A Palestinian View: A fundamental difference of understanding

In recent weeks we have witnessed an exchange of public statements between former Israeli PM Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas regarding the Annapolis negotiations process. The exchange is reminiscent of the post-mortem that followed the failure of the Camp David final status negotiations between Ehud Barak and the late President Yasser Arafat.

Part of the reason for these statements, undoubtedly, is an attempt by Olmert to secure himself a positive place in the history of the peace process. Another reason, however, would seem to be an attempt to score another point against the Palestinian side by making the argument that it has yet again wasted an opportunity for peace.

Nevertheless, studying the details of the statements it is clear that the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas never went beyond touching the surface of the fundamental aspects of the conflict. In fact, most of the negotiations centered around only one of the five issues that need resolution, namely borders (though that does indirectly touch on another, i.e., settlements). According to Olmert, on the issues of Jerusalem and refugees there were either no negotiations or an Israeli refusal to include them on the table.

The Annapolis process also reflected a recurring problem with the Israeli attitude to negotiations. It has happened more than once that the Israeli side insists on including certain issues while excluding others and then presumes that it is undertaking a comprehensive process. When the process then fails, the Israeli side conveniently forgets that one of the reasons for failure is exactly the issues that were excluded. With Annapolis, these included the issues of Jerusalem, refugees and sovereignty.

Israelis need to understand that Palestinians are coming from a position that is based entirely on international law. In other words, the Palestinian position cannot and will not veer from the specific rights that United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as international legality guarantee Palestinians.

As long as international legality, including the US-brokered 2003 roadmap, considers Israeli control over the territory occupied in 1967 an illegal, belligerent and military occupation, Palestinians will continue to insist on a settlement that secures a complete end to that occupation.

Similarly, the Palestinians will continue to insist on a solution to the refugee problem that is based on the relevant stipulations of international law, which give Palestinian refugees a right of return. By the same token, East Jerusalem is occupied territory. It must either become the capital of a future sovereign Palestinian state or, should Israel insist that the eastern and western parts be unified, Palestinians must have the same rights in all the city that Israelis do.

Finally, Israelis should understand that Palestinians have a concept of compromise that is different from theirs. The Israelis are coming to the table with the idea that they are going to compromise on the occupied territories, i.e., the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians, on the other hand, come to negotiations with the understanding that the original dispute with Israel is over historic Palestine, and the 1967 borders are themselves a compromise that cannot be further compromised.

This means that the Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 is the other side of the coin for Palestinian recognition of Israel on these same borders. Until Israel is able to understand where Palestinians--and international legality--come from, we will continue to move from one wave of violence and sacrifice to another.

Published 29/6/2009 © bitterlemons.org

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org