Time For Plan B

The new Obama administration has already found that its ability to inspire optimism at home and abroad is colliding with bitter realities in the Middle East. Honeymoon feelings cannot overcome the growing realization that the international effort to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has come to a dead end. The problem is not the solution itself-it still holds some attraction for many of those involved-but the realities on the ground and the utter collapse of a diplomatic process that ignored those realities. The obstacles are all too well known: leaders who lack the ability or the willingness (or both) to coax their societies toward the necessary compromises; deep (and often quite justified) mutual mistrust; political disarray on both sides; deliberate actions to impose realities that would make a two-state solution impossible; and disillusionment stemming from the fecklessness of past U.S. efforts.

Although the Obama administration has inherited a nearly spent diplomatic process, some tools are still available. Israel and Hamas refuse to acknowledge each other's legitimacy and reject negotiations over a settlement, but they do negotiate (however indirectly) over short-term arrangements. Both have shown an interest in some kind of a cease-fire-Israelis to prevent rocket fire on a widening swath of the country and Hamas as a way to resume the construction of its party-state in Gaza.

Acknowledging and working with existing realities must not, however, mean accepting them as permanent. The existing situation is not only short on security and justice; it is also unstable.

Things can-and might well-get worse unless the United States and other outside actors couple a realistic view of the present with a serious effort to push for a more promising future.

But for the present, they should stop banging their heads against the obstacles to an immediate and comprehensive solution of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Instead, it is time for Plan B.

Step One: Properly Negotiate a Ceasefire: The first step in a new diplomatic approach must be to establish a cease-fire that builds on the common interest of both Israel and Hamas to avoid fighting in the short term. Learning from the mistakes of the past, a new cease-fire should be clear and perhaps even written, and mediators (whether Arab or European) must be willing to make it more attractive to both sides to maintain. Hamas can be enticed with border openings, freedom of operation in Palestinian areas, and a freeze on settlements and Israel with a cessation of attacks from Hamas and other groups, combined with a serious effort to halt arms supplies to Hamas.

Step Two: Broaden the Cease-fire to an Armistice: The second step must be an armistice that would offer each side what they crave for the present-Israel would get quiet and a limit on arms to Hamas; Palestinians would get open borders, a freeze on settlements, and an opportunity to rebuild their shattered institutions. Such an armistice must go beyond a one-year cease-fire to become something sustainable for at least five to ten years.  It would also allow for a national unity government-but only as an interim step to elections. Any long term approach depends not on Hamas and Fatah sharing power but on forcing them to face their own voters.

Step 3: Use the Respite: Finally, the calm provided by the armistice must be used to rebuild Palestinian institutions and force Palestinians and Israelis to confront rather than avoid the choices before them.

The argument for this policy reorientation is not that it is certain to deliver peace. It is only that it is likely to allow Israelis and Palestinians to live together for a time, during which-with significant international effort-the conflict can be led to evolve into more tractable forms.

This post is a summary of a policy paper published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.