The Record Of Israeli Likud Governments And The Dilemmas Netanyahu Faces

There have been four Likud prime ministers in Israel's history: Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Binyamin Netanyahu, and Ariel Sharon. Netanyahu has now come back for a second round.

As Likud returns to power, a new popular theory has taken off that Likud is the party that makes peace. And, of course, there is some evidence for that. The breakthrough Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty occurred on Begin's watch. Shamir did not respond militarily to Saddam's missile attacks at the outset of the Persian Gulf War and he did attend the path-breaking Madrid conference of October 1991, the first Israeli-Arab peace conference. Netanyahu became the first Likud prime minister to meet Yasser Arafat and also agreed to withdraw from Hebron and signed the Wye Accords, becoming the first Likud prime minister to withdraw from parts of the West Bank.  Sharon withdrew from Gaza, and when his permanently debilitating stroke ended his Prime Ministership, he appeared to be in the process of preparing the way for withdrawing from a substantial part of the West Bank.

So, it is not entirely illogical or unsubstantiable to suggest that Likud prime ministers in the past have made major breakthroughs. It is not accidental that the Syrian ambassador to the United States, Imad Mustapha, declared recently to a television interviewer that he prefers Avigdor Lieberman as foreign minister to Tzipi Livni, because Lieberman is more straightforward, and Livni simply talks without making any concessions. It is also the case that many prominent Palestinians whisper the same message. It is better to deal with the straightforward and tough Likud, and they can make arrangements stick. It is certainly true that the more liberal part of the Knesset will always support Likud concessions, so that if a Likud prime minister makes a deal, it will survive any challenges inside Israel.

But, there is a darker side of the story, in terms of assessing Likud prime ministers, and each has another part of his history. Begin began the process of accelerating what had been a relatively small number of settlements, and it was Likud that was responsible for making it the headache and impediment to peace that it has become. Begin also authorized the attack on Ossiraq (condemned at the time and loudly praised later), but he also authorized the devastating invasion of Lebanon in June of 1982, from which Israel is still suffering.

Shamir, who could easily be called Mr. No, may have gone to Madrid, but later admitted that he was stalling in order to prevent any concessions to the Palestinians. His rejection of the Shimon Peres-King Hussein agreement in April 1987 for a possible conference that would lead to a deal with Jordan was one of the biggest mistakes in Israeli diplomatic history, and, if it had proceeded, would likely have prevented the first Intifada, let alone the second.

Netanyahu may have made some concessions vis-à-vis the West Bank, but they were always balanced by concessions to his constituency, which included expansion of settlements, the opening of a controversial tunnel in Jerusalem, etc. In a desperate attempt to balance between his international and domestic pressures, Netanyahu often managed to alienate both, leading to the demise of his government.

Sharon subdued the terrorist opposition in the West Bank and Gaza, gaining him substantial gratitude and support in Israel but opposition abroad, given his tough methods. His withdrawal from Gaza may have been a shocking act of super hawk turned partial dove, in part because of demographic issues. But, the withdrawal was implemented poorly and without coordination with the Palestinian Authority's president, Mahmoud Abbas.  The result was that it led to the later victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections and the Hamas coup in Gaza the following year, creating the current crisis.

Netanyahu's return to power is in a new setting that no past Likud prime minister has ever faced. On the one hand, he has a range of views in a highly disparate coalition. And his tough, right wing side of the coalition does not even allow him to declare in favor of a two-state solution so central to international diplomacy on the issue. To make matters worse, unlike previous Likud prime ministers, Netanyahu must face the growing realization that Iran may well gain nuclear weapons and is on the verge of doing so.

The Iran issue has led to much discussion of the possibility that Israel will attack Iran, and that is a critical point. A Likud government, on the surface at least, would be much more likely to attack than a Kadima or Labor government, and that makes foreign governments more nervous about this Israeli leader than some of the possible alternatives. 

Netanyahu will be taking an enormous risk if he confronts the new Obama administration with both requests to be tougher on Iran and his own unviable diplomatic position against the two-state solution. Make no mistake about it. Some kind of economic peace as the new Prime Minister proposes is a dodge that will not solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  And most Americans with influence today are against an Israeli attack on Iran.

The central foreign policy decisions of Netanyahu's prime ministership will be how he handles these two issues. The Obama administration has made its position clear in terms of engagement with Iran and its determination to move ahead on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Netanyahu cannot be opposed to Obama on both issues, and, indeed, it will be difficult to be against him on even one of them.

It is true that the Syria issue may provide an opening to Netanyahu. In his last prime ministership he was ready to deal with Syria. He may do so again. But, given his constituency, could he possibly make a deal with Bashir Assad and withdraw from the Golan? That is doubtful.  Confronting the Syrian question will be unlikely to allow Netanyahu to  avoid the Iranian and Israeli-Palestinian dilemmas.

So, for Netanyahu, the quandary he confronts on the international scene is much starker than it was for the previous Likud prime ministers. The international stakes in an era of financial crisis and Iran's growing power are far higher than they were for Netanyahu's predecessors (including himself).  Worse, the range of flexibility for Israel is much diminished, especially after the diplomatic fallout of the previous Israeli government's Gaza war, which may or may not have been militarily successful, but did result in a devastating Israeli public relations disaster.

Many American critics of Netanyahu are now talking about confronting him or at least making his life more difficult. It might be more useful to repeat over and over again the dire consequences of any mistakes Netanyahu might make for Israel's foreign and security policies. The fact is that, for Netanyahu, he will have to either confront his domestic demons and opponents and make package concessions on the Palestinian, Iranian, and Syrian fronts, or he will have isolated Israel and destroyed a part of the good feeling that Israel enjoys in the United States. Netanyahu has a tough diplomatic road ahead. He needs American help to make the right decisions.