on the Jordanian border which is regularly subjected to attacks. This entire range of challenges is best addressed in close coordination with the United States and Israel. For that to happen, Washington must stay tuned and engaged and Israel needs a course adjustment.

Restoring Jordanian authority over the al-Aqsa compound would ease public pressure and provide room for Jordan to reclaim its leading stabilizing role and to do what it does best: employing its deft diplomacy to weave a complex fabric of ties with Americans of all stripes, with Israelis, and with close friends in the region, and use those ties to integrate mechanisms to stem violence and reduce tensions, primarily in Israel and the Occupied Territories. King Abdullah’s productive meetings with senior National Security Council, Pentagon, and USAID officials, as well as Congressional leadership, confirmed U.S. support for Jordan taking the lead in coordinating efforts within mechanisms such as the Aqaba Process.  

Despite challenges, King Abdullah II pointed out that there is a new desire among Arab countries to reengage in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and move forward with normalization of relations. However, he stressed that unless the Palestinian issue is resolved, no matter what relations Arab countries have with Israel, we will see a step forward and two back.

Going back to basics and to the principles outlined in the historic Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty will open the door to changing the perception of the Jordanian public that diplomacy works, treaties matter, and the use of violence will not achieve anything of value. Consequently, in preparation for President Biden’s visit, it is important to articulate steps that safeguard Jordan’s national interest in preserving the historic Status Quo at al-Haram al-Sharif and respecting the Hashemite custodianship in Jerusalem. This should include holding the long-awaited meeting between Jordanian and Israeli officials to clarify and agree on the interpretation of the Status Quo in Jerusalem and respecting the authority and powers of Jordan’s Jerusalem Awqaf and Aqsa Affairs Department. The Americans can play a crucial role in sending that message and making it happen, both by helping bridge gaps and guaranteeing that agreements are reached.

At a time when the world is focused most on the Russian war against Ukraine and its devastating global repercussions, President Biden will be making his first trip to the Middle East. He is expected to visit Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. His administration has not written off an additional destination for a regional meeting, but it is quite complicated and may not be achievable.

The discourse regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the beginning of this administration and the formation of the current Israeli government make for low expectations of his visit. However, absent some practical steps, the visit will not augur well for an administration that is facing a credibility crisis in the region, even though this conflict is no longer high on the list of U.S. priorities.

To its credit, the administration reasserted that the two-state solution is the only way to resolve the conflict and repeatedly indicated that the United States believes that Palestinians and Israelis “deserve equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity.” It was also instrumental in ending the Gaza war in May 2021, which witnessed a particularly active role by Egypt, and resumed some assistance to the Palestinians that had been all but terminated by its predecessor. 

Most of the administration’s efforts to prevent destabilizing developments have been done behind closed doors. It sent strong messages to Israel on a number of issues including its practices in al-Haram al-Sharif and Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem, and in relation to settlement activities and house demolitions, indicating that they constitute unilateral actions that undermine prospects for a two-state solution. However, with the recent announcement of over 4,000 new settlement units and continued house demolitions, it is clear that the messages were not heeded.

The administration also put pressure on the Palestinian Authority to reform payments to the families of prisoners and martyrs and curricula in Palestinian schools. At the same time, the administration did not honor its promise to the Palestinian leadership to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem or to reverse other policies of the previous administration including by declaring settlements as inconsistent with international law.

This visit is challenged by two developments: the administration suffers from low popularity on the eve of midterm congressional elections and finds it difficult to exert pressure on an Israeli government that is on the verge of collapse. Moreover, it should find it difficult to press Palestinians without having anything meaningful to offer them, especially at a time of great tensions resulting from the killing of the Palestinian reporter Shireen Abu Akleh and the disruption of her funeral.

It is against that backdrop that it is doubtful that significant progress could be made during the visit. However, its impact should be assessed based on the visitor’s political message and steps taken by all sides in its wake, specifically on the following seven issues.

