Next Steps for the United States in the Israel-Arab Arena: Summary Conclusions of IPF's "Ambassadors' Roundtable

On September 12^th in Washington, Ambassador Samuel Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to Israel for 8 years under Presidents Carter and Reagan, the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department in the first Clinton term, and now Senior Policy Advisor to Israel Policy Forum (IPF), hosted an "Ambassadors' Roundtable" convened by IPF on the US response to this summer's violence in the Middle East.

Former US Ambassadors, senior advisors to four US presidents, high-ranking State Department officials and prominent academic researchers gathered to discuss the steps the United States should take now to resolve the problems and seize opportunities created during the past few months by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Lebanon and the Syria/Iran/Hezbollah axis.

During the morning-long discussions, these participants concluded that there are five areas where the United States could and, many felt, would have significant impact:

• An Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire
• The new Palestinian unity government
• The Saudi Initiative
• Engaging Syria
• Rebuilding Lebanon.

This paper summarizes these experts' views on these five topics and offers policy recommendations.

A Comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian Ceasefire

The experts agreed unanimously that a comprehensive ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians is of the highest priority for further moves in the area. They believe that the United States' first step should be mediating a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire that includes the release of Gilad Shalit and a cessation of all attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets. In return, and assuming the Palestinians keep their side of the bargain, Israel would need to halt its incursions into Palestinian territory and its targeted killings.

With a ceasefire in place and Shalit returned, the participants also agreed that Israel might be more willing to give a Palestinian unity government a chance to govern and that there would be space for further US involvement.  Some participants also argued that active US efforts to negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire would ensure continued policy coordination with Europe, whereas a failure to act would allow European countries to shift positions on Hamas, away from the existing consensus with the United States.

There was general agreement among the experts that the responsibilities of Lt Gen. Keith Dayton should be expanded as soon as a unity government is formed, if not before. The United States could also work with President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to enhance cooperative arrangements at crossing points, whether or not a unity government is put into place. Reinvigorating General Dayton's mandate would be an early signal of America's willingness to engage in the Israeli-Palestinian process. If such a new government does not come into existence in the near future, then the United States should intensify its discussions with both President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to urge both parties to reach and enforce a durable ceasefire.

The Palestinian Unity Government

Assuming that a new Palestinian government is formed, most of the experts felt the United States should focus on what the new government, and Hamas in particular, does, rather than what it says.  With this in mind, restoring economic aid and engaging with the new government should depend on the absence of violence and terrorism, for instance, rather than the contents of the Hamas charter.

The issue of "benchmarking" (international aid to be increased in stages as benchmarks are reached) was also suggested.  Thus, aid to the Palestinians should be restored in phases as the new unity government (if it were formed) fulfilled its commitments and performed effectively in carrying out its obligations.  European aid might precede the restoration of taxes collected by Israel, and the last step would be the resumption of aid by the United States. Each of these would also be increased gradually.  If the new government performed effectively over time, then aid should be fully restored, setting in place the foundation for further negotiations.

There was considerable discussion of the three conditions that the international community has set for restoring aid: Hamas' renouncing terrorism, recognizing Israel and accepting previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.  The participants argued as to whether the United States should concentrate on the three conditions or on Hamas' behavior, in particular its effectiveness in stopping all violence and halting the endorsement of terrorism.  They generally agreed that the United States cannot abandon the three conditions and, as a result, cannot embrace the entire Palestinian government right now.

On the other hand, the majority also argued that the three conditions should not be allowed to prevent the testing of whether a unity government could be effective in implementing a comprehensive ceasefire and ending the violence.

Therefore, most of the participants recommended that United States re-engage with the acceptable parts of the Palestinian Authority, particularly the office of the President.  Some members of the group argued that the US should promote a new negotiating process by working initially on a solution to the border crossings issue.

Saudi Plan

There was unanimous agreement that the US should work to keep the revised Saudi Initiative document out of the UN, especially the Security Council, because this initiative, as currently constituted, would almost certainly have to be vetoed by the United States.  Although no one in the group asserted support for the specific Saudi Initiative as its contents are presently known, there was also unanimity that a US veto would represent a significant setback to American interests and diplomatic efforts.  To avoid the necessity of a veto, the participants agreed that American consultations with the Saudis, Egyptians, and other backers of the plan might lead to its being revised in ways that would meet US objections. At this point, it is imperative that the plan not be embodied in a Security Council resolution, and best if the UN General Assembly avoided it as well, though that is unlikely.

