Mideast Peace Pulse

Israel Policy Forum Announces its Next Chapter with Middle East Progress

Israel Policy Forum — Tue, 19 Jan 2010 15:52:10 -0500

Dear Friends and Supporters of Israel Policy Forum:

On behalf of Israel Policy Forum (IPF), including our President Peter Joseph and Chair Larry Zicklin, I am pleased to inform you that IPF is embarking on its next chapter.

Effective January 1st, Israel Policy Forum will bring its experience and expertise to Middle East Progress (MEP), a project of the Center for American Progress (CAP), to form a strong base of American support for a comprehensive Middle East peace, including a two-state solution. Founded by former White House Chief of Staff John D. Podesta in 2003, the Center for American Progress is the leading voice in Washington promoting ideas and action to address a wide-range of issues, from domestic and economic policy, to climate change and national security. CAP recognizes the critical need to “build and hold a consensus for a two-state solution as a U.S. national security interest.”

Click here to read the letter from CAP Senior Vice President, Rudy deLeon

Israel Policy Forum was formed in 1993 by a group of American Jewish leaders who, with the encouragement of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and others, created an American voice that combined support of a strong U.S.-Israel relationship with that of robust U.S. diplomatic efforts in pursuit of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Over the past 16 years we have consistently provided engaging commentary and analysis, insightful policy recommendations and advocacy, and compelling events. All of our work has supported active U.S. engagement to achieve lasting peace and security in the region as a core American interest.

At Middle East Progress we will do this and more.

With our combined credentials and capacity in the United States and across the region, Middle East Progress will be uniquely suited to promote pragmatic U.S. policy approaches to the challenges facing peace and security in the Middle East.

As we combine our efforts in the coming weeks, I encourage you to support us by making a contribution in support of our combined effort and sign up for the Middle East Bulletin, the twice-a-week newsletter of Middle East Progress.

Click here to support Middle East Progress at the Center for American Progress.

On behalf of IPF, MEP and CAP, I thank you for your past and continued involvement and support.

Sincerely,

Nick Bunzl

Executive Director, IPF

2010 Must Be Showtime for Mideast Peace

David Halperin — Wed, 30 Dec 2009 12:27:37 -0500

As 2009 draws to a close, we are bombarded by the annual litany of commentary features recapping the year in Hollywood movies to the year in international conflict, and everything in between.

When it comes to the Middle East peace process, current conventional wisdom suggests the 2009 recap might go something like this:

Despite committing his administration to achieve progress, appointing a special envoy in his first days in office and reaching out to the Muslim world in unprecedented fashion, President Obama has been unsuccessful in advancing the Middle East peace process. He was unable to secure a full Israeli settlement freeze or get the parties to begin negotiations, and he alienated – and angered – both Israelis and Palestinians in the process. The Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, did not come through with confidence building measures as the president had proposed. Today, the Middle East peace process is stuck in the mud, with no clear way of getting out.

This should come as no surprise. Years of failure in achieving peace have taught us that when analyzing the Middle East peace process, pessimism is usually considered realistic, optimism naive.

The truth usually lies somewhere in-between.

As with many of the domestic and foreign policy issues the president tackled in his first year in office, the Middle East peace process in 2009 suffered from overly inflated expectations. President Obama’s stirring election victory engendered hope that “change we can believe in” might mean sweeping ends to regional conflicts and a quick economic turnaround.

In reality, change requires perseverance and time.

The administration demonstrated an abundance of resolve in its Mideast diplomacy in 2009. Entering the White House, the president was dealt a very difficult hand. He inherited a conflict with fresh tensions following Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, a fiercely divided Palestinian polity and, shortly after his inauguration, a right-wing government in Israel that was skeptical of – and in some cases vocally opposed to – the idea of a two-state solution.

Matters were made worse for the administration after it committed its share of mistakes. When the U.S. demanded nothing less than a complete Israeli settlement freeze, it raised expectations even higher and ensured that the Palestinians would demand no less before returning to the negotiating table. The September meeting the president hosted in New York between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was framed by much of the international media as a mere photo-op, or worse.

Despite the high expectations, hurdles, and missteps, the administration remained dedicated, unequivocally committed to a resolution to the conflict that it repeatedly identified as “a national security interest of the United States.” As a result, there were some significant achievements in 2009.

Firstly, Israel’s Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted the concept of a two-state solution in his speech at Bar Ilan University on June 14. This was by no means a sweeping endorsement of “two states for two peoples,” nor was it without a host of preconditions which would seemingly make a two-state solution improbable. But the significance of a right-wing Likud prime minister endorsing the two-state concept should not be undervalued. As the Geneva Initiative’s Gadi Baltiansky told an Israel Policy Forum (IPF) audience during a conference call shortly after the speech: “while Netanyahu's remarks set up limitations, reservations, and conditions on a state, it created a consensus that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end with the creation of a Palestinian state.” This is no small feat.

Secondly, significant improvements in the West Bank, including in the areas of economy and security, have continued and, as a result, the foundation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank was strengthened in 2009. Israel has removed numerous manned checkpoints and dozens of roadblocks throughout the West Bank in the past year, easing Palestinian movement throughout the territory. The economy is projected to have 7 percent growth in 2009. Meanwhile, American-trained security forces have transformed the security environment in much of the West Bank. Fatah, the ruling party of the P.A. in the West Bank, held its first conference in nearly twenty years in an effort to rid its reputation of corruption and cronyism, and the P.A.’s Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a detailed plan to build the infrastructure of a Palestinian state within the next two years. The impact of all these developments is to make a viable Palestinian state appear more realistic than ever.

Thirdly, while the moratorium on construction recently announced by Israel does not include East Jerusalem – and was coupled with numerous unhelpful comments and political maneuvers in support of the settlement movement, including Israel’s ill-timed announcement this week of new homes to be built in East Jerusalem – the limited freeze does represent a step forward. As IPF’s Roberta Fahn Schoffman recently wrote:

Like Netanyahu’s endorsement of two states at Bar Ilan University last June, this move is one more irrevocable step toward a two-state solution. Yes, in ten months, should there be no progress, or should the Palestinians continue to boycott negotiations, the moratorium can be revoked. But the larger gesture is irreversible, because Bibi Netanyahu has once again crossed the ideological divide. He has poked one more hole in the Greater Land of Israel balloon, and has given momentum to the growing Israeli mindset that accepts the inevitable division of the land. For those holding firm to the belief that a peaceful, two-state resolution to the conflict is still possible, this is a very good thing.

Finally, after Israel’s Operation Cast Lead ended just prior to President Obama’s inauguration, there have been few instances of Israeli-Palestinian violence in 2009. As long as this remains to be true, the opportunity to re-start peace talks and achieve progress toward ending the conflict is infinitely greater. Unfortunately, the return of tit-for-tat violence this past week – in which an Israeli was shot and killed in the West Bank and Israeli forces subsequently killed three Palestinian militants deemed responsible – is a reminder that the current relative calm is extremely fragile.

Indeed, while some significant steps were taken in 2009, the many obstacles facing a more peaceful and secure future for the region remain large and complex heading into 2010.

The administration’s many New Year’s resolutions must include re-starting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, addressing the situation in Gaza, engaging the Arab world to play a more constructive role, and assuring that the process on the ground for Israelis and Palestinians will be deepened and broadened. Above all, the U.S. must instill confidence in the peoples and leaders of the region that with America’s stewardship – and their own courageous leadership – a sustainable resolution to the conflict is attainable.

It will be no easy task, but one that must be achieved. The administration has shown it has the necessary determination. Its early engagement suggests the White House recognizes that it does not have a limitless amount of time. If 2009 set the stage for real change in the Middle East, then 2010 must be show-time.

US-Iran Negotiations: Simulation Exercise at INSS

Institute for National Security Studies — Tue, 29 Dec 2009 09:45:00 -0500

Ephraim Asculai, Emily B. Landau, and Tamar Malz-Ginzburg

INSS Insight No. 154, December 29, 2009

Despite the tendency to denote any simulation exercise on security issues a "war game," the recent simulation designed and held at INSS did not focus on the option of a military attack. Rather, it developed the scenario of a bilateral US-Iranian negotiation over Iran's nuclear program. [1] With Barack Obama – in line with his self-imposed end of the year deadline – currently poised to assess the progress made with his diplomatic outreach to Iran, the importance of understanding the implications of a possible direct bilateral dynamic comes into sharper focus.

The purpose of this exercise was to estimate the trends of a possible US-Iranian negotiation dynamic in order to evaluate the best response policy for Israel. Taking part were current and former senior personnel from the Israeli defense establishment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the academic world, including experts from INSS. The three main teams that took part in the exercise simulated the US, Iran, and Israel. The American and Iranian teams were further divided into upfront negotiations teams and behind-the-scenes "decision makers." Joining them was a large group of additional players representing Europe, Russia, China, the GCC, Egypt, and the IAEA.

The opening scenario created the conditions for the onset of a bilateral US-Iranian negotiation sparked by the nuclear crisis, but which would include a broader set of issues that went beyond the nuclear issue per se.

As the exercise developed, however, it became clear that the participants limited the declared general scope of the game, and became fixated on the situation as it was in early November. As such, the proposed Vienna Agreement on the supply of fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor took center stage in discussions. This persisted in spite of attempts by game coordinators to expand the talks to the more general issues, including the suspension of enrichment in Iran.

