What’s at Stake in the Israel-Lebanon Negotiations

Israeli and Lebanese officials are set to meet again in Washington this week, with the goal of reaching an agreement to end the war between Israel and Hezbollah. Yet significant barriers stand in the way of a durable arrangement, especially with attacks continuing amid the talks despite a nominal ceasefire.

Abridged timeline: Israel-Lebanon hostilities since October 7:

• October 8, 2023: Hezbollah launches rockets at communities in Israel’s north
• Sept. 17, 2024: Israel’s pager attack against Hezbollah; escalation of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah
• Sept. 27, 2024: Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah assassinated
• Nov. 27, 2024: The U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah takes effect. 
• Mar. 2, 2026: Hezbollah launches rockets at Israel following Israel’s assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Israel resumes its military campaign against Hezbollah.
• Apr. 16, 2026: Current Israel-Lebanon ceasefire takes effect
• Apr. 24, 2026: Ceasefire extended for an additional three weeks 

Rewind: Following a high-intensity Israeli campaign against Hezbollah that left the organization severely diminished in terms of its capabilities and influence, the November 2024 ceasefire agreement brokered by the Biden administration saw an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon—save for five strategic posts just across the border—and a return to quiet. The Lebanese Armed Forces were called upon to demilitarize the country’s south. An unpublished U.S.-Israel side letter to the agreement reportedly confirmed Israel’s right to act against threats in Lebanon that the LAF fails to address.

In February 2026, Lebanon said the LAF had completed the first phase of its disarmament plan in the area between the Litani River and the Israeli border, and that a second phase between the Litani and Awali rivers would take approximately four months. Yet Israel rejected Lebanon’s claim that the first phase had been completed, arguing that Hezbollah’s military infrastructure remained in place, while Hezbollah rejected any effort to disarm it north of the Litani. This progress advanced slowly relative to the timeframe stipulated by the ceasefire agreement, which had called for the immediate deployment of 10,000 LAF troops to southern Lebanon. The Lebanese military’s ability to rein in Hezbollah was hindered by insufficient manpower, outdated equipment, and political constraints. 

On the ground: Days after Israel initiated Operation Roaring Lion against Iran in coordination with the U.S., Israel responded to Hezbollah attacks by resuming its ground operations in southern Lebanon, and striking targets in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley. The U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon on April 16 froze the advancement of Israeli ground forces, yet left Israel in control of a security zone stretching up to 10 kilometers deep into Lebanese territory. The agreement prohibited offensive operations and tasked the Lebanese state with preventing attacks by Hezbollah and other armed groups, but a carveout for IDF self-defense operations left ambiguity over what military activity remained permissible. In practice, Israel and Hezbollah have continued to fight at a lower intensity, with the latter significantly reducing (but not stopping) its attacks on targets within Israel and most Israeli operations now focused on clearing out the new security zone. 

The period since the April 16 ceasefire has seen an attack by Hezbollah on a UNIFIL patrol, clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in Bint Jbeil, Hezbollah rocketfire at Israeli troops, Israeli aerial attacks on southern Lebanon, and strikes on Dahiyeh that eliminated a senior Radwan commander.

Reminiscent of Israel’s tactics east of the Yellow Line in Gaza, the IDF has begun clearing out and destroying Shiite villages in the Lebanese security zone to prevent Hezbollah’s reemergence along the border.

The diplomatic track: In parallel, the U.S has brokered historic direct Israel-Lebanon negotiations, the highest-level publicized bilateral contacts between the two sides in decades. On April 14, Secretary of State Marco Rubio facilitated a meeting between Israel and Lebanon’s ambassadors to the U.S., Yechiel Leiter and Nada Hamadeh Moawad. According to the State Department’s readout, Israel insisted on the dismantlement of non-state militant groups and terror infrastructure in Lebanon, while the Lebanese side expressed support for the reimplementation of the November 2024 ceasefire and maintaining its territorial sovereignty. Following the talks, Leiter expressed optimism and affirmed that the two governments are aligned on the problem of Hezbollah. 