1. Political Horizon: The administration has indicated that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on final status issues may not be possible now. This relieves both sides of any pressure to make concessions and—as evidenced by recent rounds of violence—results in a dangerous stalemate. Now is the time to start defining the endgame. It has to be made clear that improving living conditions is not a substitute for a political process toward the end goal of achieving a two-state solution; that steps that undermine that objective are unacceptable; and that the status quo is not sustainable, neither in Gaza, nor in East Jerusalem or the West Bank and perhaps not within the Green Line either.

2. Jerusalem: Reopening the consulate may require some time, but the administration should at least indicate that it will be establishing an American embassy to Palestine in East Jerusalem in the context of progress towards peace. In the meantime, the status quo in al-Haram al-Sharif that was accepted and reaffirmed in 2015 by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister at the time, should be restored and upheld in line with the statement issued after Biden’s meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan, and evictions and house demolitions should be terminated.

3. Two-State Solution: The administration should reiterate its adherence to the two-state solution and be firm in opposing steps that undermine that objective, including settlement activity, house demolitions, and Israeli practices in East Jerusalem.

4. Munich Group: In line with its new approach that fosters multilateralism in dealing with international challenges, the administration should engage with and support the efforts of the Munich Group (France, Germany, Egypt, and Jordan), including in calling for the implementation of confidence-building steps it presented to the parties.

5. Palestinian Elections: The administration should be more forceful in its support for conducting Palestinian elections, including in East Jerusalem in accordance with the Oslo Accords and as was the case during previous Palestinian elections. This can bolster the legitimacy of Palestinian institutions, which contribute to intra-Palestinian reconciliation efforts led by Egypt.

6. Normalization: In supporting the Abraham Accords, the administration expressed hope that the normalization agreements can build bridges and contribute to a negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The time has come for the administration to translate this objective into practical steps. The slogan that Palestinians and Israelis “deserve equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity” should also be translated into a concrete action plan in cooperation with partners in the region and the EU. If the discussions to convene a regional meeting during the visit are successful, this should constitute the main focus of its deliberations. The location, participation, agenda, and outcome of this proposed meeting require separate analysis and evaluation.

7. RIP Shireen Abu Akleh: The general perception in the region is that Israel acts with a sense of impunity. With the visit coming soon after this tragic incident that shocked Palestinians, the region, and the international community, the U.S. should send a message on whether this impunity continues unabated.

This visit is an opportunity for the administration to lay the groundwork for more concrete efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian front following the war on Ukraine, the midterm congressional elections, and the current period of instability and uncertainty facing Israel’s coalition. If this does not happen, it would greatly reduce prospects for stability, let alone any significant progress in advancing peace during Biden’s term of office.

Overview

When Jews gather for the Passover Seder, tradition has it that the youngest asks four questions, beginning with “Why is tonight different?” Even though the holiday season is still with us, and with challenging moments looming over the coming weeks, it seems that one can tentatively argue that compared with but a year ago, the differences are significant, mostly for the better.

A change in Israel’s conduct contributed to the fact that thus far we have not witnessed anything close to last year’s level of violence. On the other hand, several third parties—most significantly Jordan, an old peace signatory, and the UAE, a new normalizer—have been far more outspoken in expressing disapproval of Israel’s conduct than they were last year. Concurrently, Egypt, which was the key firefighter last year, was spared the need to mediate a ceasefire, but true to its pragmatic approach, combined private messaging with effective behind-the-scenes delivery of preventive diplomatic medicine. Finally, though far less engaged than during last year’s hostilities, and benefitting from ‘eyes and ears on the ground’ thanks to a fully staffed embassy, the U.S. proved unable to stay away. Its involvement—from presidential phone calls to the dispatch of senior State Department diplomats—seemed again to echo Al Pacino’s famous quip in The Godfather: “Just when I thought that I was out, they pull me back in.”

