The Ceasefire Had an Irresolvable Contradiction, and So Does Netanyahu’s Vision for What’s Next

Early Tuesday morning, the IDF resumed large-scale airstrikes in Gaza, officially bringing the ceasefire that began on January 19 to an end, one day shy of its two-month mark. The ceasefire’s relatively short life should have surprised nobody; negotiations over its extension had broken down, it revolved around an irreconcilable internal contradiction, and Israel’s coalition politics meant that it was fated to collapse before the end of March. That this was foreseeable does not, however, make it any easier to countenance, and what happens next will be harder to swallow. The resumption of fighting will make it difficult for Israel to recover its hostages, will buy more time in power for a deeply unpopular Israeli government, and will put Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s refusal to consider any implementable plan for Gaza into even starker relief as the IDF continues pushing a rock up an endless hill.

“The resumption of fighting will make it difficult for Israel to recover its hostages, will buy more time in power for a deeply unpopular Israeli government, and will put Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s refusal to consider any implementable plan for Gaza into even starker relief as the IDF continues pushing a rock up an endless hill.”

The stated reason for Israel’s airstrikes was to put pressure on Hamas to return to negotiations. While this is a sensible goal, if it was indeed the primary motivation it will not work. If a successful negotiation is the desired outcome, Israel already achieved that in January, when it and Hamas agreed to the deal that implemented the first stage of the ceasefire and hostage release and also agreed to negotiate over the second phase. The second phase was the barrier, and nothing that has happened over the past two months or that the IDF will do over the months ahead will alter that basic equation. The Israeli government rejects the premise of the second phase, which will leave Hamas in place unless there is an actionable plan to disarm the group and replace it with something else. Hamas rejects the premise of a continued deal without moving now to the second phase, since it will not give up its only leverage—living Israeli hostages—without a guarantee that the IDF will leave Gaza and that it will remain in control of the territory. This was the unresolvable knot at the core of the negotiated agreement, which is why a return to fighting was inevitable. The deal was a temporary fix that saved the lives of 25 Israelis and secured the return of eight more who were slain, and bought time for both sides to regroup. Expecting airstrikes, a complete blockade on goods entering Gaza, or a new multi-pronged ground invasion to alter the basic negotiating dynamic is wishful thinking.

“The deal was a temporary fix that saved the lives of 25 Israelis and secured the return of eight more who were slain, and bought time for both sides to regroup. Expecting airstrikes, a complete blockade on goods entering Gaza, or a new multi-pronged ground invasion to alter the basic negotiating dynamic is wishful thinking.”

There were other reasons for Israel to resume airstrikes. One is that the first phase of the ceasefire deal ended on March 1, negotiations were pretty obviously deadlocked, and Israel had given Hamas over two free weeks of quiet with no imminent prospect of more hostages being released. But the real reason that Netanyahu ordered the resumption of attacks on Hamas targets is that his politics required it. Without passing the new budget by March 31, under Israeli law the government automatically falls and new elections are held. Netanyahu’s margin to get the 61 votes the budget requires was as tight as it could be. Itamar Ben Gvir had left the government when the ceasefire was implemented, reducing the coalition to 62 seats, and his condition to return and to vote for the budget was a resumption of the war. Bezalel Smotrich remained in the government, but has been threatening to follow Ben Gvir’s lead if Israel did not resume the war and instead moved to the second phase of the agreement. Combined with two Haredi MKs who declared that they would not vote for the budget due to the failure to pass a draft exemption law for ultra-Orthodox who are eligible for conscription, Netanyahu was faced with the very real possibility of falling short on the budget and thus ending his current tenure in power. Formally ending the ceasefire guaranteed that Smotrich would stay in the fold and that Ben Gvir would return home. Lo and behold, Ben Gvir announced—in a joint statement with Netanyahu’s Likud party—that he and his party would rejoin the government, and his return to the National Security Ministry was unanimously approved by the cabinet the same day. It is for good reason that Israelis have already dubbed the airstrikes “Operation Itamar,” and it should surprise no one that Netanyahu’s political survival was the driving force behind decisions that should be based solely on Israel’s interests and security instead.

