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Policy Pulse: Expert analysis and sharp insight on Israeli-Palestinian and regional affairs from Israel Policy Forum.

The Mecca Pact: What Does It Mean for Jordan?

by Farah Bdour

Key points:

  • The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Mecca security agreement has the potential to benefit Jordanian deterrence against Iran-backed threats and enhance cooperation with each of the three states, though it is not party to the agreement.
  • The deal also presents internal and external complications for Jordan: internally, it risks increasing Turkish influence in Jordan and amplifying domestic Islamist movements as well as being framed as a purely anti-Israel move; externally, Jordan will have to ensure it is not bypassed by a burgeoning Saudi-Syrian-Turkish economic corridor.
  • Jordan should marshal its infrastructure assets and strategic policy to turn its geographic potential into leverage and ensure the Kingdom remains relevant and secure, investing in IMEC as well as new partnerships and increasing its contributions to regional security.

The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani defense agreement signed in Mecca this month marks an important development in the regional security landscape. For Jordan, the significance of the pact lies in the changes it may accelerate around the Kingdom and Israel’s role in determining different variables, particularly in regional deterrence, the balance of security partnerships, and Jordan’s wider strategic environment.

The choice to sign the agreement in Mecca is difficult to separate from the pact’s political symbolism. Coming after Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and Tehran’s efforts during the war to portray the American-Israeli campaign against it as an assault on a “Muslim” country, signing the agreement in Islam’s holiest city gave it significance beyond its formal defense commitments. For Arab states closely aligned with the United States and hosting U.S. military forces on their territory, responding to Iranian attacks and Iran-backed groups carried an additional political sensitivity: their actions were vulnerable to criticism as participation in a U.S.-led confrontation rather than as an exercise of their sovereign right to self-defense. The Sunni Muslim identity of the three signatories may therefore have served a strategic purpose: providing political legitimacy for regional states to organize collectively for their defense at a moment when it was relatively easy for Iran to portray U.S. and Israeli military action as foreign aggression against the Muslim world, while preventing Iran from claiming exclusive ownership of the language of defending Muslim states.

The Sunni dimension, however, should not obscure the pact’s broader strategic logic. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stressed that the agreement is not directed against Iran. That may be formally true, but strategically it is difficult to separate the pact from Saudi Arabia’s effort to strengthen its position vis-à-vis Iran. Tehran has spent years developing a network of partnerships and armed groups that encircle the Kingdom, including the Houthis in Yemen and a network of militias in Iraq. Riyadh is now building its own network of regional security relationships around Iran, bringing together military capabilities and strategic positions that can provide greater depth and deterrence. The pact is therefore not formally an anti-Iran alliance, but it does strengthen Saudi Arabia’s options in dealing with the strategic challenge posed by Iran. 

Large digital screen at night displays Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with group photo of leaders; pedestrians, a bridge, and vehicles are visible nearby.
A digital screen displays greetings for the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement on Liaquat Bagh Road in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on August 9, 2026.

This matters for Jordan because the pact is emerging within a changing regional security architecture. The United States remains central to regional security, but Washington is adjusting its military posture while regional states are seeking greater capacity to defend themselves. The Mecca pact may therefore be less a replacement for the U.S.-led system than an effort by regional states to build additional capacity within it. This also raises the question of how the pact relates to the security vision embodied in the Abraham Accords, which sought to deepen regional integration through normalization with Israel. For Saudi Arabia, however, normalization has become less strategically urgent as Riyadh develops alternative channels for securing its interests. Functional U.S.-Saudi security cooperation through CENTCOM, particularly in air defense and intelligence sharing, has provided practical security benefits without normalization. Riyadh has also secured a long-sought U.S. agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, though it remains subject to congressional review. Together, these developments reduce the extent to which normalization is indispensable to Saudi Arabia’s strategic objectives. The political cost of normalization has risen while its marginal strategic necessity has fallen. This does not signal disinterest, but gives Riyadh greater leverage to wait for terms that serve its interests. 

The longer-term question is how these emerging arrangements, including the Abraham Accords and new regional defense partnerships, will interact with existing mechanisms such as CENTCOM. If they complement the U.S.-led architecture, they could strengthen regional deterrence without fundamentally altering the security system countries such as Jordan rely on. If they develop into competing structures, however, they could contribute to a more fragmented regional security environment. 

Jordan is already closely connected to the three countries involved in the Mecca pact. Saudi Arabia is part of Jordan’s Arab strategic depth–the dense and well-established network of strategic relations between Jordan and other Arab states–with extensive political, economic and security ties. Pakistan has a longstanding military relationship with Jordan that increasingly extends into drones and defense technology, and Türkiye-Jordan ties are growing. The recent Zulfiqar military exercise, which brought Jordanian, Turkish, Pakistani and Azerbaijani forces together for special operations and counterterrorism training, illustrates that Jordan already cooperates with the countries participating in the new arrangement without being defined by it. 