Consequently, it took several preventive measures, including:

• Controversial (if not provocative) demolitions of Palestinian houses and evictions of families in East Jerusalem were suspended.
• Jewish extremists’ plans for provocative, arcane religious ceremonies at the Temple Mount as well as a provocative ‘flag march’ entry into Palestinian neighborhoods were forcefully prevented.
• Police norms of conduct were refreshed and adjusted to account for the sensitive location and moment.  
• Israel issued additional permits for Gazans to work in Israel and implemented other relief measures meant, inter alia, to deter Hamas from risking it all by opening fire. 
• Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives on the West Bank were detained in an effort to thwart terror activities against Israel and Israelis. 
• The government extended the traditional ten-day closure of the Mount for Jewish visitors to two weeks for the duration of the second half of Ramadan. 
• West Bank closure, in the past lasting the entire Passover week, was shortened substantially.
• All of this was preceded by discreet coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and intense high-level consultations with Jordan, in order to signal adherence to the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty’s clause that ensures Jordan’s role in all matters related to Muslim shrines in the Old City and to coordinate preventive measures. This was in line with the Bennett government’s reversal of the Netanyahu policy of undermining both Jordan’s role in these matters and overall bilateral relations with this critical neighbor.

Though weak and suffering from a lack of popular legitimacy, yet ignoring pressures to sever relations with Israel—security coordination included—Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas reacted both cautiously and responsibly. Much like Jordan, with whom he is closely coordinating, he confined his protest to words, not deeds that could have further aggravated matters.

Two other players deserve credit: the U.S. and Mansour Abbas. Not the expected bedfellows, both Washington and the leader of the Islamist Ra’am party (a coalition partner of Prime Minister Bennett) pressed for similar lists of dos and don’ts, including preventing the flag march from entering Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighborhoods and continuing the practice of closing the Mount for non-Muslims for the second half of Ramadan.

The Bad News

On the domestic political front, it appears that both Prime Minister Bennett and MK Abbas have all but exhausted the political space afforded by their respective parties. In both, ideological diehards were up in arms over what was viewed as yielding on core values: Jewish freedom of visitation, prayer, and blunt demonstration of sovereignty for Religious Zionists; unrestricted and unfettered access to Muslims for the Islamist party. 

Otherwise, on the domestic front, it turned out that the message of a new mode of conduct did not reach all layers of law enforcement agencies. The phenomenon of the ‘strategic corporal’—where a junior officer’s misconduct triggers a crisis—found expression in viral images of police violence, feeding unfounded conspiracy theories and fueling tensions.

Vis-à-vis local Muslim populations, both West Bankers and Israel’s Arab citizens, a decade-long Israeli policy of undermining any entity claiming authority regarding al-Aqsa left the government and those acting on its behalf with no ‘address’. If in the past one could communicate and coordinate—discreetly or otherwise—with a center of authority that could exert influence over incited youth, this is no longer the case. Preventing any PA presence, undermining Jordan’s role, and castrating the Waqf’s potency opened the door for the most extreme agitators—Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Northern Branch of Israel’s Islamic movement, and others—to incite violence, forcing the Israeli police to deal with challenges it was not designed for.   

Intra-Palestinian dynamics were also affected by these events, and not for the better. Careful to not involve Gaza in yet another round of fighting with the IDF, Hamas—as well as PIJ—confined their activity to remotely inciting Palestinian youth to violent protest on and around the Mount. Both also bragged that it was their threats that forced Israel to restrain Jewish extremists and close the area to non-Muslims. Consequently, almost without firing a shot, Hamas reinforced the false dichotomy that Hamas and PIJ “protect Jerusalem” whereas the PA is “complicit in Israeli aggression.” Further undermining what remained of PA legitimacy, this was perceived as a continuation of Israeli policies that strengthen extremists while weakening moderates.

Regionally, reactions proved less forgiving than they were during May 2021. Jordan’s prime minister went as far as to express support for Palestinian stone-throwers; the UAE not only issued sharp public condemnations (which it had avoided doing last year) but went further by being instrumental in convening a U.N. Security Council emergency session on the subject. These are just the most striking examples. When asked about the reason for more forceful reactions to less violent developments, one Gulf diplomat intimated frustration with what had been perceived as an insufficient Israeli reaction to early warnings. Israel seemed less sensitive to the effect of images of violence at the holy shrine, which serve adversaries of its peace partners who seek to undermine internal stability and regime legitimacy, he added.