In fairness, there is a valid argument to return to fighting, which is that Hamas has done everything it can to demonstrate during the ceasefire that it has not only retained its position but rebuilt its authority and improved its capabilities. Post-October 7, Israel cannot sit back and watch Hamas reestablish the pre-October 7 status quo. But this is a valid argument in theory rather than in practice, since it does not accord with what Israel has done. The Israeli government has made two claims about returning to fighting. One, as mentioned above, is that the airstrikes are a tactic to pressure Hamas on the negotiating front, but this is likely a message aimed at the Trump administration so that it does not look so blatantly as if Israel is ditching the mediation process led by Steve Witkoff.

The second claim is the one that Netanyahu has been making since October 7, which is that IDF operations will accomplish the two war aims of securing the hostages’ release and defeating Hamas. Continuing to insist that the IDF will save the hostages is factually ludicrous in light of the 106 hostages who were released during the two ceasefires as compared to the eight hostages who were rescued in military operations. It is insulting to the overwhelming majority of the hostage families, who have decried the resumption of airstrikes as imminently risking the lives of their loved ones who remain in captivity in Gaza. It tramples on the firsthand testimony of the hostages who have been released, who have said over and over again—including this week—that their lives were in the greatest danger during IDF bombing campaigns and when IDF troops approached the places where they were being held. It would be wonderful if the IDF were able to kill Hamas terrorists while also rescuing hostages, but circumstances have demonstrated that the ability to do so is severely limited.

In order for the next phase of the war to succeed in accomplishing the second war aim of defeating Hamas, something would have to be different this time as compared to the first 15 months of fighting. And on that front too, Netanyahu’s claims fall flat. In over a year of fighting, the IDF eliminated Hamas’ top leadership, killed 20,000 fighters, and flattened over 75% of Gaza’s structures. Despite all of that, Hamas remains in control. It has, according to IDF intelligence, replaced the fighters who were killed with new recruits. It has murdered the various alternatives that were presented by the Israeli government as potential challengers, such as clan chiefs. It continues to control aid distribution and enforce price controls, while also diverting as much aid for itself as it wants. The IDF has inflicted enormous damage at a high cost to Israel and to Palestinian lives, and Hamas is still there. Rather than make fantastical claims about the IDF now being able to fight unhampered by Biden administration restrictions, as if it somehow held back before, or assert with zero evidence that Hamas is going to lay down its arms if Palestinian civilians experience severe food shortages and go without electricity, the Israeli government needs to actually do things drastically differently if it expects a drastically different result.

“Rather than make fantastical claims about the IDF now being able to fight unhampered by Biden administration restrictions, as if it somehow held back before, or assert with zero evidence that Hamas is going to lay down its arms if Palestinian civilians experience severe food shortages and go without electricity, the Israeli government needs to actually do things drastically differently if it expects a drastically different result.”

Is there a new implementable post-war plan that the Israeli government has accepted, or is it still going to do nothing beyond repeat the mantra of “no Hamas, no Abbas?” Is it prepared to hold all of the territory that it takes this time around, or will it again kill Hamas fighters and then withdraw to security corridors and buffer zones? Has it done anything to cooperate with Arab states who want to establish an independent transitional administration and create a Palestinian security force to replace Hamas, or is it still going to insist on magical fantasies about two million Gazans voluntarily leaving, the Egyptians coming in to run the territory for nothing in return, and the Saudis and Emiratis bankrolling all of it out of the goodness of their hearts? Unless the answers to these questions have all changed, then the outcome of what comes next is tragically predictable, since it will be another iteration of what we’ve already seen, with the fates of the hostages hanging in the balance but Hamas’ fate far less precarious.