At a later stage in the exercise, an explosion was reported at the Arak heavy water production plant in Iran, and although whether this was an operational accident or deliberate sabotage was undetermined, the Iranian team turned the incident to its advantage by claiming Israeli aggression against Iran.

Although the event was a simulation exercise only, some important insights into the real world emerged.

Regarding Iran, its main strength is that it has a clearly defined ultimate aim: obtaining nuclear weapons capability. This aim guides its tactics in confronting the international community. In contrast, while in general terms the US as well as Israel wants to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear state, it lacks well-defined aims and consolidated strategies for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. What we observed is that this situation played to Iran's advantage, allowing it to determine to a large degree the pace and even the content of the talks. It used tactics of playing for time and flooding the US with vast amounts of irrelevant information to delay substantive discussion. Iran was also minded to form international coalitions and acquire allies, and demonstrated much flexibility to changing situations.

The Iranians felt superior and displayed this edge towards the Americans in the negotiations game. The US in general and President Obama in particular was perceived as weak. The Iranians estimated that because of internal and international considerations Obama would not dare launch a military attack on Iran's nuclear installations. Nor in their view did Israel pose a real threat. And overall, it was emphasized through the Iranian team in the simulation that Iran saw no way that it could be forced to suspend its ongoing uranium enrichment project unless the regime itself was put in danger. In this context, it was apparent that a military attack on Iran that is not preceded by an intensive campaign to sway world public opinion could cause severe harm to Israel and/or to the US, immunize Iran against further attacks, and generally strengthen Tehran's position.

For its part, the US, rather than taking the lead in the talks, was relegated to reacting to Iran's actions and positions. Following US responses both to Iran and to the increasing European and Israeli demands that they be partners in the negotiations decisions, it became clear that while Obama may be the dominant figure in the conflict with Iran, he appears neither able nor willing to take major decisions on this issue.

As in the case of the US, Israel did not display a clear definition of its ultimate aims regarding Iran, which could range from the dismantlement of the nuclear program to a change of regime. Consequently, there was no clear definition of how to attain its goals. Sensing its isolation from the world's actions towards Iran, Israel devoted much attention to influencing the US position, while making little effort to advance diplomatic moves with other potential partners, in Europe and in the region. This persisted despite its understanding of the US administration's limitations in negotiating with Iran, and can be attributed to Israel's own difficulties in creating and utilizing diplomatic opportunities. Israel became a perceptible burden on the US in the sense that its threats of military action demanded that the US devote energy to neutralize this possibility. Conversely, the lack of credibility of these threats in US eyes meant they could not be used by the US as a possible "stick" in its negotiations with Iran.

Returning from the exercise to the real world, the West remains entrenched in its efforts to obtain Iran's agreement to the Vienna proposal, Iran is becoming more adamant in its refusal while apparently still seeking a compromise solution, and more severe sanctions are yet to be seen. Meanwhile, the Iranian nuclear program proceeds relentlessly. The Vienna Agreement, even if implemented (and this is a very big if), will do nothing to slow down the enrichment process and obstruct the inevitability of Iran's nuclear weapons capability.

Where does this leave Obama? This is the big question on the eve of 2010. If he is serious about negotiations with Iran, he must improve his negotiations strategy. At the same time, perhaps he is simply not serious enough about arriving at a negotiated outcome. It is up to Israeli decision makers to assess which alternative is most likely, and on that basis develop Israel's own approach.

[1] We are grateful to NEST Consulting-Negotiations Strategies for its collaboration on the exercise, carried out on November 1, 2009.

This column is re-published with the permission of the Institute for National Security Studies.

Israel and the Europeans: On a Course to Conflict Over Jerusalem

Ir Amim — Mon, 28 Dec 2009 15:27:23 -0500

By Orly Noy, Ir Amim's Spokesperson

A month after Prime Minister Netanyahu announced a limited "freeze" on construction in Israeli-controlled Palestinian territory, it appears that his action will not end international pressure on Israel. True, the United States welcomed the announcement and attempted to solicit positive responses from other members of the Quartet. But outside the United States, Netanyahu's belated response--described by many commentators within Israel as half-hearted--has not had the same effect. Indeed, Israel appears to be on a collision course with several European states and the newly-enhanced European Union.

One indication of the deepening tensions between Israel and Europe came with the Swedish initiative to declare Jerusalem the capital of both Palestine and Israel, thus laying the ground for the city's re-partition. Intensive lobbying by Israeli leaders and diplomats resulted in a softening of the European position. Thus, the resolution adopted by the foreign ministers of the European Union on December 12 states that, "if there is to be a genuine peace, a way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states." While insisting on Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine as well as Israel, the ministers accepted that the final status of Jerusalem must be determined through direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

Another sign of the new direction European diplomacy seems to be taking toward the question of Jerusalem was evident on December 16, when Catherine Ashton used her first speech as the European Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs to criticize Israel for its policies of house demolitions, evictions of Palestinian residents, and the separation wall. "East Jerusalem is occupied territory, together with the West Bank," she declared.

While these events unfolded in Brussels and other European capitals, another signal of Europe's disapproval of Israel was revealed in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem-based consuls of several European countries issued a highly critical and comprehensive report on Israel's policies in East Jerusalem. (It should be remembered that, because they reject Israel's unilateral annexation of Jerusalem, all of Israel's diplomatic partners keep their embassies in Tel Aviv and their consulates in East Jerusalem, which mainly serve the Palestinian population.)

The report covers a wide array of questions, from Israel's long range strategic and demographic goals to its ongoing practices. It documents unresolved and long-standing problems, like the poor state of infrastructure in East Jerusalem and the low number of building permits issued to Palestinian residents of the city. In addition, it highlights a dangerous new trend of using physical and demographic barriers to isolate East Jerusalem from the Palestinian population in the rest of the West Bank.

One element in this new trend--the plans for hundreds of new residential units in Gilo--has recently come under criticism from the US, UN and other international actors. In response, Israel has argued that construction in Israeli neighborhoods in Jerusalem is a purely domestic issue. But the European consuls' report exposes the political implications of the new construction plans. It shows that the much discussed plan for Gilo's expansion is only one in series of plans for new and expanded neighborhoods to the east, west and south of Gilo. These plans include the expansion of Har Homa and the new neighborhoods of Giv'at Ya'el and Giv'at ha-Matos. Together, these new residential areas will connect the Israeli neighborhoods of South-East Jerusalem to Gush Etzion and, at the same time, drive an Israeli wedge between the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. As the European consuls point out, the new construction undermines the possibility of an agreed settlement of the question of Jerusalem and, therefore, the possibility of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The report also criticizes Israeli actions to change the demographic balance in Jerusalem. The most egregious of these is Israel's separation wall. Its winding course places over 50,000 Palestinian residents of Jerusalem on the other side of the wall, thus cutting them off from the city's urban space and along with it, their places of work, their children's schools, and the medical and social services to which they are entitled under Israel's law.

The three policies highlighted in the consuls' report--the exclusion of a large number of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem from their own city, the severe restrictions on residential building in Palestinian neighborhoods, and the plans for large scale construction of Israeli neighborhoods on the city's parameters--demonstrate the true demographic aspirations of the Israeli government with regard to Jerusalem.

If past experience is any guide, both government and the public in Israel will react to the consuls' report with anger and derision. But they would be well advised to consider it seriously. The conclusions of the report contain a recommendation to work for a European recognition of East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state, even if at present such recognition must remain a purely symbolic act. The recommendation represents the changing approach of many international actors. They are increasingly doubtful about the negotiating process and its chances for success, and as a result, they tend to accept the need for unilateral steps, at least at the declarative level. If allowed to continue, these new trends will undermine Israel's capacity to shape the region's political reality.

It is in Israel's interest to re-engage with the negotiating process and to prevent international acceptance of unilateral steps of the kind recommended in the European consuls' report. This does not require radical concessions at this time; rather, it requires that Israel forgo its own unilateral actions in East Jerusalem, such as the plans for large scale residential construction, or the steady incursion of Israeli settlers into the Palestinian neighborhoods encircling the Old City. This would give a chance for renewed diplomatic negotiations, where both sides can present their needs and demands. Allowing political initiative to move from the negotiating table to unilateral steps, whether by the European states or by Israel, poses a critical threat to Israel's most vital interests in Jerusalem.

This was cross-posted on Huffington Post World on December 28, 2009.

Who are the settlers and what do they want?

Israel Policy Forum — Wed, 23 Dec 2009 15:57:38 -0500

On Wednesday, December 16th Professor Steven L. Spiegel moderated a discussion with Dr. Shlomo Fischer, the founding director of Yesodot- The Center for Torah and Democracy and a professor at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The following is a summary of his remarks. A full recording of the conversation can be found here.

How did we get into the crisis with the settlements that we find today?

The Israeli government counts 300,000 settlers. The American government counts settlers who moved over the 1967 cease-fire line in Jerusalem as well, bringing the count up to something like 450,000.

The settlements, as a whole, have been sponsored and constructed by various Israeli governments. Almost all of the settlements have an extensive infrastructure of roads and electricity that can only have been accomplished by numerous Israeli governments. That's on the one hand.

On the other hand, there has definitely been an ideological spearhead, which is composed of what I call radical religious Zionists, who make up about 60 percent of the settler population. Nevertheless, today they provide a coherent lobby and pressure group for the entire enterprise.

