The churn over Israel in American politics and the madcap race in the Knesset are because the players know the board is about to be reset. That doesn’t change the underlying structure of the game, and that is what matters.
The last few weeks in the politics of Israel—both in Israel itself and in the U.S.—have been the mad dash during a game of musical chairs right after the music stops, but the handful of seconds before someone is eliminated are playing out interminably. In Israel, the coalition is passing all of their most unpopular and most extreme ideas during this Knesset’s last week before it dissolves forever, partially in a ludicrous bid to keep Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s “natural partners” together with giveaways to the Haredi parties and partially to destroy any last vestiges of institutional independence beyond the government’s grasp. Whether it is canceling Haredi enlistment in the IDF and banning arrests of draft dodgers, expanding government control over television stations and media websites, or shoveling billions of shekels out the door to new settlements, the government is acting as if there is no tomorrow, which for them is a good bet given the state of the polls.
In the U.S., presumptive Democratic presidential candidates are planting their flags in the ground, whether Rahm Emmanuel with his speech at Tel Aviv University or Ro Khanna with his media blitz following his trip to the West Bank, while the direction of Republican policy toward Israel became a lot murkier following Lindsey Graham’s sudden death. This comes against the backdrop of an effort from Republican Thomas Massie to cancel all American assistance to Israel, which nearly half of House Democrats voted for yesterday. And looming over all of this are the monumental shifts in Israelis’ mindsets stemming from October 7, and the shifts that are still unfolding in Americans’ mindsets stemming from the Iran war and Israel’s role in it.
It is impossible to watch this without concluding that we are in a revolutionary moment for Israel and for U.S.-Israel relations. On the Israeli side of things, this is translating into efforts to make permanent Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank irreversible. On the U.S. side of things, this is translating into attempts to force a wholesale change in the U.S.-Israel relationship that departs from a special relationship, skips right past the normal relationship stop, and ends with arms embargoes and cessation of cooperation on security, intelligence, and trade. For the overwhelming majority of American Jews who embrace a centrist, moderate, and hopeful vision for Israel and its relationship with the U.S.—support for Israel as the Jewish homeland and a Jewish state while abhorring the extremist and revanchist policies that have intensified over the past four years but are a common feature of the past decade and a half—the despair is palpable. The facts on the ground look too entrenched to overcome, and you thus have some whose impulse is to harden their support for Israel in the face of unprecedented threats coming from both sides of the American political system, some whose impulse is to seek utopian solutions that will never come to fruition but at least provide a modicum of hope, and some who are just checking out altogether and questioning whether Israel, or Israel as a Jewish state, is even that important to their identity or their Jewish lives. To quote Ted Lasso as World Cup fever reaches its apex, the opposite of love is not hate but indifference, and that means that the constituency for two states in the U.S.—what was the near consensus opinion of that overwhelming majority of centrist, moderate, hopeful American Jews—is rapidly eroding due to fear, cynicism, and detachment.
This is all understandable and legitimate. It also misses much of what’s going on, because the game of musical chairs is being played with chairs that are still anchored into the ground, so while the focus is on the chaos swirling around, there are some fundamental things that have not changed.
The first is that no matter how much Bezalel Smotrich and his band of arsonists want to portray their project of settlements on steroids as a massive success, what they are doing in many ways is building an elaborate movie set that is a façade with nothing behind it. Settlements are unpopular with Israelis; the West Bank is experiencing a multi-year net negative migration, with the growth in population attributable to the fact that the largest settlements are Haredi and their birth rate is astronomical. The Haredim live there because it is cheap, but they are also not deep inside of the West Bank and not close to Palestinian population centers. With the exception of the ideological hardcore of settlers, whose patrons and champions have dominated the current government but are unlikely to be part of the next one, Israelis are fleeing the West Bank because living there—with its security burdens, depressed to non-existent homegrown economy, and logistical difficulties—has never been less attractive. None of this is to downplay the bureaucratic revolution that this government has instituted in the West Bank, but there is still no evidence that if you build it, as this government has, Israelis will come.
The second is that for all of the cynicism around two states, it is at heart an expression of what Israelis and Palestinians have wanted since the beginning of the Zionist project, which is separation from each other and the fulfillment of their national projects. Sometimes those two things have manifested as zero-sum visions, and sometimes they have manifested as mutually cooperative and beneficial visions, and though the idea that these two peoples need a divorce rather than a marriage counselor is a pessimistic one, it is the reality. The silver lining to this is that with more than seven million Jews and more than seven million Palestinians, the zero sum visions are no longer possible, no matter how much Hamas or Itamar Ben Gvir want to make them so. One set of facts on the ground is trying to make separation impossible, while the more durable and enduring set of facts on the ground is constantly pushing in the opposite direction.
There are two other fundamentals at work, and while these are new and also point to a sea change, it is a sea change that has the potential to make things better rather than worse. One is that Israeli elections are just over three months away, and the parties that comprise the current coalition are going to suffer an overwhelming rout. That does not guarantee that the opposition parties can overcome the question of relying on the support of at least one Arab party, the various egos involved when multiple party heads each view themselves as the most suitable to be prime minister, or what will be Netanyahu’s unflagging efforts to sow division within their ranks. But the chances are greater than not that Israel will have a very different government before the end of the year, and if things truly are the darkest before the dawn, it still means that dawn will arrive. A new government will not solve all ills, and will ultimately disappoint the high expectations that many in the U.S. have on many fronts as American hopes collide with Israeli realities. Nevertheless, the most noxious trends that make a political resolution with the Palestinians appear to be impossible will begin to be reversed, and there will be a new foundation—even if it is a shallow one—upon which to build.
The other is that Israelis are in for an unpleasant shock as they absorb just how much the world has changed in relation to them. Two years ago, it was common to hear Israelis complain that President Joe Biden stabbed them in the back by withholding one shipment of one-ton bombs and arguing with them over the contours of an operation in Rafah; today, notions of rote security and intelligence cooperation are under assault while signs increasingly point to the U.S. ceasing all security assistance to Israel in two years and there is serious discussion for the first time of complete arms embargoes. In Europe, bans on goods produced in the West Bank are coming, as are more extensive sanctions. This is unfolding as Israel is stretched increasingly thin militarily and economically, and the line that Israel can defend itself by itself begins to sound like a parody rather than a legitimate boast. Israel needs friends in the world, and the easiest fix is to shift course on the Palestinian issue, which for most Israelis is still a non-starter but will start to gain serious ground. Israelis are both smart and practical, and if a new government sees some dividends from easing up on the hardline stances of this government, it will create a policy and political logic that is unavoidable.
It is really tough to be optimistic right now about Israel’s future, and the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship. The pessimism is warranted, and the signs all around are discouraging. A reset is coming, but it can be shaped in a way that will put things on a positive trajectory rather than a negative one. If policymakers who want to right the ship and Israeli and American Jewish leaders who want to build a more enduring partnership focus on the structural realities that extend beyond the tenure of any given government, then the current moment can be one of hope rather than despair.