It was always clear from the moment the Trump plan was released that it would be rejected by the Palestinian leadership and be dead on arrival. Indeed, the most important thing about the plan was not its details but whether as part of its proposal the Trump administration would green light annexation. And whether Prime Minister Netanyahu would take advantage of that moment – perhaps irreparably and irreversibly ending the possibility of a two state solution and guaranteeing a one-state outcome. The good news is that for the moment the Trump administration appears to have backed off this possibility, at least until after the Israeli elections in early March.

Still, the possibility of Israeli annexation of all the settlements and the Jordan River Valley or perhaps annexation of only some piece of this territory is entirely possible over the next few months. And so, the key question that needs to be asked now by opponents of annexation in Congress as well as a potential future American administration is – what policy options can the U.S. deploy to reverse annexation that has already happened and stop future steps by Israel to annex pieces of the West Bank?

Below I lay out five options – two that I do not believe will be effective and three that may be but require further study. None of the options are good. U.S. leverage is limited, and the process of annexation may be irreversible. But if Israel does begin annexing the West Bank, the severity and urgency of the moment will call for bold actions that in many cases involve genuine pressure on Israel or at least steps that the Israeli government will vehemently oppose. This will be an uncomfortable pathway for many U.S. policymakers and the American Jewish community. Indeed, I am quite uncomfortable with some of these options myself. But given where we will be if annexation begins, the only alternative to trying to send a real wakeup call to Israeli will be giving up on two-states and accepting a one-state reality.

Public criticism: Members of Congress and a new administration could choose to publicly criticize Israeli annexation and take steps to reverse Trump administration policy that recognized annexation of any part of the West Bank. Such an approach may make some difference to Israeli politicians especially in the center and on the left, but it is unlikely to have much impact elsewhere. Pursuing such an approach would just be a continuation of the U.S. approach to settlements over the past 25 years. Sometimes U.S. criticism succeeded in temporarily halting or scaling back settlement activity, but as evidenced by the thousands of settlers now living in the West Bank it has failed to sustainably impact Israeli behavior. American criticism with no consequences will be in essence an agreeing to live with Israelis annexation.

Conditioning Security Assistance: Conditioning the nearly $4 billion in annual security assistance to Israel as a tool to apply pressure is often the first suggestion that Americans seeking to change Israeli behavior offer. Threatening security assistance would send a credible deterrent signal but would be unlikely to work, difficult to execute, and come with significant political blowback.

While there is strong opposition in Congress to annexation there is also overwhelming support for the US-Israel security relationship. And since security assistance is about funding, a policy that leverages it requires Congressional support. At most, I can see scenarios where some very limited elements of Israel security assistance are conditioned, but that will not be enough to change Israeli behavior. On top of that, Israel’s per capita GDP is now higher than most of Western Europe. In that context, the economic leverage that U.S. security assistance presents is just not that significant. And as the Middle Eastern country with by far the most advanced and powerful military in the region, Israel does not need US security assistance as it once did. Add to that the fact that conditioning U.S. assistance is a tool that has failed to influence other countries including the Egyptians and the Palestinians, and it becomes apparent that Israel is much more likely to just shrug off American threats than make huge political sacrifices. Finally, it is important to remember that Israel is a valuable security partner and the US has interests with Israel in the Middle East beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that could be harmed by conditioning security assistance.

A Change of Posture at the United Nations: The United States could apply more international diplomatic pressure by supporting or at the very least abstaining on UN Security Council Resolutions pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict especially on opposing annexation. Traditionally, the American position has been to oppose actions at the UN because they disproportionately and unfairly target Israel. It also has traditionally worked very hard at the UN to get other states to support this position. If instead, the American position were to change, and it signaled much more willingness to stop vetoing and aggressively defending Israel that could make a meaningful difference. The U.S. would not have to support all of the terrible unfair language that is sometimes incorporated into these resolutions – but instead can engage in negotiations to eliminate language that unfairly singles out Israel but still supports legitimate criticisms. It could then vote either in support or abstain. Such an approach would open up more space for the United States and other states to also take tougher action against annexation such as boycotting products produced in both Israeli settlements and annexed areas and looking at other ways to apply pressure. Such resolutions would also be a way to reaffirm a commitment to the international terms of reference as spelled out in UNSCRs 242 and 338 – making clear the importance of the 1967 lines and the principle of land for peace.