Settlement activity began in the occupied territories almost immediately after they were captured in the 1967 war. In the early spring of 1968 the first settlement of Gush Etzion was established.

What you have in the settlements is the combination of modern nationalism and religion. There's a very deep identity issue here. For most people, for many years, nationalist identity and religious identity were considered heterogeneous. The deepest impulse of religious Zionism is to give religious meaning and religious regulation to modern Jewish Israeli nationalism. They do that by advocating a particular political program of settlement (which is considered a religious commandment) and annexation of what they call the Greater Land of Israel.

What effect has the handling of the evacuations from Gaza in 2005 had on the way settlers are responding to the possibility of evacuating settlements in the West Bank?

The lesson of the evacuation from Gush Katif is that there is no good evacuation. The very shabby treatment that these people received showed West Bank settlers that it's not in their interest to be evacuated, and that even if the government gives them some sort of compensation, it will in no way make up for their loss of home and loss of lifestyle.

With the Gaza withdrawal, the government treated the settlers like atomistic individuals, telling them to take their check and leave. What the people had in mind was to maintain their communities. It's only now, five years after the event, that people are finally getting resettled. In the meantime, their children have dropped out of school, families have been destroyed. There have been lots of human tragedies which were tied to the actuality of the evacuation itself. If one were to assess them now, looking at what has happened, one would say, “This is going to destroy my life.” Many of the settlers today probably feel they have nothing to lose by engaging in active resistance.

The entire Gaza episode radicalized the religious community. They didn’t disobey orders, yet they were shafted. The fact is that the withdrawal was smooth and the government had no resistance. And then the settlers were treated like garbage. There's a feeling that they sold themselves too cheap.

It’s often said that Americans make up a large percentage of the settlers. How would you classify the majority of settlers?

It's very significant that the majority of the visible settler leaders are people that were born in Israel. The settlers are the first generation of religious Zionists who were born and socialized at the time of the creation of the State. These are people who have no inferiority complex as far as their Israeliness is concerned. They believe that they can make an ideological proposal for leading all of Israeli society.

Almost all of the settlers were born religious. They started on the one hand with this confidence and, on the other hand, with this famous chip on their shoulder that somehow the State belongs to the Labor Party, it belongs to the secular Zionists. And they said, “We're as good as you are, we're Israeli as much as you are. We served in the paratroopers just like you did. We speak the same Hebrew as you do. We read the same poetry. There's no reason why we cannot have a say in how to run this country.” That’s a very big motif among the settler leadership.

How have religious settlers managed to play such a prominent role in the IDF?

The IDF has undergone significant changes in the last 20 years. The IDF is much less composed of charisma and of prestige than it used to be.

If you take the most advantaged groups in society, they go into the IDF because they're citizens, but they go into the famous units, of high-tech, of communications equipment, of computers. They come out of that and they go on to work in high-tech. This is the dream of those elite.

Now, you have four groups of people who will go on to be generals in the IDF.

The first component of the IDF is Kibbutznikim. They no longer have the image of admiration and prestige in Israel, and they want to get back into it.

Secondly, you have the group that historically was excluded from the IDF - Jews of North African and Middle Eastern background, who are increasingly becoming an important factor in the officer corps and in the combat units of the IDF.

Thirdly, 20 percent of the population is immigrants from the former Soviet Union who've come over since 1990. These are people want to become the establishment of Israeli society. They want to get into the mainstream. The way to do that is through the IDF and its fighting units.

The fourth group is the religious. If you look at who got killed in the last Lebanese war you'd see these groups, all of which were formerly excluded and now have a chance to get in. For the religious, it means a way to lead Israeli society. We have a group here that has a vision of how Israeli society, as an integral religious national division, should be run. That's why they invented the Machina programs. For a long time people thought that the Hesder programs were the spearheads.

What has the role of the Hesder movement been historically in Israel?

The Hesder movement got its cache in the 1973 war and the 1982 war in Lebanon. In my Hesder Yeshiva in 1973, we had 250 students. In the Yom Kippur War we had 11 dead and 50 wounded. It's a pretty high casualty rate for one institution. The other Hesder Yeshivas looked the same. And in '82 it repeated itself. I had four sons who served in Hesder and they all served in combat units. That's very much in the ethos.

When the settlers are confronting the army, are they actually just confronting each other?

The children of the leaders of the Council of Judea and Samaria (the settlers' public council in the West Bank) were the intermediaries. They were the lieutenants and captains and special forces who were taking messages back and forth from the settler leaders to the army. So the religious ideological leaders are confronting the army and the intermediaries are their own children.

Do all Hesders promote the right wing agenda?

Yes, but they're not necessarily promoting disobedience of orders. That's the subject of a huge dispute within the Hesder community itself. There are rabbis who, in 2005 said if you disobey orders, then don't come back. If you go to Gaza, if you're ordered to remove the settlers and you refuse that, then don't come back. You have no place in the Yeshiva.

The majority, the way it worked out, is those telling them not to disobey. After all the fuss, there were 67 incidences of kids disobeying orders. So, it's very, very minimal.

Netanyahu is having a difficult time implementing a freeze on settlement construction. Will the settlers eventually listen to Netanyahu? How does this get resolved?

The question is, will the army act with enough will. The settler experience is that the army is ambivalent toward them because the settlers help them control the Palestinian population, which is the major mission, as they perceive it.

The army has never demonstrated enough will to do this. Sharon made it extremely clear that he wanted it to be done and he took a number of steps to get it done, a major one being that he employed Dan Halutz as the Chief of Staff. This is significant because Halutz comes from the Air Force, which means that he has no personal or professional connections to the settlers. Anybody who served on the ground will have such connections. Now they have Ashkenazi. I believe Ashkenazi is professional enough to carry out this mission if it's made absolutely clear to him that this is the mission.

At this point Barak and everybody -- Ashkenazi, too -- would prefer that the police do it. That's bearing the brunt of things. If necessary, the police will do it, but at the price of freeing up manpower from other needed missions. It always comes down to a question of will. Sharon had fantastic political will. And he made it happen. Nobody knows about Netanyahu yet.

Compiled by Rachel Cooper

Iran, China, and the Israeli Stick

Yoram Evron — Tue, 22 Dec 2009 14:43:05 -0500

INSS Insight No. 150, December 22, 2009

When President Obama met with the president of China in Beijing last month, he cautioned that he would not be able to block an Israeli attack against Iran much longer unless there is progress in the attempts to stop Iran’s nuclear program. This warning was intended to persuade China of the urgent need for additional sanctions against Iran. Yet even if the potential success of this warning is questionable, it raises questions about Chinese interests in Iran and the Middle East as a whole, about Israel's place vis-à-vis these interests, and about Jerusalem’s possible influence over Beijing.

Until recently, it was commonplace to assume that Chinese interests in the Middle East, including Iran, lay in guaranteeing its energy supply. The tremendous growth of the Chinese economy has created an ever-growing dependence on imported energy, and in 2008 China became the world’s third largest importer. Of all energy sources outside China, the Middle East plays a major role, as about half of China’s imported oil comes from that region. In light of the expected growth in China’s demand for oil and the anticipated diminishing supply from oil fields elsewhere in the world, the importance of the Middle East to China’s energy market is expected to grow. This may explain China’s interests in fostering relations with the major oil producers in the Middle East and its concern about any move liable to undermine the political and military stability of the region.

Nonetheless, this concern alone cannot explain China’s insistence on defending Iran from tougher international steps, because China reportedly rejected the Saudi offer to supply all its oil needs at low cost as a substitute for Iranian oil should the need arise. Were oil alone the center of China’s interests, it would not matter to China if the source were Iran or Saudi Arabia. Therefore, China must have other interests in Iran and the region.

Generally speaking, one may differentiate four separate issues. The first is China's drive to establish itself internationally as a power offering an alternative agenda to that of the United States. In this context, China is trying to acquire the support of the developing nations, many of which are under American pressure to change their internal and external conduct. China has opposed outside intervention in states' internal matters, and in this sense, a Chinese agreement to sanctions against Iran is tantamount to surrender to an American agenda and abandonment of potential allies.

Second, as part of its efforts to vary its energy sources, China is investing billions of dollars in developing oil infrastructures in various countries in exchange for guaranteed large future oil supplies. China made investments of this type in Iran, and is thus interested in maintaining good relations with the regime that signed these contracts.

Third, in light of forecasts that its dependence on Middle East oil will only grow, and in light of its desire to increase its political influence internationally, China understands that it will not be able to avoid increasing its involvement in the Middle East. Indeed, while China tended (and apparently still tends) to view the Middle East as “the graveyard of superpowers,” it seems that in recent years it is both introducing variety into its regional relations and strengthening its ties with the Middle East: bolstering its diplomatic ties with various rulers, increasing its economic investments and commercial ties in the region, and showing signs of strengthened military ties with various nations, including Iran. Its growing involvement in the region may position it to stand at the head of an anti-American front in the not too distant future, and therefore is better off not being seen as buckling under American dictates.