Although the various repeated cautioning messages from these capitals were hardly ignored, it seems that Israel did not fully internalize them. Indeed, when asked about it, more than one member of Cabinet expressed dismay at the sharp reactions given “all that we’ve done to prevent escalation.”

Bottom Line 

A decade-long erosion of the Temple Mount Status Quo, best summarized by former Prime Minister Netanyahu as “Muslims pray, others visit,” accelerated during his final years in office and contributed to last year’s violence and this year’s tensions. All who were rightfully worried in 2021, who appreciate the marked improvement in 2022, and who wish the holiday season of 2023 to be calmer and more peaceful yet must not waste a day in tending to this complex issue. Worthy recommendations are found in the other memos in this compilation, but they all must begin with clarifying the essence of the Status Quo, imposing strict adherence thereto, and empowering Jordan and, on its behalf, the Waqf, while finding ways to coordinate it all with both the PA and Israel’s other peace partners. It is with this in mind that the reported Israeli-Jordanian decision to convene the bilateral Jerusalem committee shortly after Ramadan should be welcomed.

This time last year, incidents in Sheikh Jarrah, at Damascus Gate, and in other East Jerusalem neighborhoods—including a provocative ‘flag march’ and incidents at al-Aqsa Mosque—triggered an armed confrontation between Hamas and the Israeli army that resulted in more than 260 Palestinians and 11 Israelis killed and enormous damage to Gaza infrastructure. This year’s holiday convergence proved far less fatal, but violent nonetheless. Tensions mounted following a number of attacks against Israeli civilians that killed 14 individuals, and subsequent Israeli military activities in the West Bank leaving 13 Palestinians dead. Tensions on the al-Aqsa compound in Jerusalem further increased, especially during the week of Passover—which coincided with the beginning of Ramadan, where thousands of Israeli right-wing activists, escorted by Israeli police, made their way onto the al-Aqsa compound.  Coupled with Jewish extremists’ calls for holding a Passover sacrifice ritual on-site, Palestinian activists heeded the calls of political factions, clergy, and others to “defend al-Aqsa” against alleged Israeli plans to change the Status Quo on-site and divide it temporally and spatially between Jews and Muslims.  

The Israeli government dismissed as lies all reports of intent to change the Status Quo, but that by itself did little to allay concerns. It helped mitigate tensions but not prevent clashes. These tensions, though not new, triggered a political and diplomatic public spat between King Abdullah of Jordan and the Palestinian Authority on one side, and the Israeli government on the other. The Palestinian official definition of the Status Quo to apply to holy sites is almost identical to that of Jordan. Both call for the restoration of the status as it existed until 2000. 

The following examines the Palestinian perspective on and dynamics related to this sensitive issue.

Over the years, Israeli religious nationalists violated the Status Quo by performing acts that, up until a few years ago, were prohibited by all Israeli governments since 1967. These have included raising the Israeli flag, praying on-site, holding lectures, and distributing posters of the Jewish Temple replacing the Dome of the Rock. In recent years, such practices have been increasingly tolerated by Israeli police, thus cementing perceptions among Palestinians that the Israeli authorities are complicit with Jewish extremists’ gradual plan to permanently alter the Status Quo and the character of the site, including by dividing it between Muslims and Jews spatially and temporally. 

In order to help manage tensions around this site and avoid making decisions that would lead to further deterioration, President Abbas canceled a leadership meeting that was expected to implement previously announced measures against the Israeli government, including terminating security coordination. Despite internal pressures and heated criticism, President Abbas called off the meeting and instead announced that the PA, as well as Jordan, were engaged in an intense political and diplomatic campaign aimed at restoring the Status Quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem. 

