Netanyahu has many decisions to make in terms of what he signals to U.S. officials and to his own domestic audience. But his biggest challenge may be keeping Israel top of mind in Washington as other concerns intercede.
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will return to Washington next week, both leaving from and arriving at places vastly changed since his last visit. The last time Netanyahu was in our nation’s capital was in September 2020 to participate in the Abraham Accords signing ceremony on the White House South Lawn alongside President Donald Trump, in what was a celebration of an ascendant Israel that had relegated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a footnote. He comes this time representing an Israel that is still reeling from October 7 and whose path forward in the region is murky, meeting with a frustrated ally in President Joe Biden and addressing a Congress where his country is more of a lightning rod than at any time in the history of U.S.-Israel relations. And yet, some things will impart a strong sense of déjà vu, from a pending presidential election pitting Biden and Trump against each other, to a focus on another regional normalization deal. As the week unfolds, here are five things to watch that will impact bilateral ties and Israel’s own path forward.
1. Bibi vs. Biden
For 18 months, Biden has withheld from Netanyahu the White House meeting that the latter has badly coveted. Before October 7, this was Biden’s way of signaling displeasure with Netanyahu over a range of policies that were out of sync with U.S. priorities and requests, from West Bank settlement expansion and illegal outpost legalization on steroids to the judicial overhaul effort. Since October 7, this has become more complicated, as Biden has given critical support to Israel in its war against Hamas and has not wanted to damage Israel’s security, but is perhaps more frustrated with Netanyahu’s decision-making than ever. The invitation for Netanyahu to address Congress appears to have forced Biden’s hand—as Republican leadership no doubt expected—but the existence of the meeting itself will be less important than how it is carried out.
The bearhug between the two men when Biden flew to Israel a week and a half after October 7 is unlikely to be replicated. But everything from the length of the meeting, to how much time the two spend unaccompanied by aides, to whether they do a joint press conference will provide a sense of the depth of Biden’s frustrations with Netanyahu. The president is taking a gamble and giving up a large degree of leverage by scheduling the meeting before Netanyahu’s Congressional speech rather than after, as once Netanyahu has pocketed the priceless political image of being feted at the White House, there will be far fewer restraints on the degree to which he is willing to challenge Biden’s policies in front of Congress. Netanyahu will also have another calculus at hand, which is how the way he engages with Biden impacts not only U.S. policy over the next few months—increasingly important given the prospects for a much more costly and damaging war in the north against Hezbollah—but how it impacts the dynamic surrounding the next thing to watch.
2. Netanyahu and Trump, or Netanyahu vs. Trump?
As of this writing, there is no word on whether Netanyahu and Trump will meet next week, but you better believe that Netanyahu is breaking out in one of his famously profuse sweats over this one. While the symbiotic relationship between Netanyahu and Trump was well-documented during their four years of overlap, Trump has denigrated Netanyahu publicly and privately since he perceived Netanyahu stabbed him in the back by congratulating Biden on his 2020 election victory. If Trump does not want to see Netanyahu, it will be easy for him to cite his campaign schedule as an excuse but it will still be interpreted as a deliberate snub. If he goes out of his way to see Netanyahu, that will be a powerful signal that he is prepared to let bygones be bygones. There is a lot at stake involved for Netanyahu, especially given how much he dined out politically on his relationship with Trump during the Trump administration and the increasingly likely prospect that Trump will once again assume the presidency.
Even if Netanyahu gets a meeting with Trump, pitfalls will abound. Trump is liable to express his displeasure with Netanyahu and not to keep his thoughts private, and he will certainly be looking for a level of obsequiousness and political endorsement that will make Netanyahu squirm. Keeping Trump happy without completely blowing up his relationship with Biden or setting off Democrats even further, and balancing all of this against desperately needing Biden’s continued assistance in tens of different ways while also hedging against November’s election results, will be Netanyahu’s most difficult task of the week. Compared to this, his speech will be a cinch.
“Keeping Trump happy without completely blowing up his relationship with Biden or setting off Democrats even further, and balancing all of this against desperately needing Biden’s continued assistance in tens of different ways while also hedging against November’s election results, will be Netanyahu’s most difficult task of the week.”
3. What Will He Actually Say?
As for the speech, Netanyahu might go in one of many different directions. The first question will be what he is looking to accomplish. If his intention is to use the speech, and the entire visit more widely, for little beyond shoring up his support at home and continuing to avoid any political reckoning, then he will give a speech that is short on substance and long on platitudes. There will be assertions about Israel crushing its enemies, a promise to keep going until total victory, countless reminders that Israel’s fight against Hamas is actually the front line of a global fight for civilization’s preservation in the face of barbarism, and as many references as possible to Iran as the driver of all problems in the Middle East. The speech will be long on strength and short on compromise, and the overall message will be that Israel is going to continue along the same path of the past nine months without wavering.