This leads us to China’s fourth interest in the region, namely weakening America’s military presence. One of the concerns consistently expressed by the Chinese is the de facto American control of global oil sources and supply channels, which would allow the United States to block oil and gas exports to China should relations between the two powers hit a severe crisis. In this context, the establishment of the American military presence in the Middle East and Central Asia (the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Afghanistan) is viewed by China as an explicit threat to its interests, and China desires to curb this to the extent possible. From this perspective, leaving Iran out of the American circle of influence and military presence serves China’s interests well. Beyond this, should the day come when the United States withdraws its troops from Afghanistan – as China would like – China would be able to open up a direct land route to the Persian Gulf.

This complex of reasons goes a long way towards explaining China’s opposition to American-instituted international sanctions against Iran. At the same time, a military attack on Iran would likely damage Chinese interests even more. Not only would an attack shock the global oil market, at least in the short term, but it would demonstrate to the nations of the region and the world at large China’s impotence in determining international moves. It would also jeopardize China's investments in Iran and be liable to end with the United States posting its troops, one way or another, inside Iran.

In light of this, the Israeli stick President Obama was waving is indeed relevant, on condition that China becomes convinced that Israel is determined enough to undertake such a move and the United States would allow it to act. Various steps will likely be required to persuade China, a nation with many generations of experience with complex diplomatic maneuvers, that this is the case.

At any rate, whatever effect such a threat may have, the very fact that it is uttered requires China to take note of another point: Israel’s place in its complex of interests. Aside from a brief period in the history of the two nations when it seemed that their military ties and Israel’s moves in Washington gave Jerusalem some sort of influence over Beijing, China’s attitude to Israel has always been determined by much broader international considerations. The reason apparently is that Israel does not have significant enough assets to interest China, in particular not of the kind that could tip the scales against the Muslim world’s oil assets. Accordingly, it may be that President Obama served Israel well by pointing out the most effective way of reaching the heart of Beijing at the critical time China is working to increase its influence on the region. Thus instead of focusing on identifying joint assets and interests through which it may be possible to influence Chinese policy, Israel must put greater efforts into understanding the complex of China’s interests and its conduct, and on the basis of this understanding identify both direct and indirect ways of exerting influence.

This column is re-published with the permission of the Institute for National Security Studies.

A Palestinian View: A crucial but problematic triangle

Ghassan Khatib — Tue, 22 Dec 2009 10:22:28 -0500

For good but different reasons, their respective relations with the United States are of central and utmost importance to both Palestinians and Israelis.

As the US is the world's leading power, it is the most influential potential mediator between them. Israel is completely dependent for its overwhelming superiority on the near unquestioned military, economic and diplomatic support it receives from the US. The Palestinian Authority, meanwhile, is dependent on international support and international diplomacy, both shaped by the US.

Moreover, since the beginning of the peace process in 1991, the US has always played the leading mediating role, albeit to mixed reactions. On the one hand, both sides hold the US responsible for the shortcomings of that peace process, each for its own reasons. On the other hand, they also feel that the process could not move forward without serious US involvement.

There are of course fundamental differences in the relations between the two sides and the US. America makes no secret of its support for and bias toward Israel. This has caused the Palestinians to seek a greater role for other international actors in mediating the conflict as a way to mitigate this imbalance. The last round of negotiations, the Annapolis process, for instance, is an example of a process undertaken purely for American and Israeli interests. Israel needed to create an impression that it was involved in a serious process primarily for the domestic purposes of the then Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert. The US administration, meanwhile, had been heavily criticized for not paying the conflict any attention and wanted to provide it some lip service at the last moment.

By contrast, when the current American administration under President Barack Obama took over, Washington initially showed a keen interest in pursuing a more serious and extensive engagement. This was signaled from the outset with the appointment of George Mitchell as special envoy. As a result, the two sides become even more focused and sensitive about their respective relations with Washington.

The Palestinians became a little more hopeful for the same reason that the Israelis felt a little more tense: a serious process would of necessity have to be based on international legality. This in turn would expose the contradiction between the requirements of international legality and the position of the right-wing Israeli coalition government under Binyamin Netanyahu, which is based on continued control over the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and continued expansion of Jewish settlements there.

Israel dealt with the situation in two ways, through public relations and by playing domestic US politics. First, the Israeli government engaged in a public relations campaign to head off any potential US pressure without at the same time having to make fundamental changes to government policy. Thus Netanyahu announced a settlement construction "freeze" that is so only in name. Before that he had announced an "acceptance" of the two-state solution so qualified that it similarly meant no such thing.

In both cases, Netanyahu overcame the potential contradiction between his position and that of the US with a public relations strategy that provided Israel with a pro-active and well-intentioned demeanor belying its actual intransigence. Meanwhile, Israel utilized its supporters in the US to exploit the president's tussle with the US Congress over other issues. At this point in time it appears to have worked, and the US administration has backed down from its earlier enthusiasm for tackling the conflict.

Nevertheless, if for different reasons, the relations of both sides with the US are crucial to hopes for peace. The current administration has the potential to make a major difference. It is the only member of the international community that could successfully lead efforts to resolve the conflict. However, the US needs to act in concert with other members of the international community, especially Europe, otherwise all the potential of the Obama administration will be jeopardized.

- Published 21/12/2009 © bitterlemons.org

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org

An Israeli View: Criminal neglect

Yossi Alpher — Tue, 22 Dec 2009 10:01:42 -0500

There can be little doubt that Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu won the first round of Israeli-Palestinian engagement with the Obama administration--and that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas lost. Netanyahu executed a partial and problematic settlement construction freeze "balanced" by settlement provocations in Jerusalem and elsewhere. He was rewarded with US support for his readiness to open negotiations while his right-wing coalition stood behind him. Abbas misread American promises and assurances regarding the freeze and the Goldstone report. He ended up not only under American pressure to renew talks with Israel but also isolated politically.

Paradoxically, Netanyahu's meetings with US President Barack Obama have been universally described as tense and unpleasant, while Obama's relationship with Abbas seems convivial by comparison. The issue is clearly not one of personal chemistry. Rather, it appears to be institutional. Indeed, Israel's superior capacity to maneuver concerning Washington's approach to the conflict is not new and goes back decades.

The tools Israel musters in its relations with Washington are well known: an extremely effective lobby that is backed by a wealthy and influential American Jewish community and that works hard to establish influence with each new Congress and administration; close military-security-intelligence relations based on a communality of interests and shared regional threat assessments--once regarding the Soviets, now the Iranians and militant Islam; the perception of common value-systems; and currently, though not always, a prime minister who knows the American system well.

None of these components exists in the US-Palestine relationship. For the most part, there is little a Palestinian leader can do to compensate for these particular lacunae. Nevertheless, the Palestinian failure to understand how Washington works cannot be fully explained merely by the absence of a powerful diaspora or a shared Old Testament heritage.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of the poor Palestinian grasp of Washington was provided last May by Abbas in an interview to the Washington Post a day before his first meeting with Obama. Having bought fully into the Obama demand for a settlement freeze, Abbas assumed there was nothing for him to do but wait a year or two until Washington delivered the goods. "The Americans are the leaders of the world," he stated. "They can use their weight with anyone around the world. . . . Now they should tell the Israelis, 'You have to comply with the conditions.'" Abbas went on to relate confidently how he had turned down PM Ehud Olmert's far-reaching offer for a final status settlement: "The gaps were wide."

How many senators did Abbas brief and consult with during that visit regarding this bombastic approach? Where did he get it into his head that revealing the (hitherto secret) details of Olmert's offer would endear him to the American public rather than paint him as a hardliner? What sort of Palestinian diplomatic and public diplomacy staff was in place in Washington to prepare and follow-up on his visit? Indeed, to what extent do Abbas and his advisers even begin to understand the American power structure with its checks, balances and nuances?

The rhetorical nature of these questions points to the prolonged lack of a serious effort on the part of the PLO to generate the tools needed for dealing effectively with the world's superpower and the only potentially effective mediator between Israelis and Palestinians. Here we also encounter an historic reliance on Europe (as opposed to America) that contradicts everything the Palestinians should have learned by now about the European Union's difficulties in dealing diplomatically with the Middle East. From the standpoint of the real welfare of the Palestinian people, its leaders' neglect of Washington and its workings is positively criminal, on a par with their insistence on the right of return and their repeated (since 1936) rejection of territorial compromise offers.

Abbas' complacency in coming to Washington last May and, subsequently, placing his confidence in unsustainable US administration positions regarding settlements and Goldstone may well have been affected by what Palestinians presumably identify as a positive trend in American opinion that informs not only the Obama approach. American support for Israel is indeed eroding, particularly in academia and other influential institutions. American Jewish support may be evolving into a more evenhanded approach, as illustrated by the emergence of a new Jewish lobby, J Street. And in the Obama age of "engagement", American-Israeli relations could conceivably be affected by growing anti-Israel and pro-Palestine sentiments in Europe and elsewhere.

So could Abbas be right that all he has to do is wait? I doubt it. Apparently, so does he, judging by his repeated threats to resign in view of his own failings. Finally, would a more effective Palestinian presence in Washington be a bad thing for Israel? Not necessarily, insofar as to be persuasive the policies advanced by that lobby would have to be more realistic. And not if you believe that ultimately only a realistic Israeli-Palestinian dialogue will produce peace.