Such an approach would certainly weigh on Israel’s calculus as it does not wish to be internationally isolated and has counted on the United States to defend it in international fora. And opposed to conditioning security assistance it also has the advantage of being much more directly tied to the Israeli occupation and could be easier to execute without legislation. On the other hand, it is not clear how much impact the Obama administration’s abstention on UNSCR 2334 on settlements had – though things might have been different if it had not waited until the end of Obama’s term. Moreover, such a posture at the UN could be seen as a betrayal by the Israeli government and public, undercutting trust with the U.S. and portending years of US-Israel disagreements to come and hampering a new President’s ability to connect with the Israeli public.

Recognize a Palestinian State Based on the 1967 Lines with Mutually Agreed Swaps and Put Out an Alternative Version to Trump’s Plan: As a way of signaling support for a two-state solution, Congress or a new administration could recognize a Palestinian state. But recognizing a state would not be enough, the United States would also have to clarify its vision of that state by putting down new parameters for future negotiations. It may need to go even further and propose a plan similar in detail to Trump’s but more reflective of Palestinian views that tries to get to a negotiated deal instead of just taking Israel’s side. In the past, the United States has hesitated to do this based on the principle that the final agreement needs to be negotiated between the two sides without America presenting conditions.

But with the Trump plan out, this old principle of the peace process is now gone and so there is more space for a new administration to put down a different set of ideas. Indeed, it may have to, or else the void will continue to be filled by Trump’s plan. A new proposal could include a different US map that instead of giving Israel 30% of the West Bank would try to keep as many settlers in Israel as possible, provide for one for one swaps, and preserve the viability and contiguity of a Palestinian state. With the map as the basis, the United States can then pressure Israel to reverse annexation. It could also consent to Israeli construction inside the areas outlined to be part of Israel in a future agreement, but only if Israel agreed to put swap areas west of the 1967 armistice lines under international trusteeship so that the Palestinian state together with the US and the international community could begin investing in those areas and building them up. A new map could also outline parts of Area C that should be immediately transferred from Israeli control to Palestine. And other measures outlined in the plan such as security requirements for Israel or a proposal for how to create two capitals in Jerusalem could also begin to be implemented in real time even without complete agreement. The United States could also build international support for such an arrangement. Instead of using an American proposal as a first step towards unilateral annexation, this American proposal would be the first step to creating a two-state reality.

Signal Support for Democracy and Palestinian Rights: Perhaps the best option for U.S. policymakers who oppose annexation is to publicly state that while they continue to support a viable two-state solution, if that is no longer possible, they support democracy and Palestinian rights. In other words, support for a binational democratic state of Israel with equal rights for all of the people who live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean sea or some alternative configuration that ensured Palestinian rights. Such a statement would be in line with American and Jewish values and a position that would not be hard for most American politicians to justify. It is also one that has the support of 64% of Americans. And it may actually have the greatest impact on Israeli calculus. As Amir Tibon and Grant Rumley argued a few years ago, an Israeli move to a two-state solution may only be possible once Palestinians begin calling for one binational state. This could be the real threat to the Jewish nature of Israel that finally forces the Israeli public out of its apathetic resignation. If a significant consensus starts to build in the American left, the American Jewish community, and in Congress that if forced to choose between an apartheid-like Jewish state and binational Israeli democracy many of Israel’s supporters will choose democracy – this might be enough to spur Israelis to take action to preserve the viability of two-states so that they can be both democratic and Jewish. And if this does not move Israelis, it still puts supporters of Israel who oppose annexation on the right side of the argument.

The bottom line is that none of these choices are great and all of them require further study and evaluation. It is unclear if any action can reverse annexation or save the two-state solution. But if Israel goes ahead with annexation, Americans who care about the future of the state of Israel will not be able to sit on their hands. They will have no option but to wrestle with some very uncomfortable choices.