Gaza Q& A with Aluf Benn, Haaretz Diplomatic Editor

On Monday, February 4, Israel Policy Forum held a conference call with Aluf Benn. His remarks follow below:

How did Israelis view the breach of the Gaza-Egypt border?

Initially, the Israeli reaction to the breakout was, "let's wait and see and then we'll tell the Egyptians that Gaza is their responsibility."  After the first few days, Israeli officials started saying, "that's what we wanted all along. We wanted to disconnect ourselves from Gaza. Let the Egyptians care for Gaza's welfare."

The Egyptians obviously don't like their renewed responsibility for Gaza. They are trying to seal the border, but, in the meantime, Israel is complaining that all the weapons that had been smuggled underground are now being smuggled above ground. And then there's the issue of terrorists coming in through the Sinai.  This new dynamic could lead Israel to fence the border with Egypt for the first time since the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

How will the situation in Gaza be addressed now?

The idea to fence the Israel-Egypt border has been circulating for several years. In one of his final trips before his collapse, former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon went to the Egyptian border to view the situation there. At that time, the problem was not so much terrorists crossing the border, but the trafficking of women, drugs, and weapons. Sharon said then that we should build a fence, but nothing was built. Now the government will move forward on this project.

The decision to seal the Gaza border should not be underestimated. Historically, Egypt has been a very quiet border that was guarded very loosely by a small border police and military force. By fencing it, Israel is basically saying, "we cannot defend ourselves if we're not physically separated from our neighbors." This is not a good sign for peace and integration in the region.

How can the Egypt-Israel border be guarded with Hamas in control of Gaza?

Following the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice negotiated the Access and Movement Agreement that dictated that the border between Gaza and Egypt be guarded by a combination of a stronger Egyptian force on the Egypt side and Palestinian Authority (PA) forces, with European monitors and Israeli surveillance cameras, on the Gaza side. This system never really worked. Israel often closed the Rafah border crossing, the PA forces left at the time of the Hamas quo against Fatah, and the European monitors moved to a hotel inside Israel where they remain.

Now, after the Hamas led breakout across their border, the Egyptians are trying to rebuild some sort of agreement over the crossing. One idea is to bring the PA forces back and allow for some sort of coordination between the PA and Hamas. The problem here is that any PA-Hamas agreement would threaten Israel's talks with Abu Mazen, because Israel does not want Abu Mazen to work with Hamas. The European Union's foreign policy chief Javier Solana recently raised another idea to create a joint PA-Egyptian mechanism that is monitored by Europeans to guard the border. While all of these ideas are "trial balloons," some arrangement-either with Hamas-PA or European-PA coordination-will have to be found.

How is the Gaza crisis affecting the current situation in the West Bank and the possibility of a unified Palestinian state?

The situation in Gaza will determine the future of the West Bank. The Israeli view that the disengagement from Gaza led Hamas to gain power and to turn Gaza into a rocket-launching pad has caused similar fears regarding the West Bank. While the suicide bombing in Dimona on Monday was the first suicide bombing in over a year, Israelis have been living with rockets launched from Gaza for six years. A scenario in which the West Bank is turned into a similar launching pad, with not only the city of Sderot in its range but also Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and the Ben-Gurion airport, terrifies Israelis. Therefore, as long as there is no credible force to stop the rockets or better technology to intercept them, I don't expect any major withdrawal from the West Bank.

Politically, Hamas' influence in the West Bank threatens the survival of the PA there. The ongoing negotiations and meetings between Olmert and Abu Mazen-regardless of their outcome-are meant in part to keep the PA alive as an institution, even if it is with limited authority and power. Without negotiations, the PA may disappear altogether.   However, even if Olmert and Abu Mazen reach a peace agreement in principle that settles contentious issues, as long as there is no quiet in Gaza, I don't foresee Israel waving its demand for external control over the West Bank. This limits the possibility of a fully independent Palestinian state.

What are Israelis saying about negotiating directly with Hamas?

There is no serious debate within Israel about talks with Hamas. That may be surprising, but I think the main reason for this is that the Israeli left wing is too married to Fatah and Abu Mazen to turn their backs and say, "let's talk to Hamas." Furthermore, the idea of holding simultaneous talks with Hamas on a ceasefire and with Abu Mazen on political issues-an idea Abu Mazen opposes himself-has never gained ground in Israel. The only issue Israelis are willing to talk to Hamas about is the return of Israeli captive Gilad Shalit. That matter, however, is seen as a humanitarian prisoner exchange matter and not a political issue. So far, the only people seriously discussing talks with Hamas are people outside of Israel. We're not there yet.

In order for Israel to eventually talk to Hamas about a long-term cease-fire, Hamas needs to start acting more like Hezbollah. Hezbollah has more and longer-range rockets than Hamas, but Nasrallah doesn't use them because he respects the cease-fire. While Israel does not like Hezbollah's massing of weapons, there is a stable deterrent balance across the Lebanese border. 

In Gaza, the situation is different. Not only does Hamas not take responsibility for its acts against Israel, it does not police other terrorist groups the way that Hezbollah polices Palestinian groups in Lebanon, for example. As long as it doesn't take full responsibility for the area it controls, there's no use in talking to Hamas.

How would you advise the next U.S. President to deal with this issue assuming it was as it is today?

The next U.S. president may be more open to including Hamas in some way into the negotiating process than President Bush. It is not clear, however, whether this would make Hamas more willing to change its behavior and recognize Israel. After all, Hamas could have spared the boycott of the past two years had it said, even ambiguously, that under certain conditions it would consider recognizing the existence of Israel. The day after such an announcement, all the European foreign ministers would flock to Gaza. That announcement never happened.

Eventually, there will have to be some sort of arrangement on Gaza between Israel, the PA, Hamas, and Egypt. But, if I were advising the next president, I'm not sure that the first thing I would tell them to do was to take on the Gaza issue first. I think there are better opportunities for making progress than to risk already scarce U.S. credibility and prestige on Gaza.