- Published 21/12/2009 © bitterlemons.org

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org

A Larger Context for the Prisoner Exchange

Alon Ben Meir — Tue, 22 Dec 2009 09:42:10 -0500

The current debate among Israelis about a prisoner exchange with Hamas has been consumed by a narrow discussion of short-term gains and losses for both sides, evading the bigger picture of a future reconciliation between the two parties. It is time for both Israel and Hamas to recognize that there is no escape from one another. The deal that would presumably trade Gilad Shalit, Israel's soldier who was captured in 2006 by Hamas, for approximately 1,000 Palestinian prisoners should be utilized as a precursor for future negotiations between Israel and Hamas. The prisoner exchange offers an opportunity to enlarge the scope of the negotiations and put to end the long and mutually debilitating conflict from which neither side can benefit.

Most of the arguments in Israel against the release of Palestinian prisoners are valid to the extent that under such circumstances it is legitimate to argue, for example, that freeing nearly 1000 Palestinians for one Israeli soldier could encourage future seizures of Israelis. There is also an argument to be made that it would raise Hamas' fortunes and undermine the Palestinian Authority. Others, such as former director of the Prisoner of War department of the Mossad Rami Igra went as far as calling it "a shameless and bottomless surrender to Hamas' demands." Yet on the other side, there are those who argue that however illogical the exchange may appear, it is a highly emotional issue for most Israelis. Though the idea of a prisoner swap may be politically dangerous, the closeness and the nature of the Israeli society make it extremely difficult to differentiate between the personal and the political, especially when the captive is a soldier. Furthermore, those who favor the swap stress that Israel has several times in the past engaged in such lop-sided exchanges. In 1985, for example, Israel handed over 1,150 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for three Israelis captured in Lebanon in 1982. In fact, Israel is the only country in the world that has a department within the foreign ministry dedicated to rescuing its citizens experiencing difficulties outside Israel.

The pros and cons of this debate however miss the overarching point: where do Israel and Hamas go from here once the prisoner exchange takes place? Gilad Shalit will return home and the whole country will cheer his heroism and Hamas will celebrate the release of 1,000 prisoners as a major victory. The violence in the past between the two sides, and especially Israel's incursion into Gaza in December 2008 must be instructive. It has demonstrated in no uncertain terms Hamas' futile efforts to use violence to intimidate or threaten Israel's existence. Moreover, considering Israel's awesome military prowess, Hamas will never be in a position to seriously challenge Israel in any future military confrontation.

Cast Lead also taught Hamas another bitter lesson. Not only that Egypt did not come to Hamas' aid, but it in fact joined Israel in imposing strict movement on its crossing to Gaza and prevented Hamas' militants from smuggling weapons and materials through the underground tunnels. No government in Egypt will allow an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood entity to rise in Gaza and be strong enough to subvert current or future Egyptian regimes. Hamas must eventually succumb to this reality and limit its political struggle internally. To be sure, Hamas must find a way not necessarily to join in a unity government with the PA, but to agree to an electoral political system that will democratically govern a future Palestinian state.

Conversely, Cast Lead has shown the Israelis that although they can march at will into Gaza with overwhelming military force and cause incalculable damage, Hamas is a grassroots movement and will survive even if its leadership is decapitated. In addition, however justified Israel felt its military intentions were in Gaza, the ensuing civilian death toll in any future conflict will always evoke international condemnation which Israel cannot afford to ignore. This is the reality that both sides must face and use the prisoner's exchange as a catalyst for changing the nature of their relationship.

Although Israel and Hamas are negotiating with each other indirectly, the negotiations constitute nothing less than recognition of each other's prerogatives, as no prisoners will be freed without a mutual consent. It is time for both sides to rid themselves of the illusion that somehow they can wish the other away. The prisoner exchange must immediately be followed by a sequence of concrete steps to solidify any good will engendered and narrow the wide gap between Hamas and the Israeli public. Prior among these must be a ceasefire agreement to stop all violence for at least five years. Ordinary Palestinians in Gaza have suffered far more than their share because of their misguided leadership. Polls in Gaza have clearly indicated that continued military resistance has actually undermined Hamas' popular support. Senior members of Hamas including Ismail Haniyeh have floated the idea of a long term ceasefire, if Israel is to make progress on a land-for-peace agreement based on June 4th, 1967 borders.

It is also of extreme importance at this point in time that Israel follow up with goodwill gestures, primarily opening up border crossings into Gaza. There is a humanitarian outcry that both Israel and especially Hamas must address. It is unconscionable and shameless on all parties, Palestinians, Israelis and the international community to allow this travesty to continue for another day. Easing the border crossings to allow goods and materials other than food and medicine-including building materials and machinery-must be given a top priority. This will also allow for an expanded trade between Israel and Gaza, as long as Hamas adheres to the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, Israel must also facilitate economic development in the West Bank, as a two state solution relies on the sustainability of both territories.

Should an exchange open up a working relationship between Israel and Hamas, albeit indirectly, Israel should also take advantage of any rift between the more hard-line conservative leadership in Damascus led by Khaled Meshal and Gaza's local leadership led by Ismail Haniyeh that has endured the violence and economic hardship first hand. Those in Hamas who wish to see the party serve as a full fledged political organization capable of representing the Palestinian people and delivering goods and services should be allowed to partake in the democratic process. Israel and the moderate Palestinians must be clear though that Qassam rockets or any form of violence that invites retaliatory attacks will not be tolerated under any circumstances.

For Israel, the prisoner swap must be seen as the first political step to achieve a mutual accommodation with a group which Netanyahu or any future Israeli leader must sooner or later make peace. For Hamas, this would be an historic opportunity to seize upon to become a part of state building and give the Palestinian community in Gaza, especially the young, a hope for a better tomorrow. Only in this context will the prisoner exchange make sense, as it opens up future possibilities to take constructive and viable measures on the ground to achieve a workable solution.

Abbas’ Proposal for an Undeclared Settlement Freeze: Transparent Ploy or Plea for Help?

Mark A. Heller — Mon, 21 Dec 2009 10:31:25 -0500

INSS Insight No. 151, December 20, 2009

In an interview with Haaretz on December 15, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas repeated his longstanding position that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can only resume after Israel implements a complete freeze on settlement construction throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. But in a new wrinkle that might have been intended as a sign of flexibility, he added that negotiations could begin immediately, even if the freeze is not publicly declared.

At first glance, this is not a serious proposition. Abbas knows perfectly well that a surreptitious settlement freeze is a practical impossibility. Given the inevitable reaction of the settlers – already manifested in their ongoing opposition to the partial and temporary freeze declared by the Israel government – as well as the intrusive presence of the international and Israeli media, there is absolutely no chance that any attempt to impose such a freeze would remain unpublicized and, consequently, no chance that an “undeclared” freeze would be one iota less problematic for the Israeli government than a declared freeze.

The most plausible explanation for his rather curious addendum is therefore that Abbas is not really interested in a re-launch of negotiations – though this is the ardent wish of the United States and the rest of the international community, which continue to fund his government and security forces – but that he would like to show ostensible flexibility in order to shift the onus for the absence of renewed talks onto the Israeli side. The premise behind this explanation is that renewed negotiations would either produce some movement, exposing him to accusations of weakness and capitulation just at a time when Hamas has defiantly reaffirmed its total commitment to the path of uncompromising resistance, or would simply reconfirm the futility of negotiations, which would also validate Hamas’ approach. According to this calculus, which has apparently been embraced by the Israeli government, Abbas actually fears more negotiations but can exploit the international preoccupation with settlements to portray Israeli recalcitrance on this issue as the real obstacle to their resumption.

There is, however, another possible interpretation to the interview: that while an undeclared freeze is logically absurd, Abbas is nevertheless looking for some way to climb back down from the “precondition” limb onto which he was pushed by the original American demand earlier this year for a complete settlement freeze. That demand was ill-advised in two respects. First of all, it was unrealistic: there was not the slightest chance that this Israeli government would comply absent American pressure of such a brutal and unrelenting character as to be politically inconceivable. Second, and even more destructively, it painted Abbas into a corner by forcing him to demand no less than what the Obama administration was demanding but leaving him unable to adjust because his public opinion – unlike Obama’s – could not acknowledge Israeli political imperatives and subsequently accommodate any understanding with Israel's prime minister Netanyahu on partial compliance.

The hypothesis that Abbas views this as an uncomfortable dilemma from which he would like to escape is strengthened by the fact that he communicated his message directly to Israelis via an Israeli journalist, which is a rather unusual step for him, and the premise behind it is that Abbas genuinely does want renewed negotiations. According to this interpretation, Abbas sees the status quo as tolerable because of improving economic conditions in the West Bank, the growing effectiveness of his security forces, and agile maneuvering around the incumbency issue (he has not retreated from his commitment not to present his candidacy in the next presidential election but has secured PLO authorization to extend his term of office until postponed elections can be held, and has succeeded in putting the blame for the delay on Hamas). Nevertheless, this situation is not seen as sustainable indefinitely, because continuing paralysis on the political track erodes the viability and legitimacy of the strategic alternative he poses to Hamas’ approach and leaves day-to-day stability hostage to some unpredictable and uncontrollable event.

Israeli decision makers who oppose a complete settlement freeze either out of genuine conviction or calculation that the domestic political and social costs would far outweigh the possible diplomatic benefits can certainly find grounds to embrace the first interpretation of Abbas’ interview and dismiss his proposal as simply a ploy to ward off calls for negotiations without preconditions. But those who share the concern about the sustainability of the current situation of “no war, no peace, no talks” attributed to him in the second interpretation will find cause at least to explore whether or not there is anything to it. After all, pressure to restart negotiations, especially from the Obama administration, will almost certainly revive in early 2010. In addition, the ability of the Palestinian Authority to continue functioning properly – which many in the Israeli security establishment consider to be a major Israeli interest – could come under new threat from terrorist attacks, fallout from the global economic recession, or even the strengthening of Hamas’ standing following any deal on Gilad Shalit.