This list included the following:

1. Access to non-Muslims was subject to approval by the Jordanian Waqf Department through a prior written request.
2. Non-Muslim prayers were not permitted in al-Aqsa Mosque/al-Haram al-Sharif, nor were prayer tools or instruments allowed.
3. Deployment of armed personnel in al-Aqsa Mosque/al-Haram al-Sharif was not allowed.
4. The Jordanian Waqf Department had the authority to regulate entry and access to al-Aqsa Mosque/al-Haram al-Sharif for non-Muslims, which included: 
   • Determining acceptable clothing, conduct, and behavior in al-Aqsa Mosque/al-Haram al-Sharif.
   • Setting security measures intended to preserve order in al-Aqsa Mosque/al- Haram al-Sharif.
   • Providing all personnel for security escorts in al-Aqsa Mosque/al-Haram al-Sharif.
   • Blacklisting tourists who breached visitation regulations and prohibiting them from entering in the future.
   • Predetermining the time, route, and duration of visits, specifically: 
     • The size of Jewish tourist groups (usually three and not exceeding five persons).
     • The route of the visits (predetermined by the Jordanian Awqaf Department, usually 150 meters in each direction). 
     • The frequency of visits.

In conclusion, while tensions on al-Haram al-Sharif/al-Aqsa Mosque this year were not unique, it is worth noting that for the first time since 2003, the Jordanian government, as well as the Palestinian Authority, launched a coordinated diplomatic and political campaign aimed at restoring the Status Quo as it persisted between the years 1967-2000.  While the full restoration of the pre-2000 Status Quo may be difficult to achieve immediately, it is imperative that gradual steps in this direction are taken right away, in order to secure a more peaceful holiday season next year and beyond. Having been weakened over the years, the Waqf is viewed by many as irrelevant. Its ability to control crowds and prevent incidents of violence has thus been seriously impaired. In order to defuse future tensions and eruptions of violence on the site, reversing Israeli practices that undermine Waqf authority on the site is an urgent priority.

It has been less than a year since the Jordanian and Israeli governments changed course, seeking to repair the frayed ties that had characterized bilateral relations over the previous decade. In the lead-up to the converging holidays, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, Defense Minister Benny Gantz, Minister of Internal Security Omer Barlev, and President Isaac Herzog all held meetings with HM King Abdullah II and relevant senior Jordanian officials, which the monarch described as “very encouraging.” These meetings stressed the importance of the strategic partnership between the two countries and a common objective of maintaining regional stability. They also discussed ways to enhance cooperation in trade, energy, water, and food security. Jerusalem, particularly its holy sites, was certainly on the agenda.

However, the momentum these meetings achieved is challenged by two factors: first, both Jordan and Israel are burdened by respective complex domestic agendas that affect foreign policy decisions, often resulting in contradictory positions despite shared interests. Second, a decade of Netanyahu leadership, less attuned to Jordanian interests and on occasion outright offensive to them, left obstacles that take a long time to overcome. This is particularly true when it comes to Jerusalem. 

Both Jordan and Israel have an interest in maintaining calm in Jerusalem and avoiding last year’s scenario when the “Sword of Jerusalem” clashed with the “Guardian of the Walls.” From a Jordanian perspective, instability west of the Jordan River has an eastward ripple effect. The Palestinian human toll, violations of the Status Quo in Jerusalem, and a potential civil war scenario in Israel can strike an angry chord among Jordanians and fuel confrontational sentiment among thousands. There are also concerns regarding the rise of Hamas’ popularity among Jordanians and its self-portrayal as the protector of al-Aqsa. Within the context of a fragile economy and high unemployment, popular anger might be exploited by extremists and undermine the ambitious program to democratize the country, thus affecting stability. 

Consequently, in the lead-up to the month of Ramadan and Passover, and following several terror attacks in Israel, the king took steps in trying to prevent a reiteration of May 2021’s violence. These included the above-noted meeting with Foreign Minister Lapid, where they agreed to “work together to calm tensions and promote understanding.” During a subsequent meeting with President Herzog the king condemned the terror attacks in Israel and conveyed condolences to the victims’ families. The same message was conveyed over a phone call with Prime Minister Bennett. 