Some members of the group argued that the US should consider creating an alternative to the Saudi Plan.  Those in favor of this position claimed that placing an American plan out front could be a possible solution to what was viewed as an impending train-wreck at the United Nations and with the Arab world.  Others argued that it was preferable to work behind the scenes with centrally-involved Arab governments.  The idea is that the US would work with these countries to develop an alternative process acceptable to Israel, such as reaching an Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire and moving beyond that to a new Israeli-Palestinian process, and/or reengaging Syria and assuring Lebanon's territorial security and integrity.

Engaging Syria

A number of IPF's "Ambassadors' Roundtable" participants felt that it would be useful for the US to re-engage with Syria and test the intentions of the Assad regime.

Many believed that Assad is desperate to get back in the diplomatic game, and that, even though it would be very difficult to wean his regime away from its alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, conditions are ripe for making an effort. There was some skepticism that anything productive can come from engaging Syria and a concern that unsuccessful efforts with Syria could be a major embarrassment for American policy.

It was also suggested that US policy is tough on rhetoric and soft on action.  Serious follow-through on US demands, followed by a program of incentives that Syria would be unlikely to refuse, could produce significant results.

Several participants argued that the administration has been stronger at declaring how it expects Syria to alter its policies in such areas as Iraq, hosting Hamas headquarters, arming Hezbollah and its alliance with Iran, but much weaker in delineating what it would do if Syria began to take the steps the US requires.  No roundtable participants had any problem with administration demands that Syria reform its poor behavior, but some believe that the administration should also make it clear, either through intermediaries or directly, how and when it is prepared to reward Syria if it begins to alter its policies.  The transformation of Libyan behavior should be the model in dealings with Damascus.  Indeed, there are a variety of diplomatic and economic rewards that the United States has available if Syrian behavior warranted an alteration in US policy. This was an approach the administration followed effectively in the case of Libya.  One consequence of a change in Syrian-American relations would be the enhancement of possibilities of a resumption of direct or three-way Israeli-Syrian discussions.

Though skeptics demurred, the majority believed that if the Syrians begin to move on US demands, then the US should begin to reward them in a phased process, and one of these rewards would be the beginning of resumed high level discussions.  Our ultimate goal should be the end of the alliance between Damascus and Teheran. If the US-Syrian dialogue begins to show some promise, the US should at least acquiesce in Israeli-Syrian talks as well.

Rebuilding Lebanon

The Middle East experts convened by IPF agreed that maintaining the calm in Southern Lebanon is essential for stability in the entire region.  Several expressed their concern that undue restrictions were preventing American NGOs from working effectively in the south, since it is impossible to avoid contact with individuals who may turn out later to have been affiliated with Hezbollah.  These restrictions play into the hands of Hezbollah by preventing Americans from countering Hezbollah on behalf of the Lebanese government and from receiving any credit for the US rehabilitation efforts there.

At the same time, some experts voiced concern that the Israeli victims of Hezbollah in the north of the country were being ignored in the rush of new initiatives following the war.

The major concern the experts expressed was of Hezbollah rearmament that could re-ignite the conflict with Israel and endanger UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Israel would then likely initiate attacks against trucks it identifies as bringing weapons from Syria.

Therefore, for the successful implementation of 1701, most of the participants concluded that it is essential for the US to engage Syria specifically on this issue, while at the same time take steps to strengthen the central government in Lebanon.  The US should also contribute logistical and financial support to the UN force, the expanded UNIFIL, separating Hezbollah and Israel.

There was also discussion of two issues that, if implemented and handled well, could strengthen the Lebanese government vis-à-vis Hezbollah.  The first is the Shebaa Farms issue: Some experts felt an Israeli withdrawal from the area in favor of a temporary UN trust could help strengthen the Lebanese government were it to be given direct credit for Israel's action. The second is an exchange of prisoners directly with the Lebanese government, with no appearance of a Hezbollah role, except for handing over the two Israeli soldiers captured on July 12 at the outset of the crisis.  Some participants argued that Israel might want to pursue these steps in any case but there would then be no way to prevent Hezbollah from taking credit for either or both Israeli actions.

Conclusion:

This document is a summary prepared by Israel Policy Forum of the discussions of the meeting. It does not represent an agreed consensus of the group.  The following participated in the sessions. None of the below necessarily agree with every point in this summary of the discussion or the conclusions it describes.

Moderator: Ambassador Sam Lewis Jon Alterman

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering Geoffrey Kemp

Ambassador Dennis Ross Steven L. Spiegel

Ambassador Edward Walker Aaron David Miller

Toni Verstandig

Tamara Cofman Wittes