This does not mean that even those Israelis who view renewed negotiations as a matter of some urgency can accede to Abbas’ demand as currently formulated. They may, however, find in his message a signal of some desire to look together for a face-saving way around the current impasse, perhaps in the form of undeclared implementation of longstanding commitments on the so-called “unauthorized” settlements or an internationally-monitored commitment to halt immediately all construction activity in any areas to be transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction according to a negotiated agreement on borders, no matter how long implementation of that agreement would actually take.

Such ideas may prove to be sterile. After all, possibilities to square the circle are, in the nature of things, notoriously elusive. But one other useful element would be an Obama administration acknowledgment, even undeclared, of the need to avoid depositing any more circles on the road in the future.

This column is re-published with the permission of the Institute for National Security Studies.

Syria seeks US mediation in peace negotiations

The Pulse — Fri, 18 Dec 2009 10:22:12 -0500

After meeting with Syrian officials in Damascus, a European official relayed a message that Syria is ready to renew negotiations through a secret channel, leading to public negotiations with the United States as a mediator. According to the official, Syria wants to renew talks under the precondition that Israel will return the Golan Heights and retreat to the 1967 borders, and in return Syria will fully normalize relations with Israel. This falls short of former Israeli demands that Syria sever its ties to Iran.

Shimon Shiffer in Yedioth Ahronoth reports:

According to the messages conveyed to Jerusalem, the Syrians prefer the American mediation to the other possibilities that have recently arisen: the Turkish track or the French track. Syria is interested in improving its relations with the United States and extricating itself from its international isolation. The invitation to the Americans to serve as mediators is part of this effort.

The White House is currently treating the signals from Damascus with great skepticism, but a high-ranking political source says that in light of the impasse on the Palestinian front, the Americans do not rule out the possibility that they would back a renewal of talks between Israel and Syria.

Sources in Israel say that this time it may be serious. Until now, Syria has insisted on Turkish mediation, and the Netanyahu government refused on the grounds that the Turks are not currently honest brokers. Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has consented to American mediation, to which Israel also consents.

Israel Radio News also reports that Fred Hof met yesterday with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem to discuss ways of renewing the peace process.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in an interview to the Syrian media, said that Turkey would be willing to resume its role as mediator, but that it did not make sense if one of the sides was not interested in this. Israel Radio News reported that Erdogan said "it was not important who Netanyahu chooses to have as moderator, but rather what Syria would say."

This also comes in the midst of the first official meeting between Israel and Turkey since relations soured this past September. Israeli President Shimon Peres met with Turkish President Abdullah Gul today on the sidelines of the Copenhagen Climate Summit. According to Haaretz, the two countries have "agreed to resume positive and stable diplomatic relations."

Following Orders, But From Who?

Josh Smilovitz — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 16:40:27 -0500

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s removal last week of the West Bank Yeshiva Har Bracha from the Hesder Yeshiva Movement because of the statements and actions by its dean was meant to send a clear message: insubordination within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will not be tolerated. It is not clear whether Barak’s move will ultimately serve to stamp out – or fan – the recent flames of discord emanating from some religious soldiers and elements within the broader national-religious camp.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s removal of Har Bracha came after its spiritual leader and dean, Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, refused to meet with Barak to discuss Melamed’s public support for soldiers’ refusal to follow army orders. This abrogation of a Hesder by the Defense Ministry is a first for the decades-old Hesder movement, which enables soldiers to alternate between military service and religious learning. Aside from expulsion, the direct result of this sanction on the yeshiva will be a loss of funding from the Ministries of Defense and Education. Within the defense establishment, it did not come as much of a surprise that Melamed and his Hesder yeshiva was the first to be removed. In an article in the Israeli daily, Ma’ariv, a high ranking officer was quoted as saying:

“Since 2004, we have been hearing the most extreme calls for disobedience by Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, which have no connection to democracy in any way whatsoever. The IDF issued warnings, but nothing helped. A call went out to the Defense Minister at the time, but no firm decision was made on the matter and after five years, it seems that the time has come to make it clear that this is intolerable."

A statement issued by the Defense Ministry on Sunday read: "The actions and statements of Rabbi Melamed undermine the foundations of Israeli democracy, actions which incited some of his students to refuse orders, take part in demonstrations, and harm the spirit of the IDF, [actions] which have no place in a properly functioning country." The statement continued, "One must make an effort to keep the IDF out of a political dispute."

In response, Rabbi Melamed told Yedioth Ahronoth:

“All the charges that the defense minister attributes to the boys of our yeshiva and to me personally are blood libels that perhaps advance him politically, but which destroy the IDF, destroy our national cohesion and crumble the foundations of democracy in the country."

In an article on the pro-settler Arutz Sheva web site, Melamed wrote “that a soldier must disobey orders only when he is ordered to assist in expulsion; however, a soldier is not necessarily obligated to protest at an oath-taking ceremony in the IDF.” Referring explicitly to the swearing-in protest, Melamed said he “would have recommended that the soldiers not hold up protest signs during an oath-taking ceremony at the Western Wall.”

In recent months, disobedience among national-religious soldiers in the IDF has become more pointed and determined. In late October, at an official swearing-in ceremony at the Western Wall for an infantry unit stationed in the West Bank, a few soldiers held up signs pledging to disobey orders to evacuate Jewish settlers from the occupied territories. One month later, four soldiers from the same brigade displayed banners in opposition to the army’s demolition of illegally built structures near a West Bank settlement. While the soldiers in the incidents were sentenced to varying amounts of time in the brig, settler organizations rallied to their defense, awarding prizes and monies to the insubordinates and their families.

In the aftermath of President Obama’s push for a settlement freeze and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s implementation of a ten month partial freeze, there has been much fury within the settler and national-religious camps. The settler movement has staged protests and attacked police officers and settlement inspectors. A mosque was torched in the West Bank village of Yasuf, allegedly at the hands of settlers. Within this broader milieu, the Barak-Melamed affair is an integral component. As Ofer Shelach writes in Ma’ariv:

Melamed's provocation could ignite the confrontation that the security establishment fears so badly, and until yesterday, yielded to the rabbis time after time: A direct collision not only with some of the Hesder yeshivas, but with the national-religious camp in its entirety, the same camp from which such a large share of the officers in the infantry brigades comes.

Indeed, while IDF personnel numbers are notoriously hard to verify, there are clear signs that combat units are becoming more dependent on Hesder manpower. Matthew Wagner of the Jerusalem Post notes that religious soldiers’ graduation rates from officer training school range from 30% to 50%. In an August Yedioth Ahronoth article commenting on the induction of 500 Hesder graduates into the army, it noted that more than 80% will go into combat units. The reliance on Hesder graduates in combat units creates a serious predicament for the IDF, and the Hesders know it, which is why some are considering the pursuit of a two year strategy consisting of inactivity. As Israel Radio reports, “they intend to cause a two-year stoppage of Hesder yeshiva activity in order to show the IDF, as they put it, that it has more to lose by removing yeshivas from the Hesder program.” Rising out of this potential is the question of whether former and future Hesder graduates would purposefully weaken the IDF. And, if this transpired wouldn’t the IDF look in a new direction for comparable manpower resources?

As a direct result of Har Bracha’s expulsion, many Hesder deans rallied to Rabbi Melamed’s defense. Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, dean of the Hesder in the Kiryat Arba settlement said “today we are all Har Bracha.” A petition to the army signed by more than 60 former combat officers and soldiers – all Hesder graduates – was delivered earlier this week, stating:

At these yeshivas, we absorbed the spirit of combat, sacrifice and giving. If the decision-makers push Hesder yeshivas out of the Hesder movement, this means that the IDF is rejecting us from our service as combat soldiers, and is forcing us to be ejected from its ranks. If the threat should be carried out, we regret that we will not be able to see ourselves in the ranks of the army that has rejected us.

Earlier today, a group of Hesder yeshiva rabbis expressed its support for Melamed and distaste for Barak. Rabbi Benzion Algazi of the Kerem B'Yavneh Yeshiva, said "Now, after the act, Rabbi Melamed represents the whole world of Hesder yeshivas."

However, not all Hesder graduates, rabbis and members of the national-religious camp share Melamed’s radical views. On Wednesday, the chair of the committee of Hesder deans met with Barak and tried to reach a compromise. Coming out of this meeting he expressed frustration and hope. Quoted in Ma’ariv by Ben Caspit, Rabbi Haim Druckman said “The majority of Hesder yeshiva directors oppose disobedience and support service in the IDF.” But, the Rabbi went on to say Barak was playing with fire and empowering Melamed since he is “the only 'real man' to have taught Barak a lesson, and he has simply been made into a celebrated leader.” Other Hesder deans are also pushing Melamed to back down. Additional pressure is coming from a group of Hesder graduates and former combat soldiers who, according to Israel Radio, unambiguously asked Melamed “to adopt the position of the Hesder yeshiva directors who are opposed to political demonstrations and to holding signs in the IDF.” And, Melamed is wavering. In his weekly column in a religious newspaper, Melamed said he is considering signing a statement saying that soldiers who demonstrate in uniform are wrong.