The most immediate potential benefit of the agreement for Jordan is stronger regional deterrence against Iran and Iran-backed armed groups. Greater coordination among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan could improve intelligence sharing, counter-drone capabilities, air defense coordination, and the ability to impose costs on armed groups. Jordan has publicly warned that Iran-backed groups operating in Iraq could target Jordanian sites and has pressed the Iraqi government to prevent its territory from being used for attacks against the Kingdom. Amman has also made clear that it will respond to threats against its territory. If the new arrangement strengthens these capabilities, Jordan stands to benefit from a stronger deterrence environment in its neighborhood. 

There are, however, complications within this emerging architecture. 

The first is domestic. Ankara’s enhanced regional role may give greater resonance to its Islamist political model and regional narrative, particularly among Jordanian constituencies sympathetic to political Islam. This matters following Amman’s active measures against the Muslim Brotherhood and its local political arm in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front (recently rebranded as the Al-Umma Party). This movement is considerably weaker now than in the past, but a more prominent Turkish role in the region could sharpen its public narrative and increase its appeal to segments of the Jordanian public.

Jordan’s domestic concerns go beyond its broadly positive relations with Türkiye and include managing how regional developments are interpreted inside Jordan. The government will therefore need to pay greater attention to the domestic messaging surrounding the new regional order, an area in which it has not always been particularly effective. The emergence of local commentary framing the pact as an “anti-Israel” alliance is a case in point. Such a domestic narrative risks turning a regional security development into a political binary that does not necessarily reflect the calculations of the countries involved. Saudi Arabia has not closed the door on normalization with Israel, and Jordan should therefore avoid treating the new defense arrangement as evidence that Riyadh has adopted a permanently anti-Israel regional posture. Reinforcing such a binary would unnecessarily narrow Jordan’s own room for maneuver.

The second complication is external. The pact is part of a broader Saudi effort to expand its strategic options and reduce dependence on any single security or geographic pathway. For Jordan, this matters beyond defense because the same regional diversification can affect the economic geography around it. Saudi Arabia has an interest in developing multiple routes toward and through the Levant, while Türkiye has an interest in Syria’s stabilization and reconstruction and in strengthening its position as a regional connectivity hub. If trade routes through Syria become more secure and commercially viable, they could provide alternatives to those going through Jordan. 

This is particularly relevant to IMEC. Saudi Arabia may have an interest in reshaping the corridor, moving from an architecture in which the UAE, Israel and Jordan are important nodes toward one in which Saudi Arabia has greater control over the corridor’s geography and strategic direction. A configuration that connects the Gulf more directly through Saudi Arabia, Syria and Türkiye could also serve several of the region’s emerging strategic and economic interests. Whether such a configuration would be commercially and politically viable remains uncertain. But the possibility matters for Jordan because it could reduce the importance of its traditional position as a land bridge between the Gulf and the Levant. 

This does not mean that the Mecca Pact is a connectivity agreement, or that Saudi Arabia is deliberately seeking to bypass Jordan. The concern is more structural: the interests of several regional states could converge around plans that make bypassing Jordan increasingly viable. 

This is also where the evolving relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE matters. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may pursue different paths, but they remain bound by kinship and a shared Gulf history. Their interests and strategic visions may diverge, including over security and connectivity, but these deeper ties shaped over generations allow for both disagreement and renewed cooperation, and cannot be easily reduced to strategic rivalry. Jordan has little interest in being drawn into those differences or choosing between competing Gulf visions. Its interests are better served by maintaining strong relationships with both and preserving room to maneuver as Gulf dynamics evolve. For Amman, keeping its options open is therefore less about taking sides than recognizing the enduring complexity of Gulf relations. 

Jordan is well positioned to respond. It sits between the Gulf and the Levant, borders Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Israel, and has access to the Red Sea through Aqaba. But geography only creates potential; infrastructure and strategic policy are required to convert that potential into leverage. Jordan should therefore continue to support IMEC and deepen its relationship with India while simultaneously developing multiple connectivity options through Aqaba, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria. The objective should not be to preserve one corridor at all costs, but to ensure that Jordan remains relevant to several regional networks. 

The significance of the Mecca Pact for Jordan therefore lies less in the agreement itself than in what it reveals about the regional environment. Regional states are building greater security capacity, diversifying their partnerships and creating more options for themselves. For Jordan, this creates an opportunity to benefit from stronger regional deterrence, but also a warning that regional shifts can have consequences beyond security, from the domestic political narrative surrounding Türkiye’s growing role to the economic and connectivity networks taking shape around the Kingdom. Amman should therefore preserve its relationships across the region, manage the domestic political implications of regional developments, strengthen its contribution to regional security, invest in the infrastructure that turns geography into leverage, and avoid becoming dependent on any single security or economic network.

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Farah Bdour is an Israel Policy Forum Policy Fellow based in Jordan who specializes in conflict resolution and mediation and serves as an advisor to a number of governmental agencies.

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