The Trump administration is insisting that talk of imminent conflict with Iran is overblown. President Trump is reportedly anxious to avoid a dangerous escalation in the region and the U.S. could be seeking a way out through talks with Oman. Unfortunately, for those of us not eager for direct conflict between the U.S. and Iran, none of this may matter. Events have taken on a life of their own and now lie outside the direct control of the administration, suffusing new meaning into the cliché “be careful what you wish for.” It won’t be easy to wipe one’s hands clean of this mess if it ends in a hot war, a prospect that should be especially worrisome for Israel.

It turns out Team Trump may have been all too successful in its Iran strategy, which kicked off in May 2018 with America’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). European nations may support the JCPOA and remain resentful of the Trump administration policy, but they will not risk American sanctions for the comparatively trifle economic benefits of trading with Iran. As a result, President Hassan Rouhani has been backed into a corner. Earlier this month, following new American sanctions on metals and the revoking of waivers from select countries allowing them to import cheap Iranian oil, Rouhani announced the Islamic Republic would begin to downgrade its commitment to the JCPOA and warned European nations that further acts of non-cooperation would be taken if economic conditions were not improved within 60 days.

And to the surprise of the administration and the likely chagrin of the Iranians, the latter’s revisionist allies on the UN Security Council, Russia and China, are also tiring of the situation. While blaming the U.S. for the current crisis, the interests that persuaded those countries to initially support America’s campaign to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remain compelling. Foreign Policy reported over the weekend that diplomats from China, Russia, and India have reiterated the primacy of nuclear nonproliferation in dealings with Iran. If the regime goes through with its threat to unilaterally violate the JCPOA, it may find itself isolated.

All this makes miscalculation and conflict more likely, as even supporters of the Trump administration’s approach readily acknowledge. As a matter of fact, it’s hard to conceive of an act of brinksmanship that does not carry some risk of at least proportionate catastrophe. But the gamble is even more hazardous here. As many have already asked, why should the Iranian regime agree to a harder bargain if Trump himself proved that such deals are subject to the mercurial whims of the President of the United States? Despite Trump’s obvious reluctance to start another war in the Middle East, we have reached a point in this crisis where it would be profoundly unserious and irresponsible not to contemplate the potential consequences of conflict.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu certainly has, and apparently wants nothing to do with it. According to a report last week in The New York Times, Israeli officials are concerned about the possible blowback from Iranian proxies in the region, especially Hezbollah. Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, as well as Iranian-aligned groups in Syria and Iraq, are also provoking anxiety in Jerusalem.

In the event of war involving the United States and Iran or Iranian proxies (or both), Israel probably won’t manage to escape the fighting or its aftermath. IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot noted during a lecture last week, that despite a recent reduction in support from Tehran, Hezbollah remains committed to the geopolitical ambitions of its patron. With over 150,000 rockets, including highly accurate and long-range weapons, Hezbollah is in a position to cause serious if not unprecedented loss of life and property in Tel Aviv and beyond. Not only is Israel is an easier target for Iran than American assets, but certain Israeli retaliation risks disrupting any coalition formed between the U.S. and its Arab allies.

But beyond the fighting itself, Israel has significant reputational capital at stake. Netanyahu was the only international figure who sought to kill the deal after it was signed. The Sunni Arab states, who were just as skeptical of American policy toward Iran at the time, treated the JCPOA as a fait accompli and were content with prying other concessions from the U.S., most notably the Obama administration’s acquiescence to Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen. But not Netanyahu, who gave a dramatic speech to Congress in opposition to President Obama, the sheer chutzpah of which is indelible in the memories of the even the most moderate Democrats.

If conflict erupts, it will be rightly attributed by Democrats and European allies to Trump’s decision to unilaterally withdrawal from the JCPOA. This may or may not have happened without Netanyahu’s campaign against the deal – Trump has managed to pull the U.S. out of the Paris Climate Accord and the Trans Pacific Partnership without international encouragement – but it certainly does not augur well for Israel that the prime minister’s efforts were especially ostentatious and memorable.

Netanyahu may wish to steer clear of tensions between the U.S. and Iran, but he is unlikely to succeed.