Looking at Melamed’s positioning within the national-religious movement, in Yedioth Ahronoth Alex Fishman points out that Barak’s move is likely to weaken Melamed’s yeshiva, and other Hesders are unlikely to cross Barak as a result.

A Hesder yeshiva like the one led by Rabbi Melamed will dry up without the army’s financial support. It’s also possible that the rabbi will now draw delusional characters from isolated communities and from the hills, turning into a yeshiva supported by donations.
Other rabbis who will condemn the Defense Minister’s decision do not want to face such a situation themselves. Hence, we can assume that their protest will not cross the same red lines as Rabbi Melamed did. Meanwhile, the students of Hesder yeshiva rabbis who serve in the army now understand that not everything is permitted, and that they won’t be forgiven for everything.

Increasing politicization of IDF service could have drastic implications. As Yair Sheleg in Haaretz writes:

Even people who believe that removing settlements is totally wrong must take into account that widespread refusal by soldiers to do so would soon lead to a refusal by leftist soldiers to serve in the territories or guard settlements there. Dividing the army into those who obey right-wing orders and those who obey left-wing orders is a sure recipe for disaster for both the army and Israeli society. In terms of Jewish law, preventing such a situation could be defined as saving the life of the nation, and we all know that saving even an individual life permits one to disobey almost all of the Torah's prohibitions.

On Monday, under pressure from some of his coalition partners to support Melamed’s Hesder against Defense Minister Barak, Netanyahu instead issued a strong statement saying “he had no intention of intervening in Barak's decision to remove the Har Bracha Yeshiva from its Hesder arrangement with the Israel Defense Forces.” To a certain extent, Netanyahu has the public backing in this regard. In a Shvakim Panorama poll conducted for Israel Radio's Hakol Diburim program, when asked, “do you support the decision to remove the Har Bracha Yeshiva headed by Rabbi Eliezer Melamed from the existing arrangement between the IDF and the Hesder yeshivot,” 43.5% responded yes, 31.6% responded no and 24.9% said they don’t know or did not reply.

This Sunday, all of the deans of the Hesder yeshivas are gathering to meet and discuss their coordinated response and future steps. This meeting will be a breaking point, and Ben Caspit in Ma’ariv remarks that “if matters do not change by then, the call to escalate the battle is expected to be renewed.”

Netanyahu has a lot of tough decisions to make—supporting Barak in this case is not one of them. As he remarked in November in the wake of the banner protests: “The IDF was established on the basis of hierarchy in the ranks…If you want to get rid of the IDF, then support refusal - it will bring about the collapse of the state.”

David Halperin contributed to this article.

For more context on the national-religious and the settler movement and their relationship within Israeli society and vis-à-vis the IDF, please listen to the latest IPF conference call which occurred on Thursday, December 16, moderated by Professor Steven L. Spiegel with Dr. Shlomo Fischer of Hebrew University, the Founding Director of Yesodot - The Center for Torah and Democracy.

Olmert peace plan made public

The Pulse — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 10:33:46 -0500

Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed swapping land with the Palestinians for major settlement blocs in the West Bank as part of his peace plan, as detailed in a map released to Haaretz. Olmert's plan, which was presented to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in September 2008, would have involved the transfer of 327 square kilometers of land within the Green Line to the Palestinians, while annexing 6.3 per cent of the West Bank to Israel. Olmert proposed a safe passage route from Hebron to the Gaza Strip through land that would remain Israeli sovereign territory but would not have any Israeli presense.

Currently, Olmert suggests that his plan provide the basis for a resumption of talks, even though his office has said that "Giving Abu Mazen the map [in September 2008] was conditioned upon signing a comprehensive and final agreement with the Palestinians so it would not be used as an 'opening position' in future negotiations the Palestinians sought to conduct. Ultimately, when Abu Mazen did not give his consent to a final and complete agreement, the map was not given to him."

Haaretz details Olmert's plan here.

Dr. Shlomo Fischer: Who are the settlers & what do they want?

The Pulse — Wed, 16 Dec 2009 13:49:31 -0500

Earlier today, Dr. Steven L. Spiegel interviewed Dr. Shlomo Fischer on the highly contentious issue of settlements in the West Bank and the various components of the settler movement.

Listen to their discussion here.

Dr. Fischer is the Founding Director of Yesodot - The Center for Torah and Democracy. He teaches in the School of Education at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and has worked in the field of education for 25 years. As Founding Director of Yesodot, Dr. Fischer has focused on religion, democracy and tolerance as he works to advance education for democracy in the State Religious school sector in Israel. He has been a fellow at Tel Aviv University and the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. His research interests include the nexus of religion, politics and class in Israel, contemporary religion and Jewish historical sociology. He has authored many publications, several of which deal with the challenges facing religious Zionism today.

An Israeli View: Dealing with Mr. Yes and No

Yossi Alpher — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 09:44:05 -0500

Back in the days of Binyamin Netanyahu's first term as prime minister, more than ten years ago, he was satirized as Mr. Yes and No. For every "yes" he delivered to US President Bill Clinton or PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, there was also a "no" or, if you like, a "yes" to the settlers and other opponents of the peace process. That appears to be where we are today, once again.

The ten-month settlement freeze was a "yes", primarily to President Barack Obama, and a dramatic "no" to the settlers. For a change, a genuine attempt is apparently being made to enforce this prohibition, too. But the "no" to a peace process--indeed, to the very concept of a two-state solution--was quick to come, in the form of Netanyahu's proposal to award "area A" development status, with its concomitant financial benefits, to outlying and provocatively-located settlements like Yitzhar and Tapuach.

Thus does Mr. Yes and No seek to placate the parties who are pressuring him. Obama and the international community want peace gestures; so does Defense Minister Ehud Barak and the rag-tag remnants of his Labor party. Hence the freeze. The settlers want to continue expanding, if possible with government support. Hence the development money. Interestingly, Netanyahu does not appear to perceive significant pressure on the part of the PLO, the Palestinian Authority and the Arab world in general, hence he can afford for now to keep his zigzag two-dimensional.

Which pressures are likely to prevail? The settlers' strategy is much easier to figure out than Obama's. The American president appears to be increasingly preoccupied with Afghanistan and disillusioned with the Arab-Israel peace process and with the vagaries of both Palestinian and Israeli politics. How much more effective pressure he can direct toward Netanyahu or PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas is questionable.

The settlers, on the other hand, are responding to the construction freeze with their usual energy, faith-based dynamism and organizational capability. They appear to have developed a combination of two integrated strategic concepts.

First is preemption and prevention: the settlers fear that the freeze--which, after all, is only for ten months and does not affect 3,000 current construction projects, construction in East Jerusalem or public buildings--is really the beginning of the end for the West Bank settlement enterprise. They regret not having fought harder against the Gaza pullout in 2005. They see a dangerous pattern here. They are determined to render the freeze unenforceable so there can be no follow-up.

Second is defense and intimidation. The settlers are witness to a right-wing government caving in to American peace pressures and turning against them. They want to set it back on the course they originally prescribed for it: enabling them to expand their grip on the West Bank.

The most dangerous provocation against the freeze carried out thus far by settlers is setting fire to a mosque in a village near Nablus. While the Netanyahu government has condemned this act and will hunt down the perpetrators, it does not seem to understand that under current circumstances, every financial concession it makes to the settlers, every compromise it offers an extremist West Bank rabbi calling upon IDF soldiers to mutiny, merely encourages such acts of extremism.

Here the government really is playing with fire. A violent Palestinian response to the mosque-burning could begin to unravel all the security, economic and institution-building progress registered over recent months by the Salam Fayyad government, thereby negating the very purpose of the settlement construction freeze.

We have already noted the relative absence of Arab, especially Palestinian, pressures as apparently perceived by Netanyahu. The most effective and constructive pressure that Abbas could possibly exercise right now is to acknowledge the settlement freeze, problematic and inadequate as it is, as the response he needed in order to enter into immediate and accelerated peace negotiations. He would have the backing of the Obama administration and most of the Israeli public. He would really put Mr. Yes and No on the spot.

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org

A Palestinian View: The ball is now with the international community

Ghassan Khatib — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 09:26:04 -0500

Binyamin Netanyahu's announcement in late November that his government would implement a settlement freeze was not taken seriously by Palestinians, Arabs or other interested and involved parties.

Palestinians warned that the announcement amounted to no more than a public relations gimmick aimed at reducing growing international criticism of Israel's settlement expansion policies. Palestinian officials made clear that the Israeli "freeze" did not signal any change to Israeli settlement expansion, which is responsible for preventing the resumption of negotiations.

It should be obvious why. The "freeze" excludes occupied East Jerusalem and environs, a total of 22 percent of the West Bank and the focus of most settlement activity anyway. It also excludes some 3,000 housing units already approved and construction projects for public buildings--anything from synagogues to kindergartens. Indeed, Israeli settlement watchers and analysts are on record as saying that this "freeze" will in fact allow Israel to maintain the same level of annual settlement expansion as over the last four years.

Nevertheless, the Israeli government didn't stop there. As Israeli settlers took to the streets and prevented government officials from serving the freeze orders--while stepping up their attacks on Palestinians and their property, including an arson attack on a West Bank mosque--the Israeli government decided that it would try to appease settlers some more. With its new "national priority map", Israel is now offering even greater economic incentives and subsidies to settlers. This clearly underlines that settlements are a priority over peace to this Israeli government. It also explains why population growth in settlements is higher than in Israel.

