The Israeli government and Arab states will continue to differ on their long-term visions for Palestinian sovereignty. The difference that matters more in this moment is how they think about Hamas.
On Tuesday, Arab League representatives met in Cairo to discuss a plan presented by Egypt aimed at breaking the deadlock over Gaza. It comes at a tipping point amid several uncertainties: the future of the continuing ceasefire, the status of President Donald Trump’s vision to evacuate Gaza’s population, and the question of whether Israel will resume full-scale fighting in Gaza. While the plan itself was not released as of this writing, the initial communiqué issued by the participant states was not encouraging. It suggests that rather than take advantage of what is both an important and dangerous moment, Arab states are largely dithering and discounting the Israeli and American determinations not to treat Hamas as a garden-variety foe.
The Cairo summit declaration hewed to a conventional view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unsurprisingly. It opened with two states and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, rejected annexation and forced displacement, talked about international conferences and U.N. peacekeepers, and called for the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza. Despite the fact that these are all long-standing and relatively vanilla positions, they are out of sync with where Israel is post-October 7. In a world where Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is cheerleading for Trump’s idea to take over Gaza, insisting that there is no meaningful difference between Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas, and waging an all-encompassing political battle against the U.N., what used to induce Israeli eye rolls now induces vehement opposition. But the biggest problem with what emerged from Cairo is not what was there, but what wasn’t. The Arab League statement was missing even one mention of Hamas, and therein lies the massive blind spot that is its biggest problem.
“The biggest problem with what emerged from Cairo is not what was there, but what wasn’t. The Arab League statement was missing even one mention of Hamas, and therein lies the massive blind spot that is its biggest problem.”
Israel has faced an irreconcilable dilemma from the moment that Hamas’ Nukhba fighters dragged Israeli hostages back across the breached fence into Gaza. Taking the fight to Hamas meant not recovering hostages, while negotiating to recover hostages meant leaving Hamas in place. Israel has gone through different stages of prioritizing one versus the other, with the past six weeks representing the most sustained period of accepting the tradeoff that means getting hostages back home. Hamas has spent much of this time demonstrating why this tradeoff is so painful and so costly for Israel; not only staging humiliating and degrading hostage handoff ceremonies, but projecting a public image of having survived 15 months of fighting still intact, still armed, and still in control of Gaza. This has not driven Israelis to resignedly accept that Hamas is not going anywhere. It has had the opposite effect, and made many Israelis only more determined that Hamas cannot be allowed to survive in any functional manner.
The Arab states have so far been silent on what mechanism they believe will serve as a bridge between Hamas’ current status and their aim to have a technocratic transitional Palestinian administration run Gaza. But whatever their thinking is, yada-yada-ing Hamas is not going to work. Without a plan to disarm Hamas that is front and center, any discussion of the day after is a meaningless academic exercise. This is not how things had to unfold, and the responsibility for much of that rests with Israel for refusing to develop a sustainable plan at the outset for security and administration that could have been rolled out on the immediate heels of IDF operations in November and December 2023. But now that things are where they are, the only way to avert another Gaza-wide IDF military operation and the resumption of full-blown war is for Arab states to figure out how to deal with Hamas as a military entity. Getting Hamas acquiescence to give up running Gaza is not enough, since Israel rightly views this as a way to recreate Hezbollah’s arrangement in Lebanon with Hamas in Gaza. If the plan does not take disarming Hamas seriously, then neither the U.S. or Israel will take the plan seriously.
“If the plan does not take disarming Hamas seriously, then neither the U.S. or Israel will take the plan seriously.”
Much of the critique around Israel’s operations in Gaza has centered around separating terrorists from civilians, whether that be during airstrikes and ground incursions or in the decisions around provision of humanitarian assistance. But that has to apply to both sides, and the Arab response to Trump’s Gaza vision does not appear to be doing so. It can’t be enough to simply take away Hamas’ administration of government ministries, or to exile a few top Hamas leaders and then integrate tens of thousands of Hamas fighters into the next iteration of a Gaza security force as if they didn’t participate in massacring and torturing civilians. Not making an effort to genuinely disarm Hamas only guarantees the inevitability of the next Israel-Hamas war. Ideological groups cannot be co-opted so easily through things like economic incentives, and it is worrisome that Arab states appear unwilling to apply the tragic lesson of October 7. Disarming Hamas will not be easy, as Israel’s military campaign demonstrated, but without an effort that treats the problem seriously, there is no point in going through the sound-and-light show of yet another summit meeting that will amount to nothing.
“Disarming Hamas will not be easy, as Israel’s military campaign demonstrated, but without an effort that treats the problem seriously, there is no point in going through the sound-and-light show of yet another summit meeting that will amount to nothing.”
Israel is on the verge of going back to war in Gaza. Once it does so, the exit point will be difficult, if not impossible, to see. There will be no restraining variable this time in the form of American pressure on things like humanitarian assistance or marrying military tactics to strategic aims. A viable Arab plan is the only opportunity to avert what will be an endless military campaign for Israel, the near-certain death of many remaining living hostages, and a human and humanitarian catastrophe for Palestinians. What’s needed is a demonstration from Arab states that they are as committed as Israel to disarming and neutralizing—and not just sidelining—Hamas through their own sustained commitments on security. The U.S. must also create an enabling environment by ensuring Congressional funding for the U.S.-led Office of Security Coordinator to train a Palestinian security force that will be supported and enhanced by Arab forces, and Israel must show flexibility on day-after arrangements involving the PA. This has to begin with a real and detailed security plan that treats Hamas with the gravity it requires. Otherwise, what is happening in Cairo this week is the diplomatic equivalent of fiddling while Gaza burns.