Following a second meeting on April 23 facilitated by President Trump at the Oval Office, the two sides agreed to extend the ceasefire by an additional three weeks. That extension is set to expire on May 15, around when the upcoming round negotiations will be taking place.

However, with Israeli attacks in Lebanon ongoing, the Lebanese side continues to reject Trump’s ongoing push for a face-to-face meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.

The issues at hand: Lebanon and Israel recognize each other as enemy states and have effectively never had diplomatic relations. The two governments have substantive disagreements, including unresolved land-border disputes. In 2022, the two countries agreed on a maritime border through indirect negotiations facilitated by the Biden administration. Following the November 2024 ceasefire, Israel continued to hold five points over the border in Lebanese territory and now holds a full-fledged security zone in the south, reigniting longstanding Lebanese concerns over foreign powers infringing on the country’s sovereignty. The ceasefire also established a tripartite Israel-Lebanon-U.S. coordination mechanism to handle ceasefire violations with face-to-face meetings at the U.N. compound in Naqoura.

Yet the thorniest and most salient issue is Hezbollah’s continued use of Lebanese territory and resources as a basis for attacking Israel. Ironically, Israeli and current Lebanese officials are aligned in recognizing Hezbollah’s malign activity on Iran’s behalf as an issue. In a recent interview with the Saudi outlet Al Arabiya, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam affirmed his desire for eventual peace with Israel, predicated on a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Both he and President Aoun have been consistent in their opposition to Lebanese soil continuing to be grounds for a proxy war between Israel and Iran. For his part, Netanyahu and other Israeli officials have publicly affirmed that their grievances rest solely with Hezbollah, not the Lebanese state.

Dissecting the discrepancy: A large part of the issue is sequencing and mutual distrust, with both sides wanting the other to act first. Israel sees Hezbollah’s disarmament and meaningful Lebanese state enforcement in the south as prerequisites for a full withdrawal, while Lebanon insists that Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory is necessary to create the political conditions for meaningful diplomatic progress. Hezbollah, meanwhile, points to Israel’s continued presence in southern Lebanon to justify maintaining its armed resistance.

Both Israel and Lebanon also have legitimate reasons to be cynical. From Israel’s perspective, Salam, Aoun, and the LAF are insufficiently willing to use real force against Hezbollah for fear of a civil war, necessitating Israel’s intervention. Hezbollah remains deeply entrenched in Lebanese society and perceived as providing for the welfare and security of the Shi’a population. For Lebanon, Israeli officials’ rhetoric about holding a permanent security zone and rhetoric from far-right leaders about extending Israel’s border northwards undermine Jerusalem’s claim to desire genuine peace.  

Iranian interplay: What happens between Israel and Lebanon may ultimately be impacted by the course of the war with Iran, which is in a similar state of ceasefire limbo. Should the U.S. and Iran reach an agreement to end the war, that may ramp up pressure on both Israel and Hezbollah to revert back to the November 2024 ceasefire, albeit without any real progress to resolving the root causes of the conflict. Support for Iran following the Khamenei strike was what prompted Hezbollah to attack in early March and the group remains reliant on Tehran for financial and material support. 

Looking forward: Hezbollah’s tactical defeat by Israel in late 2024 and the election of President Aoun and the swearing in of Prime Minister Salam’s government in early 2025 tipped the balance of power in Lebanese politics away from Iran and created a historic opening for progress. These developments contributed to the recent diplomatic opening between Israel and Lebanon. Yet Hezbollah’s ability to reconstitute itself militarily with help from Iran and maintain its dominance over Lebanon’s Shi’a community mean it will continue to pose a long-term threat to Lebanese state sovereignty and Israeli security for the long term, even if a ceasefire arrangement succeeds in rendering that threat temporarily dormant. The Lebanese government’s unwillingness or inability to fully confront Hezbollah directly means that Iran will continue to maintain a foothold in the country for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, Israel’s post-October 7 skepticism of trusting spoken or unspoken quiet-for-quiet arrangements means that conflict is all the more likely to simmer on a low or moderate flame.