President Trump’s decision to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights on Monday, which followed an abrupt Purim tweet foreshadowing the official announcement, had all the hallmarks of a Trump administration foreign policy: impulsive, unnecessary, and with clear political motives that, to his mind, supercede the American national interest. There was no evidence of serious policy deliberation and plenty of signs that the move was politically motivated ahead of Israel’s national election on April 9.

Worst of all, the provocation was needless. There was no expectation of Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights, and the price paid in credibility and shattered international norms are in no thoughtful assessment worth the gamble. It could have serious ramifications not only in the region but in Europe and Asia as well.

But the move may not even help Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the intended recipient of the otherwise inexplicable gift to Israel. Although there is a first time for anything, as the current occupant of the White House reminds us daily, it nevertheless defies history and current political dynamics to believe that the Trump administration could swing the election.

This is not the first time an American administration has “intervened” in an Israeli election. The Clinton and Obama administrations arguably expressed their preferences for non-Likud governments, but neither of them instituted major policy changes in order to influence an election. Still, past experience here is instructive: Israelis don’t place an especially high premium on the American preference. They reelected Netanyahu in 2013 and 2015, despite knowing full well that it meant more tensions with the United States.

However, it is undeniable that Trump’s announcement is major foreign policy achievement for Netanyahu and it didn’t hurt him to have it come before the election. Polls continue to show a tight race or a modest lead for the bloc of right-wing parties, depending on which combination of parties at the bottom cross the electoral threshold.

But Netanyahu’s election prospects depend more on issues of security, which are unaffected by the Golan decision. Indeed, the White House ceremony has already receded from the front pages, replaced by the ongoing tensions in and around Gaza, which don’t serve Netanyahu’s political interests and present him with a painful predicament. If he escalates, he risks entering the election amidst armed conflict. If he remains cautious, he leaves himself vulnerable to attack from both the kaki-themed Kachol Lavan and parties to Likud’s right.

Additionally, Case 3000 (submarine-gate) has, like a phoenix, risen from the ashes to discredit Netanyahu’s security credentials. Before departing for the United States, Netanyahu admitted on national television that he alone authorized Germany to allow Thyssenkrupp to sell submarines to Egypt (arms sales agreements with Israel often come with a condition that similar weaponry won’t be sold to other Middle Eastern countries without Jerusalem’s approval). Netanyahu’s explanation for keeping the defense minister and IDF chief of staff in the dark, that the sale involved extremely sensitive security information to which even those tasked with protecting Israel’s security could not be privy, did not meet the minimum threshold of the laugh test and was ruthlessly mocked for days. It didn’t help Netanyahu’s case that Attorney General Avichai Mendelblit also said he knew nothing of the rationale at the time, and that the prime minister apparently turned a 700 percent profit on stocks of a company in the submarine supply chain.

None of this, of course, means Netanyahu is certain to lose the election and polling does not indicate that. Benny Gantz, it should be noted, didn’t have the best week, either. But President Trump’s dramatic move on the Golan failed to obscure any of these issues, and Netanyahu won’t escape his domestic woes so easily. When Israelis head to the polls on April 9, the Golan Heights will not be the foremost issue on their minds.