On the Palestinian side there is a consistent and firm insistence that settlement expansion is incompatible with the peace process. Both President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are clear that constructive negotiations will only take place if there is a complete freeze on settlement construction as well as clear terms of reference for the talks.

It is the position of the international community that can make a difference here. Clear messages need to be sent to Israel. At this point, with the settlement issue a focus of debate in Israel, international prodding can be extremely helpful. The December 8 European Union statement is an important example. The EU made very clear that it "would not recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders, including with regards to Jerusalem" and that "settlements [and] the separation barrier, built on occupied land, the demolition of homes and evictions, are illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible."

Another example came from Britain, where authorities are now expecting products from Israel to be clearly labeled to indicate when some originate in settlements. While this stops short of outlawing such products, it nevertheless indicates their illegality and constitutes a kind of economic sanction.

Such statements and actions can make a difference to Israel and in Israel. Israeli public opinion, which perceives itself as part of the western world, understands the level of Israeli dependence on western support, whether for its military or economic superiority and is usually sensitive to serious messages from the West. And while Europe is not exactly the United States, Israelis may realize that Europe would not have come up with its statement--which would require consensus from every one of the EU's 27 member states--if the US administration had wanted to prevent it. The same can also be concluded from the relatively mute reaction in Washington to the EU statement.

For now, the near future will witness an increase in settler violence against Palestinians and the continued failure of Israel to comply with its obligations under the roadmap, particularly vis-a-vis settlements, at a time when the Palestinian side is showing an impressive commitment to fulfilling its obligations. This is the situation that anyone trying to help end the conflict and maintain stability in the region will have to grapple with.

This column is re-printed with the permission of bitterlemons.org

Conference Call Wednesday: Who are the settlers & what do they want?

The Pulse — Mon, 14 Dec 2009 14:53:24 -0500

Since Prime Minister Netanyahu declared a 10 month freeze on settlement building in the West Bank, outrage has been voiced by the various sides of the debate, with the settlement movement staging a protest with thousands of rioters last week near the Prime Minister's residence, and supporters of a two-state solution claiming that Netanyahu's freeze does not go nearly far enough in advancing the negotiations process. To add to the chaos of the settlement situation, Israeli news is centering on the struggle with Hesder Yeshivas, as several rabbis have ordered their students to disobey army orders to evacuate outposts and enforce a freeze in building, and a group of radical Israeli settlers are being blamed for setting fire to a mosque in the West Bank village of Yasuf as part of the "price tag" for Netanyahu's decision. The Israeli government also approved a plan yesterday that would classify several West Bank settlements as "National Priority Zones", meaning that they would receive millions of shekels from the government to encourage growth.

Professor Steven L. Spiegel will be moderating a conference call on this highly relevant and divisive topic with Dr. Shlomo Fischer on Wednesday, December 16th at 11:30am ET. If you'd like to listen to their conversation, please email Rachel Cooper at rcooper@ipforum.org with a phone number where you can be reached at the time of the call.

The Jordanian Predicament

Shaul Arieli — Mon, 14 Dec 2009 09:31:51 -0500

At the end of the War of Independence – the outcome of the Arab rejection of the Partition Plan – 600,000 Palestinians became refugees in Arab states, especially Jordan. Until 1988, the Palestinians were not included in the global agenda and negotiations on the future of the West Bank were carried out directly between Israel and Jordan. Many Israeli political leaders at the time regarded Jordan as the Palestinian homeland, and cited the growing Palestinian population there as validation of this view.

Following the Six Day War, an additional 250,000 Palestinians from the West Bank also relocated to Jordan, and the depleted Jordan Valley, according to the “Alon Plan,” was viewed as part of the security zone against the “Eastern Front.” Jordan’s detachment in 1988 from the West Bank did not affect the “Open Bridges” policy and the gates were opened even wider with the signing of the 1994 Peace Agreement with Israel. Since then, however, the Hashemite family has avoided challenging the leading role of the PLO in negotiations with Israel on the future of the West Bank, and reiterated that it is in Jordan’s interest that an independent state be established in the territories.

Even though Israel has stopped making public statements in support of a Palestinian homeland in Jordan, the facts on the ground have not changed. Since the year 2000, 250,000 Palestinians have emigrated from the West Bank to Jordan, contrary to the trend perceived after the Oslo agreements, where tens of thousands of Palestinian visitors flowed to the West Bank from Jordan and outstayed their permits. In response, the Jordanians have recently decided to refuse or postpone granting Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians seeking family reunification, in order to reduce the number of registered refugees in Jordan, thus hoping to encourage their return to the West Bank once a permanent settlement is reached.

Jordan fears that in addition to existing pressures resulting from tribal conflicts, there is a potential stream of refugees from Iraq when the Americans pull out, a huge foreign aid debt and the critical shortage of water. It also might face a heavy flood of Palestinian refugees if the PA collapses or in the wake of an escalating security situation, such as another “Cast Lead” operation. Furthermore, the Jordanians are fearful that Israel might opt to withdraw to the security fence border if it proves disadvantageous to continue to hold onto the West Bank, in which case the subsequent chaos will only increase immigration eastwards.

As a result, we are now seeing intensive activity on the part of the Jordanian kingdom to promote the establishment of a Palestinian state, such as the greetings that the king sent to the J-Street conference urging Israel to accept a peace agreement that would include no further demands, or the suggestion to transfer responsibility for the Palestinian issue to the Security Council. Jordan even voiced support for the unilateral Palestinian declaration that it would establish a state with temporary borders.

Israeli supporters of the “optimistic scenario” of the “alternative homeland” completely disregard its great risk to Israel. The chances that Hashemite control will be lost to a Palestinian majority are slim, and this could only happen if the West were to completely withdraw their support. The more likely development is that as a result of increasing internal pressures, it will have to form a secular, Islamic Jordanian-Palestinian national coalition, which will pressure it to gradually distance itself from Israel until all manifestations of peace disappear. In addition, the king will be coerced to court Hamas openly, which has been done in secret until now, far from the eyes of the media. This is considered critical by Jordanian political and security leaders in order to prevent tension and conflict as Hamas continues to gain strength because of the stalemate in the peace process. This coalition might also push Jordan towards Turkey and Iran, and Israel will find itself facing a new regional alignment that no longer has a pro-West orientation.

Rep. Wexler sends letter of optimism for Middle East peace to Congress

The Pulse — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 14:45:26 -0500

Steve Clemons at the Washington Note reports today that Rep. Robert Wexler, who will be leaving Congress soon to head the Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation, sent a letter to other members of Congress noting increasing support among Israelis toward President Obama, and stressing the need for Obama to address Israelis directly with a clear proposal to move the peace process forward. The basis for his letter rests on the results of a survey published by the New America Foundation which shows a much higher favorability rating for Obama than generally thought.

As his letter states:

After reviewing the New America Foundation's national survey of 1,000 Israelis it is clear that there is greater support among the Israeli public for President Obama and American efforts to move the Israeli-Palestinian peace process forward than previously reported. These poll numbers suggest the Israeli public is willing to move the peace process forward with its ally, the United States, and under the right circumstances. It also suggests that President Obama has a unique window of opportunity to directly engage the Israeli public to pursue a course of peace in cooperation with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.

The poll, which was released yesterday, shows that Obama has a 41% favorability rating, much higher than the 4% which has been touted previously. As Wexler noted in his letter to Congress, with Obama's unfavorability rating of 37%, this is only slightly higher than unfavorable attitudes toward Bush, who is generally seen as very popular among Israelis.

Wexler continues in his letter to stress the important role of the United States in pursuing a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict:

Additionally, the poll reports that by a 65% to 31% percent margin, Israelis believe that the United States is the only powerful country that Israel can count on in the world today. Further, they do not believe Israel will be able to build alliances with other powers if relations with the U.S. ever deteriorate. According to the poll, if President Obama were to put forward a peace plan based on the previous Taba talks, such a plan would receive the support of a majority of Israelis if Prime Minister Netanyahu is on board (53% to 45%), while the public is evenly split (48%) if Prime Minister Netanyahu rejects the plan.

This poll is a helpful reminder that the unbreakable bond shared by Americans and Israelis remains strong and that only through greater cooperation can we ensure peace, prosperity and security in the Middle East.

Let the Desert Bloom: Gazan Flower Exports to Europe

The Pulse — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 11:07:54 -0500

In an exceptional lifting of the blockade on Gaza, Israel is allowing Gazan flower farmers to export their product to Europe through the end of May when the growing season concludes. Since 2006-2007 Israel has prevented the vast majority of flower exports. Flowers are an important part of the Gazan economy. As Erin Cunningham in the Christian Science monitor reports:

Gaza was one of Europe’s main flower suppliers before Israel halted commercial and agricultural exports from the territory. Gaza’s last shipment of flowers was a truckload of 25,000 stems symbolically allowed out for Valentine’s Day earlier this year.
Yusuf Shaath, the cash crops project manager for the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), a local development organization that works closely with farmers, says the sector expects to earn $6.3 million with this year’s harvest, after a near-total collapse over the past two years.

Over the past few years, since the flowers could not be exported, many were fed to livestock in Gaza.