Jordanians’ frustration with Israel’s conduct and the need to deal with the same situation year after year found expression in demands that their government react more forcefully to what is viewed as illegal Israeli practices that aim to change the Status Quo at al-Aqsa Mosque/al-Haram al-Sharif and impose spatial and temporal division on the compound. Consequently, the Jordanian government resorted to diplomatic pressure on Israel including by summoning—and conveying a sharp message to—the Israeli chargé d’affaires in Amman, hosting an emergency meeting of the Arab Ministerial Committee, and holding a series of phone calls with Arab, European, and U.N. leaders. Jordan conveyed the same concerns also in a meeting with a senior U.S. delegation that included Yael Lempert and Hady Amr, in a short-notice meeting attended by HM King Abdullah II with the Emirati Crown Prince and their Cairo host, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. As part of stepping up the pressure, in a phone call with President Biden, HM King Abdullah II also discussed the importance of maintaining coordination to prevent the recurrence of violations in Jerusalem that may undermine peace prospects and lead to further escalation. Finally, all this was followed by His Majesty’s April 28 trip to Washington.

In determining its response to the events of April 2022, Jordan seems to have factored its alarm with not only the continued erosion of the Status Quo (and its above-noted domestic ramifications), but also an appreciation of the need to encourage the fragile Israeli coalition to continue—and accelerate the pace—of changing the policies of its predecessor. It is in that context that Jordanians are well aware of the risk that, should a coalition crisis result in the return of previous policies, Netanyahu’s decade-long drive to undermine the Status Quo might see a sequel. It is during those years that Jordan and the Waqf were bypassed, as the role of the Israeli prime minister’s office, national police, border police, and special forces increased in managing the holy shrines. This was not only in contradiction to the specific clause in the peace treaty that acknowledged Jordan’s centrality. Weakening Jordan and the Waqf’s role has also empowered the anti-Jordanian pan-Islamist radical party Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) and enhanced its presence at al-Aqsa, thus affecting the orientation of mosque visitors and activists (who reportedly provoked clashes with visiting Jordanian officials) and adding fuel to the fire. 

Jordan is not naïve about the possibility of securing long-term stability around Jerusalem’s holy sites, Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem, or in the region beyond, absent a far more comprehensive effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Likewise, there is no illusion that a solution is readily available. In the interim, dynamics on the ground are met with grave concern, as it seems just a matter of time until Jerusalem forces itself on the regional agenda, and in violent ways yet again. The annual calendar is studded with moments known to create tension. Just to illustrate, marking the unification of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists opt for provocations the likes of which triggered last year’s violence in the city, clashes between Jewish and Arab Israeli citizens, and an 11-day war with Gaza. Averting such tragedies cannot await a comprehensive peace initiative.

Reflecting that logic, in an interview with CNN, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi introduced the Jordanian formula for addressing tensions in the city through the adoption of short-, medium-, and long-term measures designed to restore calm, address root causes of violence, and get the parties back to the negotiating table. The minister reiterated that this can only be done by respecting the legal and historic Status Quo, as well as the Hashemite custodianship, and by creating a credible political horizon to resolve the Palestinian issue. 

The good news is that there are intensive regional and international efforts to avoid another Israeli-Palestinian war. The preventive effort has been extensive, and the U.S. seems to be carefully monitoring the situation. The bad news is the reconfirmation of what most already know: the Israeli-Palestinian Status Quo is volatile and not sustainable. The resulting successive wars only take us many steps further away from peace.

Egyptian efforts have been instrumental in ending almost all the Israel-Gaza wars. Egypt has been continuously monitoring the pulse in the occupied territories, particularly in Gaza, and coordinates closely with Amman and Ramallah on issues pertaining to East Jerusalem.

Like many countries in the region and beyond, Egypt condemned—and demanded an end to—the Israeli escalation in the Palestinian territories and continued incursions by Israelis onto the al-Aqsa Mosque compound under Israeli police protection. Stressing the importance of adhering to international law, Egypt called for the provision of due protection for Palestinian civilians, as well as for ending any practice that violates the sanctity of al-Aqsa Mosque and other religious sites or affects the identity of East Jerusalem.

The Egyptian president hosted a tripartite summit with Jordan’s King Abdallah and UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed. They stressed that their countries would spare no effort to restore calm in Jerusalem and stop all forms of escalation to enable worshipers to perform their religious practices without hindrances or harassment. They called on Israel to stop all measures that undermine the chances of achieving peace, to reach a political horizon, and to return to serious and effective negotiations to resolve the Palestinian question on the basis of the two-state solution and in accordance with international law.