If Netanyahu’s intention is to use the speech to move some policies forward, it will look a bit different. There will still be plenty expressions of Netanyahu’s and Israel’s steely determination in the face of adversity, but Netanyahu may also use the opportunity to salvage whatever hope remains of a Saudi normalization deal in the next few months. If he goes in that direction, he will promise nothing substantive on the Israeli-Palestinian front so as not to rattle his coalition, but will do a watered down version of his 2009 Bar Ilan formula, where he does not mention Palestinian statehood or two states but makes some vague promises about extending his hand for peace and his willingness to sit down with responsible Palestinian leaders to discuss their political future. While this should be seen for what it is—a transparent attempt to get normalization without giving up anything at all, returning to the fictitious paradigm that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not actually matter—it may still be worth the Hail Mary attempt in the hopes that it gives the Saudis what they need to hear. Netanyahu may also want to use his speech to advance the chances of a breakthrough on a hostage and ceasefire agreement, but that will depend on his next decision.
4. Is He Just Going to Play Out the Clock?
Netanyahu is under pressure from all quarters. He has a coalition that is unhappy with him and partners in Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir threatening to bring it down if he agrees to a ceasefire. He has hostage families and the political opposition demonstrating in the streets in increasing numbers in favor of a ceasefire, and a security establishment that is also strongly in favor of a deal to pause the fighting and bring living hostages back home. Biden has been pushing unreservedly for a ceasefire and hostage agreement, and Israel’s regional partners all want the fighting to have come to an end months ago. While Netanyahu’s domestic political interests point to his continuing to hold out, since his only path forward for political survival is getting through each subsequent Knesset session with the support of his 64 Knesset seats irrespective of the political polls, the pressure from outside his bubble is intense.
If he can hold out until January 2025, however, his life may become a lot easier. There is a near-universal perception that Netanyahu is eager for a Trump victory, under the assumption that he will then be able to do whatever he wants. No Biden pressuring him on a ceasefire or on West Bank settlements and settler violence, and a region that will follow whatever Trump’s lead is in order to remain in his good graces. There are many reasons to doubt this reading of the landscape under a Trump restoration, but Netanyahu likely subscribes to it. And if that is the case, then his task in Washington becomes much clearer. He cannot give any indication that agreements on a ceasefire or a day after plan for Gaza are close, he needs to subtly give Trump a political boost, and he needs to assess how much support he will get from (mostly) Republicans and (some) Democrats if six months from now there is still no resolution to the war in sight. Netanyahu knows that this White House has no patience for him playing out the clock, but he needs to figure out the extent to which that extends beyond the confines of Biden and his inner circle.
5. How Can He Keep Israel in the Spotlight?
This is not only a challenge for the moment, but for the long term. Biden took office clearly intent on not allowing events in Israel to crowd out all of the other things he wanted to do, which became instantaneously unsustainable on the morning of October 7. The administration now spends an inordinate amount of time on Israeli security, preventing a war in the north, trying to get a ceasefire in Gaza, and keeping the embers of Saudi-Israel normalization alive. Even taking into account the ways in which U.S.-Israel friction has burst to the surface over the past nine months, it is undoubtedly to Israel’s benefit to be the center of U.S. attention, and Netanyahu in particular revels in the spotlight.
“Even taking into account the ways in which U.S.-Israel friction has burst to the surface over the past nine months, it is undoubtedly to Israel’s benefit to be the center of U.S. attention, and Netanyahu in particular revels in the spotlight.”
This is not guaranteed to continue. The presidential election is about to crowd out lots of other issues, which will be an issue for Netanyahu to manage over the next few months. If Biden wins reelection, he will undoubtedly keep trying to work on regional normalization and improve things on the Israeli-Palestinian front, but once the fighting in Gaza winds down, the administration’s attention will inevitably wane a bit as well.
If Trump wins, the Biden team is going to have more pressing issues during the lame-duck period, such as shoring up European and Asian alliances and putting whatever measures they can in place to mitigate some of the upheaval they expect from a second Trump term. As for Trump himself, he spent lots of time talking about Israel during the 2016 campaign, but has paid little attention to Israel this time around beyond some standard throwaway lines. One look at the Republican platform—where the first and only mention of Israel comes in the very last section and reads, “We will stand with Israel, and seek peace in the Middle East”—reveals the extent to which Trump’s attention is elsewhere. Maybe that redounds to Netanyahu’s benefit when it comes to having to navigate U.S. policies that he doesn’t like, but it also means that Israel’s own priorities get submerged.
There was a glimpse of this during the months of haggling over a security assistance package for Israel that got bogged down in the politics of aid to Taiwan and Ukraine. In the past, it would have been difficult to imagine this taking place, but Israel is now not only polarizing between the two parties but not always a priority issue. The feeling of emergency that existed in Washington immediately after October 7 is receding, and the longer the fighting in Gaza goes on, the more weariness sets in. Netanyahu is accustomed to a feeling when he comes to the U.S. that everything else is put aside, but much as the politics around Israel have changed since he was last here, he may find that keeping Israel front and center is more difficult than he remembered.