Egypt also participated in the emergency ministerial meeting hosted and chaired by Jordan with representatives from Algeria, Morocco, the PA, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the UAE that condemned the Israeli attacks in al-Haram al-Sharif. The parties warned that these actions represent a blatant provocation to Muslims and threaten to ignite a cycle of violence, and they expressed support for Jordan’s custodianship in administering holy sites. King Abdullah stressed the importance of observing the Status Quo at the Jerusalem holy sites.

However, Egypt was less vocal publicly, preferring to work in a more discreet manner behind closed doors compared to the PA and Jordan, who had sharp public exchanges with Israel.

Egypt conducted private talks with Hamas, including its leadership in Qatar, as well as with the PA and Israel. Egypt indicated to Hamas that the Israeli government is at its weakest and that if Hamas escalates, Israel will strongly attack in order to ensure its political survival and avoid criticism from the extreme right. Cairo expressed the fear that the fall of this government would lead to a more extreme right-wing one. Concurrently, Egypt is convinced that Hamas can calm things down and that violence would hamper the reconstruction of Gaza. Should this happen, the flow of construction materials would cease and Egypt will not issue work permits for construction engineers.

Egypt’s advice to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to issue a joint statement indicating that they do not seek escalation was not heeded. They said that this depends on Israel’s actions in Jerusalem. Stressing that they had no intention to escalate, the two organizations argued that securing calm is up to the Israelis, but they were determined to thwart Israel’s perceived interest in separating Gaza from Jerusalem and the West Bank. Hamas further demanded that Israel allow complete freedom of worship in al-Haram al-Sharif and stop military actions in the Jenin refugee camp. Publicly, both stressed that they had not committed to de-escalate.

Amidst rising tensions, Israel again asked Egypt to pressure Palestinian groups in Gaza to avoid escalation. At the same time, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz threatened that “if they release the gunlock, Israel will come crashing down on them.” Israel said its military was prepared for any eventuality, including attacks from Lebanon and Syria, as well as from Gaza. It was in that context that Egypt asked Israel to release over 400 Palestinians who were arrested during clashes at al-Haram al-Sharif.

All of this followed Egypt hosting an unprecedented tripartite summit (March 2022) with Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, only a few months after the Israeli prime minister visited Egypt. Both summits reflected a new chapter in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Likewise, Egypt participated in the Negev Summit (also in March 2022), convened by Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and featuring his American, Emirati, Bahraini, Moroccan, and Egyptian counterparts. During all these meetings, participants expressed concern that last year’s violence could erupt again due to tensions surrounding Jerusalem holy sites and Palestinian neighborhoods. More recently, the U.S. sent a senior delegation to Israel, Ramallah, Egypt, and Jordan to de-escalate the situation. The visiting diplomats indicated that the U.S. expressed “the need for all parties to call and work for calm, especially in Jerusalem, and our mutual commitment to a two-state solution.”

Many lessons can be drawn from previous tensions leading to violence. The 11-day war of May 2021 was particularly instructive. It demonstrated that a match lit in Jerusalem can ignite fire far beyond. More broadly, it was a reminder that such matches are scattered way beyond Jerusalem. All this leads to one overarching conclusion: much as the issue of the Status Quo regarding Jerusalem’s holiest site cannot be ignored, so too can’t the Palestinian question be bypassed. Rhetorical commitment to the Status Quo, much like to the two-state solution, must be backed by action. This lesson applies to the U.S. discourse and conduct as much as to anyone else’s. As demonstrated time and again, including in May 2021 and April 2022, looking the other way is not an option. On both these recent occasions, nothing short of U.S. presidential intervention proved sufficient. If Washington wishes to free the president of such burdens, it must empower its diplomats to tend to the Israeli-Palestinian arena in a more robust and regular manner, with a view to reaching understandings on a political horizon or end game definition. Egypt and Jordan are ready and willing to assist in this important undertaking, however long and demanding it is likely to prove.